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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Esau sold his birthright to Jacob for a hot lunch, he 
probably had no notion of Jacob's designs on his inheritance. 1 The 
hidden agenda behind Jacob's enticement of his older and slower­
witted brother became excruciatingly clear to Esau when he ar­
rived at his father's deathbed shortly after Jacob. There Esau dis­
covered that his father Isaac had been deceived into willing all of 
the family flock and the rights under the Covenant between Ab­
raham and Yaveh exclusively to his brother Jacob. 2 
At the time of this incident, Isaac was blind and probably 
senile. Jacob utilized a combination of palpable fraud and excessive 
favoritism to receive the bounty of his father. Once the deception 
had been played out, the winner and the victim entered a twenty 
year power struggle. 3 The hatred, treachery, and malice shown in 
1. And Esau said to Jacob, Feed me, I pray thee, with that same red pot­

tage, for I am faint: therefore was his name called Edom. 

And Jacob said, Sell me this day thy birthright. 

And Esau said, Behold, I am at the point to die: and what profit shall this 

birthright do to me? 

And Jacob said, Sware to me this day; and he sware unto him: and he sold 

his birthright unto Jacob. 

Then Jacob gave Esau bread and pottage of lentils; and he did eat and drink 

and rose up, and went his way: thus Esau despised his birthright. 

Genesis 25:30-34 (King James). 
2. Genesis 27:6-38 (King James). Understandably, Esau vowed to murder his 
brother and recover his place as head of the extended family group. Jacob promptly 
fled the jurisdiction to avoid an armed confrontation with his brother. Id. at 27:44, 
28:6-7. 
3. Genesis 27:41-45 (King James). The first recorded will contest was settled 
by a compromise. Jacob was permitted to retain the sacred convenant and Esau was 
assuaged by a gift of livestock and free passage to the land of Edom. Id. at 32:2-13, 
33: 1-20. Esau, of course, came out with an armed band to attack Jacob's retinue. Jacob 
sent an advance to Esau, promising him 200 she-goats, 20 he-goats, and assorted 
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this biblical will contest illustrates the trauma which occurs in any 
family involved in a will contest. 
Modern will contests are no different in kind than that be­
tween Esau and Jacob. The damaging effect such crises have upon 
the people involved, as well as upon the assets of the decedent's 
estate, cannot be fully understood by empirical analysis. What em­
pirical analysis can show, of course, is the way in which the 
Anglo-American legal system has attempted to deal with the Esau­
Jacob problem via its legal rules concerning the making and en­
forcement of wills, and its rules for the disallowance of certain 
kinds of wills. 
The primary American notion which governs the jurisprudence 
of willmaking is the notion of "testamentary freedom." This notion, 
which will be analyzed in the course of this article, allows a person 
to make or to refrain from making a post-death transfer of his prop­
erty to anyone he pleases, with the exception of a surviving spouse 
who has a crude form of forced interest in the assets of the testator 
under the laws of all fifty states. 
This freedom to transfer assets at death is limited by the coun­
tervailing notions of testamentary capacity and undue influence. 
The principle of testamentary capacity holds that a person is con­
sidered legally competent to make a will if that person knows the 
nahrre and extent of his property, the natural objects of his bounty, 
and is able to put the two notions together to form a rational plan 
for disposition of his property. The principle of undue influence 
holds that one who acquires property in a post-death transfer by 
exercising undue influence over the testator will not be permitted 
to enjoy the fruits of his deception. This article will examine the 
notions of testamentary freedom and testamentary capacity. The 
objects of this article include: 
(1) An historical survey of the development of the legal princi­
ples underlying the test for testamentary capacity; 
(2) a comparison between these historically derived principles 
and current psychological and psychiatric understanding of human 
behavior relating to property values; 
(3) a review of the mechanics of attacking testamentary capacity 
to illustrate how historically derived principles of burden of proof, 
presumption, and evidentiary law have been substituted for an-
sheep, cattle, and horseflesh as a pledge of his brotherly love. Esau accepted the 
gift and called ofT the war. 
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alysis of the concrete problems associated with testamentary 
capacity; 
(4) an empirical survey of appellate will contest decisions to 
determine what types of disposition patterns and what types of 
testators are most often involved in will contests, and the probable 
results of such contests at the appellate level; and 
(5) a modest proposal for placing a direct limitation on testa­
mentary freedom and deriving an alternative test for testamentary 
capacity. 
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 

OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 

Prior to the Reformation, the making and enforcement of wills 
was a task consigned by the English legal system to the clergy. 
Land could not be devised. Wills related only to the testator's 
movable property, and were written and enforced by the clergy 
through the ecclesiastical legal system. 4 The legal principles gov­
erning the making of wills were derived from the Roman law. In 
England, canon law recognized five classes of persons who were 
considered unable to make a will: (1) those lacking the power to 
make wills, such as a son, a slave, or a monk;5 (2) those who were 
mentally defective, such as the mentally retarded, madmen, or 
prodigals;6 (3) those whose senses were defective, the blind, deaf, 
or dumb;7 (4) those who were criminals;8 and (5) those whose legal 
status was doubtful. 9 
Willmaking was associated with administration of the final sac­
raments. The priest who administered the last rites to the testator, 
generally the only literate person available, took down the last 
wishes of the dying man with respect to the distribution of his 
livestock and other movable goods. to Since the testator usually 
could not sign his name, he made his mark on the testament, with 
the priest as official witness. The local priest offered the will to the 
diocesan courts as evidence of the dying man's last wishes. The 
willmaking, at that time a matter between the dying penitent and 
4. For a good summary of this system, see III W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAw (5th ed. 1942). 
5. ld. at 541 ("propter defectum suae potestatis"). 
6. ld. ("propter defectum mentis"). 
7. ld. ("propter defectum sensualitatis"). 
8. ld. ("ratione poenalitatis"). 
9. ld. ("ratione dubietatis"). 
10. ld. at 514. 
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his priest, was not witnessed by anyone other than the scrivener. 
The testament of the dying freeman was enforceable in ecclesiasti­
cal courts, at least in some instances, by excommunication from the 
church.ll Pre-reformation commentators such as Lyndwood recog­
nized and applied the five classes of disabilities to English testa­
ments of personal property.12 
The Reformation meant the abolition of the ecclesiastical 
courts as a separate court that could appeal to a law higher than 
the monarchy. In one of the many trade-offs used by Henry VIn to 
consolidate his position as absolute monarch, he accepted the prin­
ciple of willing land as well as personal property. This was incorpo­
rated into the original Statute of Wills of 1534. 13 The statute pre­
scribed: 
That all and singular person and persons having a sole estate or 
interest in fee simple ... shall have full and free liberty, power 
and authority to give, dispose, will or devise to any person or 
persons, ... by his last will and testament in writing. 
* * * 
[W]ills or testaments made of any man or ... by any idiot, or 
by any person of non-sane memory shall not be taken to be good 
or effectual in law. 14 
The Statute of Wills raised the question whether the ecclesiastical 
law relating to defects or incapacity to make a will had been 
changed. If not, it was an Anglicized version of the Latin "defec­
tum mentis" which excluded impubus, madmen, and prodigals 
from the ecclesiastical privilege of making a will. 15 
A. 	 Definition of Testamentary Capacity at Common Law 
The early English cases defining who was "an idiot" or "a per­
son of non-sane memory" were the dialectical prelude to modern 
legal rationalizations for testamentary capacity. In the first leading 
11. 	 Id. at 73-87. 
12. 	 Id. at 543. 
13. 	 34 & 35 Hen. 7, c. 5 (1534). 
14. 	 Id. (emphasis added). 
15. Substantially the same notion was transmitted by the Wills Act of 1837. See 
1 T. JARMAN, A TREATISE ON WILLS 66 (5th American ed. 1881). The original dis­
abilities stated in Ecclesiastical commentary were not repealed by the Wills Act. See 
III W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 541. 
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case following the Statute of Wills, Pawlet Marquess of Winches­
ter's Case, 16 the testator died leaving a will which gave most of his 
property to his bastards. The legitimate son of the Marquess sued 
out a prerogative writ of prohibition to restrain the Ecclesiastical 
Court from probating the Marquess' will on the ground that the 
testator was not of sane and disposing memory when he made his 
will. Attorney General Coke pled that the common law courts ought 
to decide whether the testator was of sane and disposing memory 
at the time the will was made. The Court of King's Bench naturally 
agreed with this contention. As an aside, Coke suggested a test for 
determining when a willmaker was of "sane and disposing mem­
ory " 
[F}or by law it is not sufficient that the testator be of memory 
when he makes his will, to answer familiar and usual questions, 
but he ought to have a disposing memory so that he is able to 
make a disposition of his lands with understanding and reason; 
and that is such a memory which the law calls. sane and perfect 
memory. 17 
This formulation, considering the status of scientific understanding 
,of human thought in 1601, stressed the willmaker's ability to for­
mulate a rational project, that is, a series of coordinated deductive 
and inductive propositions about the giving of his property to those 
persons whom he wanted to include in his post-death plan. The 
formulation, however, really adds very little to the ecclesiastical 
notion that madmen and idiots could not make wills. IS 
At this time, English wealth was principally held by the 
landed aristocracy. Land was considered to be family property 
rather than individual property. Five hundred years of official dis­
couragement of alienation of family lands was still firmly embedded 
in legal minds, although a comprehensive system of land reform 
instituted by Henry VIII had changed the basis of wealth distribu­
tion and ownership to favor free alienation of realty. 
The development of the test for testamentary capacity is 
closely tied to the evolution of English political theory. At the time 
of the Marquess of Winchester's Case at the end of the reign of 
16. 77 Eng. Rep. 287 (K.B. 1601). 
17. [d. at 287-88 (emphasis added). 
18. See, e.g., III W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 542-43. Holdsworth claims 
that the Roman canonical law of incapacity was supplanted by common law notions 
fonned around ecclesiastical law. I W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 4, at 626-29. 
436 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:429 
Elizabeth I, England's jurisprudence was emerging from its medi­
eval period. According to medieval thought, the lawmaking power 
of the crown and the legislature was limited by a series of universal 
decision making principles of right and wrong, innately known, 
called the natural law. 19 These immediate, non-rational principles 
of decisionmaking were implemented by positive law, which con­
sisted of two branches; the law of nations or ius gentium,20 and the 
law promulgated by the political states. 
The medieval view of political society was organic; the notion 
of the state was a later addition to political thought. 21 Political 
societies arose because it was in the nature of things that men must 
19. The medieval notion of "natural law" differs from modem post-Enlighten­
ment use of the term such that in this context, it needs some explanation. The 
medieval notion of natural law was rooted in an Aristotelian conception of the activ­
ity of the human intelligence. First, according to Aristotle, knowledge of the objects 
of possible action preceded choice. Accordingly, in order to make a choice between a 
course of action which benefited the actor and a course of action which did not, the 
human intellect, acting in its practical or judgment-making activity, had to make a 
judgment with respect to the course of action. If the practical intellect judged that 
the proposed course of action was "good," then the actor's will moved the actor to do 
the act. If the intellect said its judgment was that the action was "bad," the will did 
not move the actor to act. That is what the medieval thinker understood by the no­
tion of the natural law. See J. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE 84-107 (1951). 
20. Ius gentium comes closer to the natural law of Grotius and the contracta­
rians of the 17th and 18th centuries. Literally translated as the "law of nations," the 
body of law called ius gentium consisted of principles of action which were com­
monly held to be derived from the natural law by deduction, and thus irrefutable. All 
political societies were, in theory, bound by ius gentium insofar as each person in 
that society was bound to these fundamental derivative principles of action. See 2 
BRACTON ON THE LAws AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 27 (G. Woodbine ed., S. 
Thome trans. 1968). 
The structure of ius gentium, according to the medieval commentators, included 
much of what is usually referred to as the "law merchant." It related to the buying 
and selling of commodities, among other human activities, according to St. Thomas 
Aquinas, who derived most of his theories about law from St. Isidore of Seville. I ST. 
THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. 1-11, Q. 95, Art. 4 (Fathers of the En­
glish Dominican Province trans. 1947). Medieval legal theory recognized as a general 
principle that all human law was derived from the natural law, either by deduction, 
such as the principles behind the decalogue, or by inductive application of general 
deductions.ld. at Pt. 1-11, Q. 95, Art. 2. Human law, in any case, binds everyone and is 
ordained for the common good, according to Aquinas. ld. at Pt. 1-11, Q. 96, Arts. 1, 6. 
Finally, Aquinas acknowledged the rational basis for decisional law. In Pt. 1-11, Q. 
97, Art. 3, he states that custom can become or have the force of law. These notions, 
which were abandoned after DesCartes and were not interpolated into the later no­
tions of the natural law and the role of human positive law, recognized an organic, 
evolutionary law in process which was neither static nor wholly a matter of existen­
tial commitment to process, but rather was a historical, developing normative pat­
tern for society. 
21. J. MARITAIN, supra note 19, at 15. 
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live and work together. 22 The principal function of lawmaking was 
to provide concrete interpretations of the basic principles of right 
and wrong, gUided, of course, by the church. This left virtually no 
room for the development of private dynastic wealth. 
In the 190 odd years between the Marquess of Winchester's 
Case and the next landmark case on testamentary capacity, Green­
wood v. Greenwood,23 English thinkers developed a rationalization 
for the modern capitalist state, derived in part from French 16th 
century thought. 24 These principles were quite different from the 
medieval thought of Thomas Moore and other English Renaissance 
thinkers of the 16th century. For example, Hobbes, Locke, and 
Berkely concurred in a radically different perception of the forma­
tion of political society. First, it was not natural and inevitable that 
all men live together in society. Each of the English thinkers of the 
17th and 18th century set up a hypothetical state of nature in 
which all men were posited as monads pursuing their own survival 
interests. 25 The war of all against all, according to Hobbes, the 
22. Id. at 2-4. This notion, of course, reached Europe through the Arabian 
commentators on Aristotle, notably the commentary of Averroes on Aristotle's Poli­
tics. 
23. 163 Eng. Rep. 930 (K.B. 1790). 
24. Hobbes' LEVIATHAN owed an unacknowledged debt to the monarchism 
of Bishop Bossuet. Certainly, Hobbes had read Machiavelli before writing his mag­
num opus. See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1958). 
25. Thomas Hobbes, the most profound member of the contractarian move­
ment, described the state of nature construct about as well as any of the later and 
more moderate contractarians: 
Hereby it is manifest that, during the time men live without a common 
power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called 
war, and such a war as is of every man against every man. For WAR consists 
not in battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time wherein the 
will to contend by battle is sufficiently known; and therefore the notion of 
time is to be considered in the nature of war as it is in the nature of weather. 
* * * 
To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent: that 
nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, 
have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; 
where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war two cardinal virtues. 
Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body nor the 
mind.... They are qualities that relate to man in society, not in solitude. It 
is consequent also to the same condition that there be no propriety, no 
dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man's that 
he can get, and for so long as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill 
condition which man by mere nature is actually placed in .... 
T. HOBBES, supra note 24, pt. I, ch. 13, at 106-08. This description, in watered-down 
form, appears in Locke's writing. See]. LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Orig­
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intellectual godfather of this school, was a self-destructive struggle 
for power. As a result of the debilitating effects of the struggle for 
power, each monad impliedly agreed with each and every other 
monad to resign his total control over his own life and destiny to 
the representative of all in return for protection from the rapacity 
of others.26 The representative, Leviathan, Hobbes' Mortal God, 
was the king. 27 
In the late 17th century, Locke expanded the Mortal God con­
cept to include Parliament in order to justifY the Glorious Revolu­
tion of 1688. 28 According to Hobbes and Locke, Leviathan man­
ufactured law, within the limits of the contract, to protect the 
property rights of the citizen. The English philosophers of the 17th 
and 18th century taught that once the state was formed there was 
no natural law, and that all law came from the state. 29 Property, 
furthermore, was the principal reason for the state. Under the con­
tract theory of state formation, property was the only object of state 
control. 30 The only remedy an individual had against state regula­
tion of his property, according to contractarian theory, was to start 
a revolution. Consequently, the contractarian theory of political 
science served to promote revolution as well as a defense of the 
status quO. 31 
inal, Extent and End of Civil Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT 1-143 (1960). This 
provided a link to the formation of the political theory for our own Revolution. 
26. T. HOBBES, supra note 24, pt. II, ch. 17, at 142. 
The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend 
them from the invasion of foreigners and the injuries of one another, and 
thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry ... they 
may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power 
and strength upon one man .... This is more than consent or concord; it is 
a real unity, of them all in one and the same person ... as if every man 
should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing 
myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that you 
give up your right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner. 
Id. 
27. Id. at 142-43. 
28. This explanation has been offered by several modern scholars as a plausible 
way to understand Locke's use of the state of nature. 
29. Hobbes was particularly clear on this point. See T. HOBBES, supra note 24, 
pt. II, ch. 18, at 143-47. Locke, on the other hand, dissembled on this issue. J. 
LOCKE, supra note 25, at 45-56, 73-76. 
30. T. HOBBES, supra note 24, pt. II, ch. 24, at 197-202; J. LOCKE, supra note 
25, at 56-58. 
31. This criticism was offered by Dr. R.F. Sasseen during his political theory 
courses in the early and mid-1960's. It seems to be a fair assessment of the impact of 
the English contractarians. It certainly is a fair restatement of the ambiguities of J.J. 
ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL (1767), which Jacques Maritain developed in MAN 
AND THE STATE. See J. MARITAIN, supra note 19, at 36-40. 
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Contractarian psychology was a product of the political theory 
relating to the formation of the state. 32 It was based upon con­
structs which have not been confirmed by empirical investigation. 33 
Nonetheless, contractarian psychology had become embedded in 
Anglo-American law during the latter part of the 18th century. 
Contractarian psychology still provides the basis for the present 
legal rules relating to the law of testamentary capacity. So far, 
these psychological constructs and their legal progeny have still not 
been proved by legal scholars. At the time of its formation, con­
tractarian psychology was radical. It was used to support social and 
political change. Contractarian political and psychological thinking 
provided an adequate rationalization for the partnership of Parlia­
ment with the English mercantile and industrial capitalists of the 
era. In short, these notions made the Industrial Revolution hap­
pen. The implications for English property law were equally as 
revolutionary. 
If, as the con tractarians thought, an individual has priority 
over his society and his family, then he should be accorded abso­
lute freedom of choice in the distribution of his property at death. 
Since property is prior to the state, the state may regulate the 
acquisition of and exploitation of one's property only within the 
limit of the social contract. 34 Regulation within the parameters of 
32. Each of the major contractarians wrote a study of "human understanding" 
in addition to the political theories included in their major writings. Part I of 
LEVIATHAN represents Hobbes' understanding of human behavior. T. HOBBES, supra 
note 24, pt. I (Of Man) (particularly ch. 6 ("Of the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary 
Motions Commonly Called the Passions, and the Speeches by Which they are Ex­
pressed")). Locke also wrote AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING to 
expound his concept of human psychology. J. LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING 
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1956). Bishop Berkeley did the same. G. BERKELEY, A 
TREATISE CONCEfu'liNG THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE (1957). 
33. The principles of contractarian psychology may be summarized briefly as 
follows: (1) The individual is analytically and historically prior to the formation of 
political society; (2) the principal object of human activity is to acquire property; (3) 
all intellectual activity is conscious activity; (4) the intellectual faculty of choice is 
analytically and historically prior to the intellectual faculty of knowing; and (5) the 
intellectual faculty of choice moves toward what it projects as useful for the indi­
vidual, against a superimposed image derived from the faculty of knowing, thus mak­
ing good-bad decisions basically anti-intellectual. See generally J. BENTHAM, AN IN­
TRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 85-89 (1789); T. 
HOBBES, supra note 24, pt. 1, ch. 2, at 29-32; D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN 
NATURE: BEING AN ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD OF REA­
SONING INTO MORAL SUBJECTS (1961); J. LOCKE, supra note 25; J. LOCKE, supra note 
32. 
34. J. LOCKE, supra note 25, at 50. 
Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom and 
an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of na­
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the contract is limited to prohibiting evils in order to promote the 
health, safety, morals, and welfare of other property owners. 35 
Thus, the jurisprudential concept of individualistic total ownership 
of productive property owes its existence to the 18th century con­
tractarian movement. The doctrine of testamentary freedom is a 
corollary of this ownership theory, and its source is the same: the 
priority of the individual and his property to social control. 
1. Greenwood v. Greenwood 
The revolution in property law jurisprudence is reflected in 
Lord Kenyon's famous charge to the jury in Greenwood v. Green­
wood. 36 Greenwood was an ejectment suit. John Greenwood had 
contracted "consumption" in 1786. His closest relative was his 
brother William. As John's condition deteriorated, it affected his 
mind. He accused people of poisoning him. His physician, Dr. 
Reynolds, urged him to "take a cure" by going to Lisbon in the fall 
of 1787. Dr. Reynolds suggested that John take his brother with 
him to manage his affairs. Following this suggestion, John Green­
wood exhibited marked hostility toward his brother William. John 
took up with his cousin Abram, whom he showered with attention 
and giftS. 37 He selected Abram to accompany him to Lisbon. On 
the night of December 6, 1787, John Greenwood, a former law 
clerk under articles, decided to make his own will. 38 About eleven 
p. m. Greenwood told his good friend Pope that he would make a 
will. The following day Greenwood produced a piece of paper be­
ture ... hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property ... but to 
judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others .... But because no 
political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to 
preserve the property, and in order thereunto punish the offences of all 
those of that society: there, and there only, is political society, where every 
one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into the 
hands of the community in all cases .... And thus all private judgement of 
every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be um­
pire, by settled standing rules .... 
[d. 
35. The formulation of the "police power" doctrine must be rooted in some 
conception of the formation of society which places the individual prior in analysis to 
any social limitations. The contractarians never articulated a legal standard for defin­
ing the limits of the social contract. This task fell to Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill. 
36. 163 Eng. Rep. 930 (K.B. 1790). 
37. [d. at 933. 
38. [d. After being sent down at Cambridge, John Greenwood was appren­
ticed under articles to a solicitor named Dampier in the vicinity of his home. 
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fore Pope and another man named Owen and said: "Well, Pope, I 
sat down and made my will after you were with me, and now I will 
execute it. "39 The sheets were already signed, and the witnesses 
then signed the attestation clause. 
Several witnesses at trial testified that John Greenwood man­
aged his property, spoke civilly to others, and did not appear in­
sane. The most damning evidence put in by his brother William, 
the contestant, was the testimony of Price, John Greenwood's male 
nurse, and Reverend Thomas Jones. Price was a former attendant 
at a mental institution hired to look after John in 1786. He stated 
that John Greenwood had to be confined in a straightjacket to 
prevent him from attacking Price with a knife, and later, in a simi­
larepisode, from attacking other parties with a candlestick. 40 Rev­
erend Jones was John's tutor at Trinity College in Cambridge. 
Reverend Jones related a morbid discussion he had had with John 
Greenwood following his father's death in May 1786, which· indi­
cated that John suspected that his brother plotted to do away with 
his father. 41 Both witnesses, however, had nothing to say about 
John's conduct at the time he made his will in December 1787. 
Lord Kenyon's charge to the jury in this case was: 
[T]he inquiry and the single inquiry in the cause is, whether he 
was of sound and disposing mind and memory at the time when 
he made his will; however deranged he might be before, if he 
had recovered his reason at that time, he was competent to 
make his will . . . . 
If he had a power of summoning up his mind so as to know 
what his property was, and who those persons were that then 
were the objects of his bounty, then he was competent to make 
his will. 42 
Lord Kenyon's test for testamentary capacity is loosely ~ased on 
Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding 43 and the writ­
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 938. 
41. Id. at 939. 
42. Id. at 943 (emphasis added). 
43. J. LOCKE, supra note 32, bk. II, at 63-69, bk. IV, at 225-32. This rather 
complicated epistemological approach to the concrete act of making a will seems to 
relate to Locke's general theory about the funtion of choice and recall. In Book IV of 
AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 32, Locke states that 
knowledge is generally the perception of the agreement or disagreement between 
two ideas, analytically occurring on four planes at the same time. The judgment of 
congruence is made with respect to identity or diversity, relation, coexistence, and 
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ings of David Hume, a major figure in the contractarian move­
ment. 44 It assumes that the only significant factor in limiting tes­
tamentary giving is the strength of the testator's conscious recall 
and his conscious intellectual ability to carry out his prior unfet­
tered voluntariness through manipulation of his property. No ac­
count need be taken of the social value of the testator's disposition 
since, by definition, that is not a factor in the legal equation. The 
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. 
Greenwood v. Greenwood established the two primary compo­
nents of the modern law of testamentary capacity: A testator must 
know who the natural objects of his bounty might be, and the na­
ture and extent of his property. Greenwood left open the 
psychologiCal problem of integrating these two conscious acts of re­
call into a dispository scheme by the testator. 
2. Harwood v. Baker 
The third component of the test for testamentary capacity was 
added by Harwood v. Baker.45 The testator in that case, Thomas 
Edward Baker, died March 27, 1833. About seven p.m. on that 
day, Baker executed his will by mark, when he was feeble, insen­
sible, and dying. 46 Baker had become ill on March 21st and de­
veloped brain fever. 47 The inflammation of the brain became pro­
gressively worse, according to several witnesses at the trial. 48 Prior 
to his last illness, Baker had made a will distributing most of his 
assets to the children of his first marriage. The new will left nearly 
necessary connection with and real existence in the "out there" beyond intellectual 
activity. Locke further divides knowledge into actual and habitual. Habitual knowl­
edge relates specifically to recall. It is, for Locke, the same as memory, which Locke 
analyzes in Book II of AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, 
supra note 32. 
But our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease 
to be anything when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our 
ideas in the repository of our memory signifies no more but this-that the 
mind has a power, in many cases, to revive perceptions which it has once 
had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them 
before. And in this sense it is that our ideas are said to be in our memories, 
when indeed they are actually nowhere, but only there is an ability in the 
mind when it will to revive them again, and, as it were, paint them anew on 
itself, though some with more, some with less, difficulty .... 
J. LOCKE, supra note 32, at 64 (emphasis added). 
44. D. HU~1E, supra note 33, at 8-10. 
45. 13 Eng. Rep. 117 (P.C. 1840). 
46. [d. at 118. 
47. [d. at 119-20. 
48. [d. at 126. 
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all his estate to his wife, who was much younger than he. The 
disaffected children of the first marriage filed caveats to the probate 
of the will, and the whole affair ended up in Privy Council before 
Lord Justice Erskine. On review of the ecclesiastical court's deci­
sion to probate the will, Lord Erskine gave the following rationale 
of English law on testamentary capacity: 
But their Lordships are of opinion, that in order to consti­
tute a sound disposing mind, a Testator must not only be able to 
understand that he is by his Will giving the whole of his prop­
erty to one object of his regard; but that he must also have capac­
ity to comprehend the extent of his property, and the nature of 
the claims of others, whom, by his Will, he is excluding from all 
participation in that property . . . and, therefore, the question 
which their Lordships propose to decide in this case, is not 
whether Mr. Baker knew when he was giving all his property to 
his wife, and excluding all his other relations from any share in 
it, but whether he was at that time capable of recollecting who 
those relations were, of understanding their respective claims 
upon his regard and bounty, and of deliberately forming an intel­
ligent purpose of excluding them from any share of his prop­
erty.49 
This added a third element to the test for a willmaker's capacity to 
make a will enunciated in Greenwood v. Greenwood; the ability of 
the testator to form a rational plan for disposing his property. As a 
result, Baker's children broke their father's will. 50 
3. Dufaur v. Croft 
The same year as Harwood v. Baker, the Privy Council de­
cided another important will contest case, Dufaur v. Croft. 51 The 
testator in that case, Charles Day, made a codicil to his will on 
September 22, 1836, when he was totally blind, paralyzed from the 
waist down, and incapable of conversing rationally for more than a 
49. Id. at 120 (emphasis added). This holding was foreshadowed some 47 years 
earlier by dicta in the. case of Cartwright v. Cartwright, 161 Eng. Rep. 923 (P.C. 
1793). There, Sir William Wynne stated that the will of the testator, Mrs. Armyne 
Cartwright, ought to have been admitted to probate because she wrote it in her own 
hand. This, Sir William thought, showed that Mrs. Cartwright had a plan for disposi­
tion of her wealth which she carried into execution. Id. at 933. 
50. Incidentally, this is one of the most common fact patterns in American will 
contests reported in the West National Reporter System. It suggests that one way to 
ensure a will contest is to prefer a subsequent spouse to children of a previous mar­
riage. 
51. 13 Eng. Rep. 59 (P.C. 1840). 
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quarter of an hour. 52 His condition was the result of epileptic sei­
zures in August and September of 1836, which reduced his physi­
cal and mental capacity to that of a child. 53 Dufaur, the beneficiary 
of the codicil, was nominated co-executor and given a £500 leg­
acy.54 Dufaur visited with Day on September 21, and took down a 
pencil draft of the codicil. He showed the draft to Mr. Hewson, 
the surgeon attending Day that evening, and on the next morning 
showed it to Day's family. Hewson redrafted the codicil and read it 
to Day about nine or ten a.m. Day said he wished to sign it. Mrs. 
Day brought him his writing desk and put it on his lap. Day re­
fused to sign by mark, insisting that he would sign the codicil with 
his signature. The execution of the codicil was witnessed by Hew­
son, a man named Clagget, and a maid named Frances Barton. 55 
Hewson and Barton did not consider Day sane when he signed the 
codicil. 56 The ecclesiastical court refused to probate the codicil. 
The Privy Council, on appeal, affirmed the ecclesiastical court. 57 
The important passage in this case is Justice Bosanquet's view of 
the burden of proof on the party propounding a will for probate: 
If this were the case of a testator possessed of undoubted 
and unimpaired capacity, the reading of the instrument in the 
presence of his family, pursuant to his desire, expressed by ges­
ture, his approval of it by an affirmative expression, and the sig­
nature of his name, might be sufficient to show that the act was 
his own, though the instrument had been prepared by the per­
son to be benefitted by it. But in a case circumstanced like this, 
where the capacity is fluctuating and the intervals of reason very 
short, it is incumbent upon the party propounding the instru­
ment to show, by more than ordinary proof, that at the precise 
time when the act was done the Testator was in the possession 
and exercise of his mental faculties. 58 
The decisional law of England, prior to 1850, had developed 
the following rationalization for establishing testamentary capacity. 
(a) Initially, the proponent of a will must show by some proba­
tive evidence that the testator was in possession of his mental 
52. Id. at 60. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 59. 
55. Id. at 61. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 63. 
58. Id. (emphasis added). 
1979] TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 445 
faculties when he executed his will. 59 
(b) In order to overcome the impact of the propounder's prima 
facie showing of due execution and thus competency, the cavea­
tor had to show one of the following bases to set aside the will: 
(i) The testator did not know the persons who were his 
kindred, or natural objects of bounty, 60 
(ii) the testator did not know the nature or extent of his 
property,61 or 
(iii) the testator could not form a rational plan for dispos­
ing of his property. 62 
The relevant time for ascertaining capacity was the precise moment 
when the testator executed his will. 63 Clearly, this rationalization 
referred to conscious mental activity, the integration of rather 
complex data into patterns of logic, and a concluding physical act, 
actual signing of the testamentary instrument. It was in line with 
the rational, voluntaristic theories of human behavior current at the 
time. Naturally enough, this set of rules was adopted by the 
American states shortly after their independence from England. 
B. Early American Testamentary Capacity Cases 
It will best serve our purposes to develop early American 
capacity law by examining New York decisions. New York had the 
earliest and most accurate reporting system. The best early Ameri­
can statement of the rules for determining testamentary capacity 
may be found in Clark v. Fisher64 and Van Alst v. Hunter. 65 
New York adopted the Greenwood v. Greenwood rationale in 
1821 in Van Alst v. Hunter. The testator in that case, Jacob Ben­
net, was between ninety and one hundred years old when he 
made his will. He left the bulk of his estate to one daughter, ignor­
ing the children of his deceased children. Apparently the only evi­
dence tending to show that Bennet lacked capacity was his inability 
to recall the names of old friends. The court concluded that this 
evidence would not be enough to set aside Bennet's will. As he 
allowed Bennet's will to be probated, Chancellor Kent said, 
59. Id. at 62. 
60. 163 Eng. Rep. at 943. 
61. Id. 
62. 13 Eng. Rep. at 118. 
63. See text accompanying notes 51-58 supra. 
64. 1 Paige Ch. 171 (N.Y. 1828). 
65. 5 Johns. Ch. 148 (N.Y. 1821). 
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It is one of the painful consequences of extreme old age that 
it ceases to excite interest, and is apt to be left solitary and ne­
gle'cted .... The will of such an aged man ought to be regarded 
with great tenderness, when it appears not to have been pro­
cured by fraudulent arts . . . the whole case resolves itself into 
one simple question of fact, whether the testator by reason of 
age had or had not lost his sound, disposing mind and mem­
ory.66 
Seven years later, Chancellor Walworth decided Clark v. 
Fisher, an extremely thoughtful opinion on a hard case. The tes­
tator, John Fisher, made his will at age eighty-seven, shortly be­
fore his death. Fisher left all his real and personal estate to his 
second wife, Diana Rapelje, excluding his blood relatives, who 
were nieces and nephews. Fisher had an apoplectic seizure three 
or four years before his death, and was bedridden and paralyzed 
from that time until death. Fisher's physician and his nurse were 
called by the caveators. 67 The medical experts concluded that 
Fisher's mind was generally deranged. 68 The will itself had been 
drawn by a scrivener at Diana's suggestion because she stated she 
could communicate with and understand Fisher, although no one 
else could. 69 The surrogate had admitted Fisher's will to probate. 
Chancellor Walworth overruled the surrogate. 70 In so doing he 
adopted the English rules for determining testamentary capacity: 
The general principles of law in relation to the capacity of a 
person to make a will, are well understood. He must be of sound 
and disposing mind and memory, so as to be capable of making a 
testamentary disposition of his property with sense and judg­
ment, in reference to the situation and amount of such property 
and to the relative claims of the different persons who are or 
might be the objects of his bounty. 71 
Walworth's opinion is practically identical to Lord Kenyon's charge 
in Greenwood v. Greenwood. 72 It shows that roughly thirty-five 
years after English judges had adopted the rational, voluntarist 
66. ld. at 160. 
67. 1 Paige Ch. at 174. 
68. ld. 
69. ld. at 175-76. 
70. ld. at 177-78. 
71. ld. at 173 (emphasis added). 
72. See text accompanying note 42 supra. 
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standards for determining capacity, New York had adopted the 
same standards. 
In 1862, New York's Court of Appeals decided the celebrated 
leading American case of Delafield v. Parish. 73 Henry Parish, the 
testator, made a will in 1842. In 1849 he suffered what was de­
scribed as an "attack of paralysis described by the physician as 
hemiplegia."74 His 1842 will gave most of his estate to his wife. 75 
In August 1849, Parish added a codicil to his 1842 will which was 
re-executed in December 1849. This codicil gave $200,000 worth of 
realty to his wife. In 1853, Mrs. Parish instructed Daniel Lord, the 
lawyer who drew the first codicil, to make another giving her about 
$500,000 in personal property.76 On June 20, 1854, Mrs. Parish had 
a third codicil prepared which revoked all devises to Parish's blood 
relations, vesting the whole of his estate in her. 77 During the span 
of those five years, Parish could not talk. His gestures and signs 
were interpreted by his wife. 78 After Parish's death, the surrogate 
refused to probate the 1853 and 1854 codicils and Mrs. Parish ap­
pealed. 79 
At that time, the provisions of the New York Wills Act had not 
been changed since 1780.80 These statutes were essentially identi­
cal to the English Statute of Wills of 1534. Thus, Judge Davies 
rightly applied the English testamentary capacity cases, beginning 
with the Marquess of Winchester's Case. 81 The judge also cited a 
brace of American cases from other jurisdictions including Harrison 
v. Rowan,82 Den v. Johnson,83 and the earlier New York case of 
73. 25 N.Y. 9 (1862). 
74. Id. at 17. 
75. Id. at 17-18. 
76. Id. at 20. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 21. 
79. Id. at 22. 
80. It is provided by the statute law of this State, that "all persons, except 
idiots, persons of unsound mind, married women and infants, may devise 
their real estate, by a last will and testament," duly executed, in accordance 
with the formalities prescribed by law (2 R.S. 57, § 1); and that "every male 
person of the age of eighteen years or upward, every female not being a 
married woman, of the age of sixteen years and upward, of sound mind and 
memory, and no other, may give and bequeath his or her personal estate by 
will, in writing" (2 R.S. 60, § 21) .... 
Id. 
81. Id. at 23-26. 
82. 11 F. Cas. 658 (C.C. Wash. 1820) (No. 6,141). 
83. 5 N.J.L. 454 (1819). 
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Stewart's Executor v. Lispenard. 84 After this review, Judge Davies 
set OGt the standard of testamentary capacity which has since pre­
vailed in practically all United States jurisdictions: 
We have held that it is essential that the testator has sufficient 
capacity to comprehend perfectly the condition of his property, 
his relations to the persons who were, or should, or might have 
been the objects of his bounty, and the scope and bearing of the 
provisions of his will. He must, in the language of the case, have 
sufficient active memory to collect in his mind, without prompt­
ing, the particulars or elements of the business to be transacted, 
and to hold them in his mind a sufficient length of time to per­
ceive at least their obvious relations to each other, and be able 
to form some rational judgment in relation to them. A testator 
who has sufficient mental powers to do these things is, within 
the meaning and intent of the statute of wills, a person of sound 
mind and memory, and is competent to dispose of his estate 
by will. 85 
Judge Davies then explored the issue of the burden of proving a 
will to be the testator's valid disposition. He cited in support of his 
conclusion Baker v. Batt,86 Harwood v. Baker, and the Massachu­
setts leading decision, Crowninshield v. Crowninshield. 87 He 
summed up his conclusion on burden of proof in two propositions 
which disposed of the case: 
1. That in all cases the party propounding the will is bound to 
prove to the satisfaction of the court that the paper in question 
does declare the will of the deceased, and that the supposed 
testator was, at the time of making and publishing the document 
propounded as his will, of sound and disposing mind and mem­
ory. 
2. That this burden is not shifted during the progress of the 
trial, and is not removed by proof of the factum of the will, and 
the testamentary competency by the attesting witnesses, but re­
mains with the party setting up the will. 88 
The court affirmed the denial of probate of the two codicils pro­
cured by Mrs. Parish. 89 
84. 26 Wend. 255 (N.Y. 1841). 
85. 25 N.Y. at 29 (emphasis added). 
86. 12 Eng. Rep. 1026 (P.C. 1838). 
87. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 524, 526 (1854). 
88. 25 N.Y. at 34. 
89. Id. at 65. 
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The first part of this case's holding, the test for testamentary 
capacity, is the predominant United States formulation of the legal 
rationalization for establishing capacity. The second part, which 
lays the burden of proof of testamentary capacity on the proponent, 
has since been given several different twists by other American 
jurisdictions. The usual United States rule places the burden of 
disproving the testator's capacity on the party contesting the will 
for lack of capacity, once the proponent proves the will was duly 
executed according to the statutory formalities. 9o In order to show 
that the testator lacked capacity, the contestant must set up one or 
more missing elements in the Greenwood-Baker three-fold rule and 
establish the negative by at least a preponderance of the evidence. 
The Greenwood-Baker test of capacity has thus become the 
principal legal standard for measuring testamentary capacity.91 Ex­
90. See text accompanying notes 5.9-63 supra. 
91. The following states have adopted the Greenwood-Baker rule for testamen­
tary capacity: 
Alabama: Hornaday v. First Nat'l Bank of Birmingham, Inc., 259 Ala. 26, 34, 65 
So. 2d 678, 685 (1952); Dersis v. Dersis, 210 Ala. 308, 312, .98 So. 27, 31 (1923); 
Schieffelin v. Schieffelin, 127 Ala. 14,37, 28 So. 687, 695 (1900); 
Alaska: In re Kraft's Estate, 374 P.2d 413, 417 (Alaska 1962); 
Arizona: In re O'Connor's Estate, 74 Ariz. 248, 259, 246 P.2d 1063, 1070 (1952); 
Arkansas: Hiller v. Cude, 248 Ark. 1065, 1076, 455 S.W.2d 891, 897-98 (1970); 
Sullivant v. Sullivant, 236 Ark. 95, 103, 364 S.W.2d 665, 670 (1963); Tatum v. 
Chandler, 229 Ark. 864, 869, 319 S.W.2d 513, 516 (1959); Taylor v. McClintock, 
87 Ark. 243, 273, 112 S.W. 405, 411 (1908); 
California: In re Fritschie's Estate, 60 Cal. 2d 367, 372, 33 Cal. Rptr. 264, 267, 

384 P.2d 656, 659 (1963); In re Lingenfelter's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 571, 582, 241 

P.2d 990, 997 (1952); In re Haywood's Estate, 109 Cal. App. 2d 388, 395, 240 

P.2d 1028, 1032 (1952); In re Russell's Estate, 80 Cal. App. 2d 711, 719, 182 P.2d 

318, 324 (1947); In re Agnew's Estate, 65 Cal. App. 2d 553, 559, 563, 151 P.2d 

126, 130, 132 (1944); 

Colorado: Cunningham v. Stender, 127 Colo. 293, 300-02, 255 P.2d 977, 981-82 

(1953); Columbia Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Carpenter, 3 Colo. App. 360, 368, 521 

P.2d 1299, 1303 (1974); 

District of Columbia: In re Weir's Estate, 475 F.2d 988, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 

Florida: In re Wilmott's Estate, 66 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 1953); Newman v. 

Smith, 77 Fla. 633, 649, 82 So. 236, 247-48 (1919); In re Weihe's Estate, 268 So. 

2d 446, 448 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); 

Georgia: Perkins v. Edwards, 228 Ga. 470, 474, 186 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1971); 

Morgan v. Ivey, 222 Ga. 850, 851, 152 S.E.2d 833, 834 (1967); May v. May, 175 

Ga. 693, 693, 165 S.E. 617, 618 (1932); Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747, 751, 57 

S.E. 69, 71 (1907); 

Idaho: In re Goan's Estate, 83 Idaho 568, 573, 366 P.2d 831, 834 (1961); 

Illinois: Roller v. Kurtz, 6 Ill. 2d 618, 627, 129 N.E.2d 693, 697 (1955); DeMarco 
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v. McGill, 402 Ill. 46, 59, 83 N.E.2d 313, 320 (1949); Challiner v. Smith, 396 Ill. 
107, 124, 71 N.E.2d 324, 333 (1947); Quathamer y. Schoon, 370 Ill. 606, 608, 19 
N.E.2d 750, 751 (1939); Miles v. Long, 342 Ill. 589, 596, 174 N.E. 835, 839 
(1931); McLean v. Barnes, 285 Ill. 203, 209, 120 N.E. 628, 630 (1918); Owen v. 
Crumbaugh, 228 Ill. 380, 399, 81 N.E. 1044, 1050 (1907); 
Indiana: Swygart v. Willard, 166 Ind. 25, 35, 76 N.E. 755,759 (1906); Zawacki v. 

Drake, 149 Ind. App. 270,272,271 N.E.2d 511, 512 (1971); 

Iowa: In re Adams' Estate, 234 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Iowa 1975); Perkins v. Perkins, 

116 Iowa 253, 259, 90 N.W. 55, 57 (1902); 

Kansas: In re Walter's Estate, 167 Kan. 627, 634, 208 P.2d 261, 267 (1949); In re 

Cas ida's Estate, 156 Kan. 73, 76, 131 P.2d 644, 646-47 (1942); 

Kentucky: Sutton v. Combs, 419 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Ky. 1967); Teegarden v. Web­

ster, 304 Ky. 18, 20-21, 199 S.W.2d 728, 729 (1947); Frazie's Ex'r v. Frazie, 186 

Ky. 613, 621, 217 S.W. 668, 672 (1919); Newcomb v. Newcomb, 96 Ky. 120, 125, 

27 S.W. 997, 998-99 (1894); 

Louisiana: Succession of Moody, 227 La. 609, 614, 80 So. 2d 93, 95 (1955); 

McCarthy v. Trichel, 217 La. 444, 455, 46 So. 2d 621, 624 (1950); 

Maine: In re Leonard, 321 A.2d 486, 488 (Me. 1974); 

Maryland: Phelps y. Goldberg, 270 Md. 694, 697, 313 A.2d 683, 685 (1974); 

Friedel v. Blechman, 250 Md. 270, 290-91, 242 A.2d 103, 114-15 (1968); Doyle v. 

Rody, 180 Md. 471, 475, 25 A.2d 457, 459-60 (1942); 

Massachusetts: Duchesneau v. Jaskoviak, 360 Mass. 730, 733, 277 N.E.2d 507, 
510 (1971); Goddard v. Dupree, 322 Mass. 247, 250, 76 N.E.2d 643, 645 (1948); 
I 
Michigan: In re Merrill's Estate, 326 Mich. 351, 357-58, 40 N.W.2d 179, 182 

(1949); In re Bowling's Estate, 291 Mich. 218, 223, 289 N.W. 136, 139 (1939); In 

re Vollbrecht's Estate, 26 Mich. App. 430, 434, 182 N.W.2d 609, 612 (1970); 

Minnesota: In re Jenks' Estate, 291 Minn. 138, 141-42, 189 N.W.2d 695, 697 

(1971); In re Holmstrom's Estate, 208 Minn. 19,22,292 N.W. 622, 624 (1940); 

Mississippi: Lee v. Lee, 337 So. 2d 713, 715 (Miss. 1976); Cowart v. Cowart, 211 

Miss. 459, 462, 51 So. 2d 775, 776 (1951); 

Missouri: Lewis v. McCullough, 413 S.W.2d 489, 505-06 (Mo. 1967); Ahman v. 

Elmore, 211 S.W.2d 480, 488 (Mo. 1948); Lee v. Ullery, 346 Mo. 236, 245, 140 





Montana: Blackmer y. Blackmer, 165 Mont. 69, 76,525 P.2d 559, 563 (1974); 

Nebraska: In re Urbanowski's Estate, 191 Neb. 308, 311-12, 215 N.W.2d 74, 76 

(1974); In re Coon's Estate, 158 Neb. 620, 626, 64 N.w.2d 301, 304 (1954); In re 

Witte's Estate, 145 Neb. 295, 301, 16 N.w.2d 203, 206 (1944); 

New Jersey: In re Lucas' Will, 124 N.J. Eq. 347, 348, 1 A.2d 929, 929-30 (1938); 

Wallhauser y. Rummell, 25 N.J. Super. 358, 370, 96 A.2d 289, 295 (1953); In re 

Filo's Will, 9 N.J. Super. 146, 149,75 A.2d 517, 519 (1950); 

New Mexico: Callaway v. Miller, 58 N.M. 124, 129, 266 P.2d 365, 368 (1954); 

New York: In re Heaton's Will, 224 N.Y. 22,29-30, 120 N.E. 83, 86 (1918); In re 

Coddington's Will, 281 App. Diy. 143, 146, 118 N.Y.S.2d 525, 528 (1954); In re 

Morrison's Will, 270 App. Diy. 552, 554, 60 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548, aII'd per curiam, 

296 N.Y. 652, 89 N.E.2d 814 (1946); In re Butler's Will, 132 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 





North Carolina: In re Couble's Will, 272 N.C. 706, 709, 158 S.E.2d 796, 798-99 

(1968); In re Kemp's Will, 234 N.C. 495, 499, 67 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1951); 
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cept for Connecticut and Delaware,92 every American jurisdiction 
North Dakota: Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 504 (N.D. 1954); 

Ohio: Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145,155,119 N.E. 503,506 (1917); 

Oklahoma: In re Samochee's Estate, 542 P.2d 498,501 (Okla. 1975); In re Free's 

Estate, 181 Okla. 564, 565, 75 P.2d 476, 478 (1938); In re Sixkiller's Estate, 168 
Okla. 302, 305, 32 P.2d 936, 938-39 (1934); 

Oregon: In re Fredrick's Estate, 204 Or. 378, 388, 282 P.2d 352, 356 (1955); In re 

Johnson's Estate, 162 Or. 97, 130, 91 P.2d 330, 342-43 (1939); In re Crum's Es­

tate, 27 Or. App. 231, 235-36, 555 P.2d 785, 787 (1976); In re Johnson's Estate, 24 

Or. App. 897, 904-05, 547 P.2d 658, 663 (1976); 

Pennsylvania: In re Ziel's Estate, 467 Pa. 531, 537, 359 A.2d 728, 731 (1975); In 

re Protyniak's Estate, 427 Pa. 524, 529, 235 A.2d 372, 375-76 (1967); In re 

Skrtic's Estate, 379 Pa. 95, 100, 108 A.2d 750, 752 (1954); In re Sturgeon's Es­

tate, 357 Pa. 75, 81, 53 A.2d 139, 142 (1947); 

Rhode Island: Travenier v. McBurney, 112 R.1. 159, 162, 308 A.2d 518, 520 
(1975); 

South Carolina: Hellmas v. Ross, 233 S.E.2d 98, 100 (S.C. 1977); Sumpter Trust 

Co. v. Holman, 134 S.C. 412, 422, 132 S.E. 811, 814 (1926); 

South Dakota: In re Fleege's Estate, 230 N.W.2d 230,233 (S.D. 1975); 

Tennessee: Cude v. Culberson, 30 Tenn. App. 628, 648, 209 S.W.2d 506, 515 

(1947); Farmer's Union Bank of Henning v. Johnson, 27 Tenn. App. 342, 354, 

181 S.W.2d 369, 374 (1943); 

Texas: Reding v. Eaton, 551 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); Stephen v. Cole­

man, 533 S.W.2d 444, 448-49 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976); Baily v. Raines, 485 S.W.2d 

837, 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972); Miller v. Flyr, 447 S.W.2d 195, 203-05 (Tex. Ct. 

App. 1969); Carcia v. Galindo, 199 S.W.2d 488, 489 (Tex. Ct. App.), rev'd on 

other grounds, 145 Tex. 507, 199 S.W.2d 499 (1946); McNaley v. Sealey, 122 

S.W.2d 330, 331 (Tex. Ct. App. 1938); 

Utah: In re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 604, 52 P.2d 1103, 1114 (1935); 

Vermont: In re Burt's Estate, 122 Vt. 260, 263, 169 A.2d 32, 34 (1961); 

Virginia: Tate v. Chumbley, 190 Va. 480, 495, 57 S.E.2d 151, 158 (1950); 

Washington: In re Riley's Estate, 78 Wash. 2d 623, 646, 479 P.2d 1, 15 (1970); 

In re Nlitchell's Estate, 41 Wash. 2d 326, 350, 249 P.2d 385, 399 (1952); In re 

Moulton's Estate, 1 Wash. App. 993, 994, 465 P.2d 419, 420 (1970). 





Wisconsin: In re Becker's Estate, 76 Wis. 2d 336,344,251 N.W.2d 431,434 (1977); 

In re Velk's Estate, 53 Wis. 2d 500, 505-06, 192 N.W.2d 844, 848 (i972); In re 

Washburn's Will, 248 Wis. 467, 474, 22 N.W.2d 512, 515 (1946); 

Wyoming: In re Morton's Estate, 428 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo. 1967). 
Note: No cases giving the elements of testamentary capacity have been located for 
Hawaii, Nevada, or New Hampshire. 
92. The Connecticut formulation states that capacity to make a will is the same 
as the capacity to contract-whether the individual's mind and memory was sound 
enough to enable him to know and understand the business in which he was en­
gaged. See, e.g., Falk v. Schuster, 171 Conn. 5, 9, 368 A.2d 40, 42 (1976); Sturdev­
ant's Appeal, 71 Conn. 392, 397, 42 A. 70, 72 (1899); Kimberly's Appeal, 68 Conn. 
428, 435, 36 A. 847, 849 (1896); Comstock v. Hadlyme Ecclesiastical Soc'y, 8 Conn. 
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has adopted this formula as its paradigm for finding testamentary 
capacity when capacity has been attacked in a will contest. The 
standard United States formulation of the Greenwood-Baker rule 
states that a testator has testamentary capacity if he: (1) knows the 
natural objects of his bounty, (2) knows the nature and extent of 
his property, and (3) has a rational plan for disposition of his prop­
erty, taking into account its nature and extent and the natural 
objects of his bounty. Until the 1960's, no writer had attempted to 
comprehensively investigate or seriously criticize this formula. It 
has been immune from re-evaluation for its adequacy despite the 
revolution in psychology which began with Sigmund Freud's In­
terpretation of Dreams. No legal writer had attempted to formulate 
an adequate psychological explanation of why people make wills, 
and why the law supports or disallows the willmaking. In the 
1960's, a few writers began to take some strides in this direction. 
One of the aims of this article is to pursue the critical commentary 
which began fifteen years ago in order to fashion a tentative expla­
nation of the psychology of testation, and of property. 
C. 	 The Re-evaluation of Testamentary Capacity 
Although the findings of analytical and empirical psychology 
have been used by legal.scholars for several decades in explaining 
deviant behavior, these findings were not applied to other aspects 
of the law until the last fifteen years or so. The following is a sur­
vey of the recent literature on the psychology of testation. The 
re-evaluation of testamentary capacity and undue influence is so 
new that a survey of recent periodical and literary work in the field 
is unfortunately quite short. 
254, 263-64 (1830). Connecticut courts demand much more from a testator than the 
majority of American jurisdictions. Connecticut also places the burden of proof on 
the proponent, who must establish all elements of capacity by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Boschen v. Second Nat'l Bank of New Haven, 130 Conn. 501, 504, 35 A.2d 
849, 851 (1944); Comstock v. Hadlyme Ecclesiastical Soc'y, 8 Conn. 254, 261 (1830). 
The Delaware test states that the testator must "be capable of exercising thought, 
reflection and judgment; he must know what he is doing and how he is disposing of 
his property; he must have sufficient memory and understanding to comprehend the 
nature and character of his act." In re Estate of Bandursky, 281 A.2d 621, 623 (Del. 
Ch. 1971). See Rodney v. Burton, 27 Del. (4 Boyce) 171, 177,86 A. 826, 828 (1912); 
Pritchard v. Henderson, 19 Del. (3 Penne.) 128, 144, SO A. 217, 222-23 (1901); Ball v. 
Kane, 17 Del. (1 Penne.) 90, 106,39 A. 778, 783 (1897); Lodge v. Lodge's Will, 2 Del. 
(2 Houst.) 418, 422 (1886); In re Estate of Bandursky, 281 A.2d 621, 623 (Del. Ch. 
1971). In Delaware, the contestant has to disprove capacity by a preponderance once 
the proponent shows that the testator's will has been duly executed. In re Reed's 
Estate, 300 A.2d 1, 2 (Del. 1972); Pritchard v. Henderson, 19 Del. (3 Penne.) 128, 
ISO, SO A. 217, 223 (1901). 
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1. Periodical Literature 
In the past fifteen years two major articles have appeared in 
law journals relating to the mental and physical groundnorms for 
making a will. Smith and Hager's The Senile Testator,93 written in 
1964, was principally directed at exploring the medical lexicon of 
senile disorders. The authors attempted to distinguish between the 
process of aging, or senescence, and its change of quality from the 
aging process to mental deterioration commonly called "senility."94 
They then tried to untangle the medical terminology which de­
scribed "senile psychosis" and "cerebral arteriosclerotic psychosis" 
as either separate or distinct disorders.95 They follow this with an 
extended discussion of the so-called "lucid moment" theory, which, 
in legal jargon, is the theory that a person who is senile may have 
a moment of perfect sanity, and thus be hypothetically able to func­
tion normally, if only for a short time. 96 They also describe some of 
the medical characteristics of the "insane delusion," that legalistic 
phrase used to describe a congeries of delusions in testators which 
are supposed to vitiate their wills. 
Shaffer's Undue Influence, Confidential Relationship, and the 
Psychology of Transference, 97 published in 1970, did offer a 
tentative construct relating to the psychology behind the legalistic 
canons called "undue influence." Shaffer described will contests by 
analyzing the relationship between the testator and the beneficiary 
in terms of transference. 98 Transference refers to the projection of 
inappropriate feelings on to another individual. Shaffer created a 
"taxonomy" of will contest cases structured upon the type of 
transference phenomenon detectable in analyzing reported 
appellate decisions. These include: (1) The case of conscious 
manipulation, exemplified by In re Kauffman's Will,99 in which the 
beneficiary consciously used the psychology of transference to 
induce the testator to make a will favoring the beneficiary; (2) the 
case of unconscious opportunities, illustrated by In re Pitt's 
93. Smith & Hager, The Senile Testator: Medicolegal Aspects of Competency, 
13 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 397 (1964). 
94. ld. at 407-09. 
95. ld. at 409-13. 
96. ld. at 417-19. 
97. Shaffer, Undue Influence, Confidential Relationship, and the Psychology of 
Transference, 45 NOTRE DAME LAw. 197 (1970). 
98. Id. at 197-204. 
99. 20 App. Div. 2d 464, 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1964), affd, 15 N.Y.2d 825, 205 
N.E.2d 864, 257 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1965). 
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Estate, 100 in which the beneficiary is unaware that unconscious 
motivation, acting through transference, causes the testator to favor 
him; (3) the "let it happen" case in which the manipulating party 
was aware of transference, was aware that he would be benefitted 
by the testator's transference, and did nothing to impede the 
windfall, as illustrated by In re Faulk's Will;lol and (4) the "no 
manipulation" case in which a person gets a benefit from a testator 
without using the transference relationship, which, because of the 
status of the beneficiary and his relationship to the testator, must 
be avoided, as shown by such cases as In re Powers' Will. 102 
Shaffer presents a discursive discussion of "transference" in 
psychoanalysis in which the patient projects on the analyst qualities 
attributable to some person in the patient's past. These qualities 
may be good or bad. Shaffer's thesis is that testators often transfer 
inappropriate feelings to the potential beneficiaries of the testa­
tor's will. Shaffer considers this to be what the courts mean by the 
presumption of undue influence arising when a party having a con­
fidential relationship with the testator receives the benefit of the 
testator's will.l03 Unfortunately, the law deals with this phenom­
enon by attempting to reverse the transference relationship after 
death by setting aside the testator's will as the product of undue in­
fluence. l04 Shaffer offers a convincing schema for evaluating un­
due influence cases, and for a change in judicial attitude about 
undue influence. 
2. Books 
Shaffer has also written two books relating to the psychology of 
testation and of property, Death, Property and Lawyers, 105 and The 
Planning and Drafting of Wills and Trusts. 106 In these two books, 
Shaffer sets out the foundation for a psychology of property. He 
relies on an analysis of property from a phenomenological 
100. 88 Ariz. 312, 356 P.2d 408 (1960). 
101. 246 Wis. 319, 17 N.W.2d 423 (1945). 
102. 375 Mich. 150, 134 N.W.2d 148 (1965). 
103. Shaffer, supra note 102, at 230-35. 
104. Id. at 226, 229-30, 234-35. 
105. T. SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY AND LAWYERS (1970). This book repre­
sented a major break from traditional legal rationalization in property law and offered 
a tentative schema for a psychology of property. 
106. T. SHAFFER, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLS AND TRUSTS 
(1972). Much of the meat of DEATH, PROPERTY AND LAWYERS was re-issued in this 
slim, red book designed for second-year law students. 
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viewpoint. l07 Shaffer's phenomenology of property views property 
as a form of existential leap into the void of life after death, as an 
instrument of the owner's ego state which extends its existence in 
time and space. lOS According to Shaffer, property can be used to 
change the behavior of other persons by lifetime giving or with­
holding, or to extend the testator's life, that is, to achieve im­
mortality through post-death transactions. Shaffer does not explore 
the historical development of Anglo-American legal propositions, 
nor specifically apply his theorems to a large range of practical 
examples, although his work certainly indicates that such analysis 
could and should be done by lawyers and legal scholars. 
In 1968, Dr. Andrew S. Watson published Psychiatry for 
Lawyers .109 This small book condensed much analytical theory and 
Dr. Watson's twenty-five years of practice and teaching experience 
into a readable format. Watson includes a brief description of a 
possible psychology of aging based upon E. H. Erikson's work. 110 
Watson contrasts the ego states of integrity and despair, since he 
considers this the primary struggle in which the senescent ego en­
gages. lll He briefly discusses organic degeneration, but keeps his 
focus on functional disorders since the main purpose of his book is 
to explain to lawyers and other laypersons the constructs of 
psychiatric medicine. 1l2 Watson does mention regression or rever­
sion to childish behavior patterns as a potential and inappropriate 
resolution of the crisis between despair and integration. 1l3 Since 
Watson's main purpose does not include an exhaustive analysis of 
the mental process of aging, or a consideration of the role of prop­
erty as the extension of the human ego, his book leaves to later 
writers a great treasure trove of potential activity. In the following 
section, some of the implications of Shaffer's and Watson's thinking 
willbe applied to the act of making a will. 
107. T. SHAFFER, supra note 106, at 21-23. 
108. See T. SHAFFER, supra note 105, at 31-40; T. SHAFFER, supra note 106, at 
22-26. 
109. A. WATSON, PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS (1968). 

1l0. Id. at 280-83. 

111. Id. at 281. 
112. Functional mental illness is mental disturbance which cannot be traced to 
any known organic cause. Mental illness is generally divided according to severity 
into nerousis and psychosis. Psychosis is the more severe illness. Psychosis is further 
divided into organic (caused by some known physical condition, hereditary or 
traumatic) and functional. 
113. A. WATSON, supra note 109, at 127-28. 
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D. 	 Application of Contemporary Psychological Thought 
to the Greenwood-Baker Rule 
Since the scope of this article is confined to analyzing post­
death distribution, it is appropriate to take the tentative thinking 
already developed by Shaffer and Watson and apply it, together 
with the insights of other psychologists and lawyers, to the current 
legal rationalizations relating to willmaking. The working hypoth­
esis assumes that the traditional legal rationalizations contained 
in the Greenwood-Baker rule are appropriate summaries of known 
empirical data on the psychological aspects of willmaking and of 
property. In this sense, "appropriate" means normal to the proper 
functioning of the testator's personality at the time of willmaking, 
conceived as a process commencing with planning one's "estate" 
with professional assistance, and terminating with the execution of 
necessary legal documents. In this context, "inappropriate" refers 
to activity which would be either psychotic or neurotic activity 
under the same circumstances. 
1. Knowledge of Natural Objects of Bounty 
In considering the Greenwood-Baker rule, the legal issue be­
comes which of the three poles of testamentary capacity is primary. 
Unfortunately, very few courts have bothered to shed light on this 
issue by defining the way they perceive these three principles. In­
sofar as knowing the natural objects of one's bounty is concerned, 
the few courts which have commented on this principle generally 
say that the testator knows the natural objects of his bounty when 
he knows what "duties" he has toward them as members of his 
family.1l4 This notion is difficult to understand. First, acknowledg­
ing a duty toward one's bounty has very little to do with memory, 
or recall in the primary sense of the term. Second, the concept of 
"duty" may either mean a legally enforceable lifetime support obli­
gation, or some moralistic hidden agenda in which a moral duty 
exists commanding willmakers to make provisions for their im­
mediate family or blood relatives before making provisions to ben­
efit any other person. This hidden agenda may be critical to under­
standing the first element of the Greenwood-Baker test. 
It is clear that "knowing the natural objects of one's bounty" 
114. See, e.g., Brown v. Emerson, 205 Ark. 735, 737, 170 S.W.2d 1019, 1021 
(1943); Emerich v. Arendt, 179 Ark. 186,188, 14 S.W.2d 547, 548 (1929); Challiner v. 
Smith, 396 Ill. 107, 124,71 N.E.2d 324, 333 (1947). 
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does not mean honoring a legal support obligation. 115 The courts 
are dealing here with a moral or psychological compulsion to leave 
one's property at death to one's blood relatives. This notion ap­
pears to be a medieval hangover. Medieval moral theologians con­
cluded that one owes a duty to love one's parents, children, and 
members of the household before outsiders.116 Leaving one's prop­
erty to one's family, in the extended sense of next-of-kin, met that 
duty to love one's own kin first. In the thirteenth century, wills 
were a matter between the dying penitent and his confessor. The 
execution of a will took on the character of a sacral act.117 Histori­
cally, then, the compulsion to transfer one's property to one's fam­
ily had religious, moral, and cultural roots in the Christian ethical 
understanding of family obligations. In the primary sense, "know­
ing the natural objects of one's bounty" did not mean the ability to 
recall them by name and degree of kinship. It required the dying 
property owner to recall his own love for his family. This, then, 
appears to be the root of the first element of the Greenwood-Baker 
test of testamentary capacity. 
Although modern psychology has not extensively explored 
people's feelings about dying and the distribution of property at 
death, some fragments of thought indicate that the subject may still 
be invested with a magical or sacral character in the individual or 
collective unconscious. Shaffer has already projected the basis for 
a psychology of dying and of testation. 118 He sees property as an 
extension of human personality in two planes: the first plane is lat­
eral, across the structure of human life as lived; the second plane is 
skewed or tilted across the boundary between life and death. 119 
Shaffer sees property as "something I use," "something I do," and 
"something I am. "120 He feels that property is instrumentally ma­
nipulated by an individual as an extension of the individual's per­
sonality. It is also invested with that personality because it is an 
extension thereof. Thus, the act of making a will magically extends 
115. For a more detailed treatment of the legal support obligations ariSing out 
of family law, see H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 6.1-.7, at 181-218 (1968). 
116. See II ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 20, at Pt. II-II, Q. 26, Art. 9, 
which relies on citations from Origen, Hom. ii, in Cant. (a. 300 A.D.) and Aristotle, 
Ethics (200 B.C.). 
117. See text accompanying note 10 supra. 
118. See T. SHAFFER, supra note lO6, at 19-27. 
119. ld. at 21-23. 
120. This clearly indicates that property plays a significant role in ego state 
transactions. ld. at 22-26. 
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a person's manipulation of others through his property after his 
death, and sacrally extends his life to confer a legitimate "im­
mortality" on the willmaker. 121 According to analytical psychology, 
then, the identity of the ego is extended in time and space through 
the use of property. 122 Post-death giving involves a complex set of 
subconscious and conscious acts towards the possible objects of this 
extension of the personality after death. Should the testator "hurt" 
a member of his family who has "hurt" him? Should the willmaker 
consciously or unconsciously use a "carrot and stick" approach to 
his family in order to extract "love" from them through the 
medium of making one or more wills? Should the testator project 
his bad fe,elings about himself, or about some person in his life on a 
member of his family? These issues really reach the level of sa­
cred, magical, and shamanist behavior. Recalling the natural ob­
jects of one's bounty, then, encompasses the complex set of possi­
ble conscious and unconscious acts relating to the willmaker's im­
mediate circle of family, friends, or associates. The courts, in re­
viewing such a criterion, seem to have no coherent view of what 
they are about. 
2. Knowledge of Nature and Extent of Property 
Upon a superficial examination, this portion of the capacity 
test appears to be rather straightforward. To have testamentary 
capacity, a willmaker must be able to recall what he owns. The 
usual restatement of this element of the Greenwood-Baker test is 
that the testator need only have the capacity to recall, rather than 
actually remember, the nature and extent of his property.123 Some 
courts say that the size of the decedent's estate is immaterial to this 
element. 124 However, other jurisdictions have attempted to match 
up the required degree of recall of one's property to the size of the 
decedent's estate by a formula which says that "the amount of 
knowledge" of one's estate decreases in proportion to the decrease 
in size of the estate. 125 
121. Id. at 16, Shaffer quotes Shniedman's definition of the post-self, which he 
applies to people seeking to make a will. 
122. This seems to be a by-product of identity, which, according to orthodox 
psychiatry, is achieved at the post-adolescent level by reconciling love, sex, orgasm, 
extragenital sensory needs, procreation, and work. A. WATSON, supra note 109, at 
257. 
123. See, e.g., Brown v. Mitchell, 75 Tex. 9, 16, 12 S.W. 606,608 (1889). 
124. See, e.g., In re Freeman's Estate, 132 S.C. 389, 394, 126 S.E. 764, 765 
(1925); Matheson v. Matheson, 125 S.C. 165, 178, 118 S.E. 312, 313 (1923). 
125. See, e.g., Campbell v. Campbell, 130 Ill. 466, 480, 22 N.E. 620, 623-24 
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A brief digression into the psychology of memory will be help­
ful for further analysis. Memory, according to recent psychological 
studies, appears to function on several planes. Classically, "mem­
ory" is the label applied to the intellectual functions of recognition 
and recall. 126 In addition to this function, there also appears to be 
"structural recall." This phenomenon can be illustrated by the sim­
ple example of learning to swim. Once a person masters the ele­
ments of body functioning and coordination required for swimming, 
he no longer has to consciously recall when and where he learned 
it, nor generate a sensate image of "swimming" before he jumps 
into the pool. His total range of swimming behavior patterns, or 
"schema" of swimming, comes back without conscious recall. 127 
According to what is known of brain functioning, brain chemistry is 
altered in the first place by a "patterning" stimulus which works 
directly on the nerve cells in the nervous system and brain. This 
patterning creates "reverberating circuits," or alterations in the 
electro-chemical structure of the brain corresponding to the 
stimuli. 128 This original "circuit" reacts when the same neural 
pathway is stimulated again by interior or exterior stimuli, produc­
ing the phenomenon called "recall. "129 This leads to the hypothesis 
that, ordinarily, recall functions as a two-stage system. There ap­
pears to be a first-stage recall system which fades shortly after orig­
inal stimulus, which in turn produces a long-term pattern by way 
of consolidation. 130 This two-stage system leads to recall of sensate 
images, and to recall of schema. 
(1889); In re Holmstrom's Estate, 208 Minn. 19,22,292 N.W. 622, 624 (1940); Clifton 
v. Clifton, 47 N.J. Eq. 227, 242, 21 A. 333, 339 (1890). For an interesting analysis of 
this concept, see Drum v. Capps, 240 Ill. 524, 88 N.E. 1020 (1909). 
126. J. PIAGET & B. IMHELDER, MEMORY AND INTELLIGENCE 4-5 (1973). 
127. Id. at 5-6. Recall experimentation has been performed with respect to ran­
dom unassociated letter sequences, line patterns, and the like by researchers other 
than Piaget and Imhelder. See, e.g., W. KOHLER, GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY 167-74 
(1947). This type of research, by design, excluded the discovery of schema empiri­
cally. 
128. Cf. D. KRECH, R. CRUTCHFIELD, & N. LIVSON, ELEMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY 
466-72 (2d ed. 1969). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 472-73. This procedure seems to be confirmed experimentally by 
Jarvik and Essman. They ran tests in which rats were allowed to step down from one 
platform to another a few inches below. The researchers electrified the lower plat­
form, causing the rats to be shocked when they stepped down on it. After being 
shocked once, the rats remembered for about 24 hours not to step down on the elec­
trified platform, so long as nothing interfered with their short-term memory. If the 
researchers shocked the rats enough to cause convulsions, their short-term memory 
was disrupted. The rats then had no recall of the previous event, and the next day 
would unknowingly step down on the electrified platform again. Id. 
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If these findings about recall apply to the "ability to know the 
nature and extent of one's property," then what is the testator sup­
posed to do when he "knows" his property? Is a willmaker sup­
posed to be able to have a sensate image of every item of his prop­
erty in his head when he goes through the will making process, or 
is he to have a non-sensate schema which is the outline of his 
property? Returning to Shaffer's hypothesis that property is a verti­
cal and horizontal extension of the ego or personality, must a tes­
tator be able to extend his ego functioning through his property in 
order to be legally capable of making a will? 
It is possible that the judiciary anticipated some of the findings 
of empirical analysis intuitively and do not require the testator to 
hold a sensate image of every item of his property.13l The same 
sort of analysis can be applied to "recalling one's natural objects of 
bounty" as well. 132 It is fairly clear that in order to make a will, a 
willmaker must be able to hold a schema of his property and his 
next of kin. A number of cases have expressed this concept by 
stating that a testator need not recall his property in detail, nor 
actually recall it, rather he need only have the ability to recall his 
property. 133 
3. Ability to Form a Rational Plan for Disposition of Property 
The third element of testamentary capacity is logically distinct 
from the other two. The first two elements consist of a mixture of 
judicial speculation about the way persons recall sensate images or 
schema, and the way in which persons view their relationship to 
others through their property, seen as an extension of ego function­
ing. The third element, the "ability to form a rational plan for dis­
position," deals directly with impaired ego functioning. If the tes­
tator is something less than a functionally well-adjusted adult, he 
may not be able to make a will because he lacks the ability to make 
rational plans about using his property after death. If so, then this 
element is critical to determining when someone has the capacity 
131. Inferentially, this same pattern recall applies to knowledge of the natural 
objects of one's bounty. This result is apparant in a case such as McGreal v. Culhane, 
172 Or. 337, 141 P.2d 828 (1943). There the testator, who suffered from a variety of 
physical and psychic problems associated with advancing age, left his estate to the 
children of his late uncle Daniel although he was unable to recall any of them by 
name. The court held that the testator had sufficient capacity to make a will. 
132. [d. at 339, 141 P.2d at 829-30. 
133. See, e.g., Yarbrough v. Moses, 223 Ark. 489, 497, 267 S.W.2d 289, 293 
(1954). 
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to make a will, as some courts have indeed held. 134 It also explains 
why judges and commentators have been so concerned over the 
issue of whether capacity to make a will is identical to capacity to 
make a contract. The usual judicial statement says that any person 
who has the capacity to transact business and to make contracts 
surely has capacity to make a will. 135 In fact, the vast majority of 
courts passing on this aspect of the "rational plan" doctrine have 
determined that it takes less "mental capacity" to make a will than 
to engage in business, or to make a simple contract, or even to 
execute a deed. 136 Only Colorado, Connecticut, Maryland, and 
Montana, among the American jurisdictions, hold that capacity to 
make a will and to make a contract are identical legal principles. 137 
134. See, e.g., Epsy v. Preston, 199 Ga. 608, 609, 34 S.E.2d 705, 715 (1945); 
Manley v. Combs, 197 Ga. 768, 779, 30 S.E.2d 485, 492 (1944); Hill v. Deal, 185 Ga. 
42, 46, 193 S.E. 858, 861 (1937); Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747, 750-51, 57 S.E. 69, 
71 (1907); Williams v. Ragland, 307 1II. 386, 396-97, 138 N.E. 599, 603 (1922); Red­
man v. Ruff, 196 Ky. 471, 476, 244 S.W. 910, 912 (1922); Newcomb v. Newcomb, 96 
Ky. 120, 125, 27 S.W. 997, 998-99 (1894); In re Washburn's Will, 248 Wis. 467, 471, 
22 N.W.2d 512, 515 (1946). 
135. In re Arnold's Estate, 16 Cal. 2d 573, 586, 107 P.2d 25, 32 (1940); In re 
Sexton's Estate, 199 Cal. 759, 768-69, 251 P. 778, 782 (1926); In re Agnew's Estate, 
65 Cal. App. 2d 553, 560, 151 P.2d 126, 130 (1944); DeMarco v. McGill, 402 III. 46, 
58-59, 83 N.E·.2d 313, 320 (1949); In re Hayer's Estate, 230 Iowa 880, 884, 299 N.W. 
431,434 (1941); Bishop v. Shcarf, 214 Iowa 644,653,241 N.W. 3, 7 (1932). 
136. See, e.g., Doolittle v. Upson, 138 Conn. 642, 644-45, 88 A.2d 334, 336 
(1952); Anderson v. Anderson, 210 Ga. 464, 472, 80 S.E.2d 807, 812 (1954); Smith v. 
Davis, 203 Ga. 175, 185, 45 S.E.2d 609, 615 (1947); Logsdon v. Logsdon, 412 1II. 19, 
25, 104 N.E.2d 622, 625 (1952); DeMarco v. McGill, 402 III. 46, 58-59, 83 N.E.2d 
313, 320 (1949); Campbell v. Campbell, 130 III. 466, 479, 22 N.E. 620, 623 (1889); 
Walters v. Heaton, 223 Iowa 405,409,271 N.W. 310, 313 (1937); Albright v. Mockly, 
202 Iowa 565, 569, 210 N.W. 813, 814 (1926); Perkins v. Perkins, 116 Iowa 253,259, 
90 N.W. 55,57 (1902); In re Walter's Estate, 167 Kan. 627, 636, 208 P.2d 262, 268-69 
(1949); In re Harris' Estate, 166 Kan. 368, 372, 201 P.2d 1062, 1065 (1949); Kunkle v. 
Urbansky, 153 Kan. 117, 122, 109 P.2d 71, 74 (1941); Teegarden v. Webster, 304 Ky. 
18, 21, 199 S.W.2d 728, 729 (1947); Moore v. Moore, 290 Ky. 715, 721, 162 S.W.2d 
547,550 (1942); In re Weber's Estate, 201 Mich. 477, 482, 167 N.W. 937, 939 (1918); 
In re Wahl's Estate, 151 Neb. 812, 818-19, 39 N.W.2d 783, 787-88 (1949); In re 
Scoville's Estate, 149 Neb. 415, 430 31 N.W.2d 284, 393 (1948); In re Frazier's Es­
tate, 131 Neb. 61, 72-73, 267 N.W. 181, 187 (1936); In re Sturgeon's Estate, 357 Pa. 
75, 81, 53 A.2d 139, 142 (1947); Farmers Union Bank of Henning v. Johnson, 27 
Tenn. App. 342, 353, 181 S.W.2d 369, 374 (1943); Rudersdorf v. Bowers, 112 S.W.2d 
784, 789 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937); In re Chongas' Estate, 115 Utah 95, 99, 202 P.2d 711, 
713 (1949); In re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 608, 52 P.2d 1103, 1116 (1935). 
137. Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 585-86, 168 P.2d 256, 260 
(1946); Falk v. Schuster, 171 Conn. 5, 9, 368 A.2d 40, 42 (1976); Sturdevant's Appeal, 
71 Conn. 392, 397, 42 A. 70, 72 (1899); Kimberly's Appeal, 68 Conn. 428, 435, 36 A. 847, 
849 (1896); Comstock v. Hadlyme Ecclesiastical Soc'y, 8 Conn. 254, 263-64 (1830); 
Doyle v. Rody, 180 Md. 471, 477-80, 25 A.2d 457, 459-60 (1942), overruling Scheller 
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If the "ability to transact business" and the "ability to make a 
rational plan for disposition" are essentially statements of the same 
rule, it is hard to see why most American jurisdictions demand that 
a testator be able to make a disposition plan, yet do not equate that 
planning ability, the ability to integrate functionally, with that of 
making a contract. Essentially, both acts call for about the same 
response from the testator's ego structure. Each requires selectivity 
or choice among ends. This, then, leads to the question of motiva­
tion, or the impetus for action by the testator. In classical psychol­
ogy, motivation was considered purely as a conscious, rational 
selection of ends seen as pleasurable or of avoiding ends seen as 
painful. To a certain extent, modern theory accepts this principle 
and refines it into motivation factors. One set of human motives 
runs to insuring survival and security. Another runs to satisfaction 
and stimulation of desires. The first set are labeled "deficiency 
motives," the second set, "abundancy motives."138 
Deficiency motives seek to avoid anxiety or to remove de­
ficiencies in the environment. Abundancy motives, on the other 
hand, are directed toward self-realization. "Abundancy motives" 
are those motives pertainirig to one's self and to one's relationship 
with others and go toward or tend toward self-actualization. 139 
This, too, seems to follow from Shaffer's notion of property as an 
extension of the personality. In Freudian terms, property allows an 
ego to project undesirable or forbidden feelings upon an inanimate 
object, rather than upon another person. 140 Such an activity is a 
highly sophisticated form of animism. The ego is also permitted to 
deal with the resolution of a particular conflict, in most cases of 
aging and exile from active social participation, with the ego's need 
to control its situation. This makes the motivational analysis of 
willmaking extremely complex. This complexity explains in part, as 
intimated by In re Powers' Estate, 141 why lawyers and judges cannot 
understand psychiatric explanations of the factors involved in 
willmaking. 
v. Schindel, 153 Md. 547, 581, 138 A. 415, 428 (1927), and McCutchen v. Gigous, 
150 Md. 79, 86-87, 132 A. 425,429 (1926). 
138. D. KRECH, R. CRUTCHFIELD, & N. LIVSON, supra note 128, at 492-98. 
139. Id. at 498. 
140. See A. WATSON, supra note 109, at 121-22, for an explanation of the de­
fense mechanism of projection. Watson, in describing the anal period of develop­
ment, hints at the "projection" of feelings about the child's body onto fecal matter. 
The projection may survive into later development phases in which property be­
comes a form of "fecal matter" to be manipulated by the ego. 
141. See text accompanying notes 345-53 infra. 
1979] TESTAMENTARY C~PACITY 	 463 
This article cannot present a definitive, research-based conclu­
sion on the motivational pattern behind willmaking and how the 
"rational plan" criterion expresses any limitation on socially accept­
able motivation. It should be sufficient to note at this preliminary 
stage that "the ability to make a rational plan" does not encompass 
the spectrum of permissible and impermissible motives for making 
a will or for selecting one beneficiary over another. The judicial 
attempts to deal with motivation generally are confined to con­
scious motivation, as in the case of the "insane delusion" or "will 
procured by undue influence." It suffices, however, to note that 
"the ability to form a rational plan" really means the ability to 
choose socially acceptable motivation to achieve self-actualization 
through willmaking. 
In summary, the third element of the capacity test is a ques­
tion of determining motivation for making a will. If a testator is 
unable to relate to reality in a significantly effective manner, then 
his reality principle, his ego, is impaired. His motivation for acting 
then reverts to an unacceptable primitive level, and the "rational 
plan" for willmaking is no longer present. 
E. 	 A Tentative Psychology of Property 
Although this article cannot propose a final solution to the is­
sues raised by the traditional law of testamentary capacity, it can 
probe these legal formulae, discover their psychological bases, and 
suggest a more comprehensive psychology of property. Willmaking 
appears to be one of the central, existential acts of any person with 
respect to his or her property. For this reason, some working 
theories relating to the role of property and a pathology of property 
manipulation should clarifY the lag between the initial formulation 
of the legal rules about making wills and what has since been dis­
covered about human behavioral phenomena. 
1. 	 The Psychological Role of Property 
The principal role of property is to extend human personal­
ity142 laterally and vertically in space and time. This extension is 
142. Personality in this sense transcends the behaviorists' definition of "the in­
tegration of all an individuals characteristics into a unique organization that de­
temines, and is modified by, his attempts at adaptation to his continually changing 
environment." D. KRECH, R. CRUTCHFIELD, & N. LIVSON, supra note 128, at 696. 
The wider meaning of the term, as used by Gabriel Marcel, Nicholas Berdayaeve, and 
Carl Rogers, summarizes the application of this notion of personality to psychology 
and to psychotherapy in general. In this wider sense, property functions as the ex­
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accomplished by using property instrumentally to achieve the 
dynamic ends of human personality. There appear to be four ways 
in which human personality makes use of property in both lateral 
and vertical extension of its "boundaries." 
The first way in which property is used is to establish territo­
riality, or living space. 143 Every human personality seems 
motivated to acquire living space in the sense of a field of operation 
for itself among other personalities, together with a necessary life 
support system, the means with which to ensure psychological and 
physical survival. Without living space of this type, it is difficult to 
see how any human personality can establish its identity as a spe­
cific actor. The second function seems to be the appropriation of 
property beyond simple living space, what Freudian psychology 
has termed the "hoarding" level of development. 144 Appropriation 
of property beyond what is required for living space is apparently 
one way of dealing with reality as support for further expressions of 
personality. It is the foundation for the projective activities of shar­
ing and creating. Insofar as it represents a basis for these activities, 
hoarding is necessary to one's personality. The next use of property 
is sharing. Sharing seems to be as necessary to one's personality as 
is acquiring living space or hoarding. Sharing is also an activity of 
the human personality relating to how the personality works with 
property. By allowing other persons to participate in one's living 
terior principle of integration with reality other than spiritual. See N. BERDAYAEVE, 
SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 20-59 (1944); G. MARCEL, THE MYSTERY OF BEING 182-209 
(1960); C. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED THERAPY 491-533 (1965). 
143. Living space, in this sense, means something much more profound than 
the half-baked theories of Dr. Goebbels and Adolph Hitler. In this sense, every or­
ganism requires a life-support system which includes an operating territory and a 
biological basis for continued existence. In the case of humans, who are conscious of 
their own existence and who operate in a nonphysical manner at times, this concept 
includes a nonmaterial zone of privacy functioning like territoriality in addition to 
the necessity for physical space to live and a life-support system by which to live. 
For additional material, see BEHAVIOR AND ENVIRONMENT, THE USE OF SPACE BY 
ANIMALS AND MEN (A. Esser ed. 1971). 
144. S. FREUD, Infantile Sexuality, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF SIGMUND 
FREUD 389 (1938). This is, of course, based on Freud's theory of three levels of 
sexual development-oral, anal, and genital-around which he initially structured his 
theory of human behavior and typed functional behavior disorders. The "hoarding" 
state in Freud's theory corresponded to the anal level of development, to which 
Freud related later "fixations" to the tension between the child who does not wish to 
accept toilet training and the parent forcing early toilet habits on the child. These 
similes have limited value to our discussion of testamentary capacity; it suffices to 
say that humans to some extent hoard, and hoarding appears to be behavior subject 
to some modification under exterior environmental influence. 
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space and one's acquisitions beyond living space, one does in fact 
extend control over those who share, whether that control be gen­
erated and sustained by defensive mechanisms or by relationships 
with others which are non-defensive in character. Finally, property 
acquired beyond living space may be employed in creative or artis­
tic activities. This involves the remolding or transformation of 
property into forms which express one's personality. 
In dynamic situations, these four property functions will over­
lap, and will be presented in rather complex empirical fields. For 
example, a man who is married desires to build a house. The house 
clearly relates to his living space, his life support system. It also 
requires some degree of hoarding activity as a preparation for the 
creative act of building the house. He has to come up with the 
downpayment and a mortgage to finance the house. All this re­
quires accumulation of "excess" property or a surplus in the eco­
nomic sense, which translates into hoarding. Finally, the house will 
be shared with his wife and children who will co-participate socially 
in his hoarding and artistic work. 
The relatively simple description of house building includes a 
number of complex dynamic situations. It illustrates a typical lat­
eral extension of one's personality through the four functional uses 
of property. Vertical extension, by contrast, pushes the activities of 
a human personality beyond the time frame of its concrete exis­
tence. It projects the personality's existence beyond the present 
into the future. In this sense, property functions as a form of "im­
mortality. "145 Take the example of the man who has built a house 
for his wife and children. If that man provides that at his death his 
widow will have the house, he controls the activity of his wife after 
his death by using the family home, a "sharing place," as her "liv­
ing space." Consequently, he has expanded his personality beyond 
the limits of his lifespan to affect others after he is dead. 
An artist achieves similar results by his creativity. For exam­
ple, a painter transforms canvas, oils, and pigment into a painting, 
which in theory will be treasured by persons after his death. He 
projects into his creative act a great deal of who and what he is, 
145. See T. SHAFFER, supra note 106. One of Shaffer's recurrent themes is the 
relationship between planning post-death transfers and the human search for life be­
yond death. This theme seems to be confirmed by other phenomena associated with 
property disposition, such as the artist's approach to his canvas and the writer's ap­
proach to his novel, both of which indicate an attempt to prolong one's lifetime 
through a creative act resulting in a work of art. Graffiti, incidentally, may serve the 
same unconscious necessity as sculpture or prose. 
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and that projection into property form confers a degree of "im­
mortality" on him. He also engages in post-death "sharing" with 
others the beauty of what he has made. If the painter makes a will 
which leaves his art to a museum, he protects his creative act by 
post-death projection of his personality as a new hoarding activity. 
In place of his hoarding his created work, the museum will hoard it 
for him after death. 
2. 	 Normal and Pathological Projections of 

Personality Through Property 

It seems fair to say that one should regard the use of property 
in extension of human personality as normal, unless it is flawed by 
a pathological use of property. To compress a great deal of matter 
into a few lines, if a personality uses property so as to destroy itself, 
that use is pathological. 146 The destruction of personality structure 
in this sense corresponds to neurotic and psychotic behavior. 
Since these tentative notions have not been confirmed by 
anything stronger than a lawyer's clinical impression, it would 
probably be inappropriate to draw a laundry list describing the 
pathological uses of property by human personality. In Freudian 
terminology, the human ego employs a number of defense 
mechanisms against threatening exterior forces. 147 These defense 
146. Pathology in this sense means disintegrative behavior which, rather than 
integrating the functional or behavioral aspect of personality, tends to disrupt and 
impair the functioning of this level of personality. More deeply, this notion comes 
about as close to the ordinary Christian notion of sin as behavioral science allows 
itself to do. The "personalist" sees the phenomenon of human personality wounded, 
or held captive by inappropriate behavior toward the world, and liberated only by 
correct appreciation of the personality's situation in the world. N. BERDAYAEVE, supra 
note 142, at 29. 
147. A. WATSON, supra note 109, at 112-32. 
The most important notion for lawyers to retain is that defense mechanisms are 
characteristically unconscious reactions to an anxiety-producing situation. What de­
fense mechanisms do is attach anxiety feelings to other "things" in order to deal with 
the state. The usual classification of defense mechanisms includes: (a) sublimation, 
or the redirection of an instinctive drive in conformity with some supposedly higher 
motivation directed in terms of a right/wrong dichotomy; (b) repression, which is an 
unconscious, purposeful forgetting of internal or extcrnal phenomena which are pain­
ful; (c) projection, in which painful or objectionable feelings or ideas are perceived 
as originating from other persons or things, and not belonging to one's self; (d) de­
nial, in which obvious reality factors are subconsciously treated as non-existent; (e) 
introjection, where the ego incorporates human behavior patterns or actions from 
others and attaches it to itself; (f) reaction formation, which is the establishing of a 
rigid attitude or character trait as a means of preventing an undesirable or painful 
attitude or trait of the opposite kind from operating; (g) undoing, which is an 
operation by which the ego does one thing for the purpose of undoing or neutraliz­
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mechanisms are inappropriate in the sense that if an ego employs 
such mechanisms, it is likely to lose touch with reality. 148 
Property clearly can be part of ego defense mechanisms in this 
sense. An example will make this more clear. 
A man desires to control and dominate his daughter's life. This 
need to dominate his daughter is probably based upon fundamental 
flaws in the man's ego structure; his feelings of inadequacy about 
his relationship with his wife, unconscious feelings of hostility to­
ward other men who may make sexual overtures to his daughter, 
and the like. In order to keep his daughter for himself, he turns 
her into a piece of property. This transvaluation of a human person 
into property is fundamentally destructive. He then plots to keep 
his daughter always under his control by showering her with goods, 
paying for her education, and so on, so that she will always "owe" 
him everything, and thus still be possessed by him. 
The defense mechanisms employed by the father to avoid deal­
ing with his own feelings of inadequacy and sexual insufficiency 
include projection, a special form of which is called transference 
and countertransference. 149 First, the father converted his daugh­
ter, another human personality like himself, into a "thing" and 
tried to "possess" it, showing that he really regarded other persons 
as things to be hoarded. Second, he tried to extend his living space 
over his child to avoid facing his unconscious feelings about his 
wife, and probably about his own daughter. If the father cannot 
have forbidden relations with his daughter, he can still "have" her 
by using property to control her future activities. Meanwhile, he 
makes little progress at dealing with his hostilities and his feelings 
of inadequacy. Instead he hides his feelings from himself by this 
game-like strategy. 
These examples could be multiplied and the range of Freudian 
ego defense mechanisms can be matched to manipulation of others 
ing an act previousl}' performed; (h) regression, or temporary or permanent aban­
donment of more mature measures for earlier ones which were appropriate at one of 
the earlier levels of sexual maturation; (i) rationalization, in which the ego substi­
tutes an acceptable reason for an unacceptable one in order to explain a given action 
or attitude; and 0) displacement, where an ego displaces an effect attached to one 
object and attaches it to another. ld. 
148. ld. at 112-13. 
149. ld. at 4-9. Freudian analysis places transference and countertransference at 
the foundation of all therapeutic (counseling) relationships. It holds that the relation­
ship, once established between therapist and client, must be shifted to another au­
tonomous basis before therapy is successful. 
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by the use of property in a pathological manner. The father in the 
preceding example, in all likelihood, will consciously experience his 
attempt to "own" his daughter as an example of his conspicuous 
generosity toward his offspring. It should be sufficient to say that 
the use of property is a vital factor in the total strategy that human 
personalities often use to avoid facing their unconscious and con­
scious feelings of hatred, fear, inadequacy, and frustration. 
Consequently, a fully developed psychology of property should 
take into account the various modes by which people utilize prop­
erty to manipulate reality, and describe both the pathology of 
property distribution and the integrative or authentic aspects of 
property distribution. To fully explore individual personality ex­
pansion by means of property, a social psychology of property de­
scribing the social influence on property distribution should be 
developed. This, in the last analysis, is an elaboration on the so­
ciology of wealth and of class. The remainder of the article is an 
appraisai of the Greenwood-Baker formulations about testamen­
tary capacity based upon the psychology of property and wealth 
transfer. 
III. 	 TESTING THE GREENWOOD-BAKER RULE: 
ORGANICALLY IMPAIRED TESTATORS 
The Greenwood-Baker rule was designed to be applied to the 
case of the senile willmaker. It was designed to determine whether 
advancing deterioration of the testator's recall and motivation had 
reached a point where his testamentary freedom should be cut 
off. It has since been applied by the courts to situations in which 
it originally had no application. It has been used to gauge the legal­
ity of the wills of retarded testators, and to measure the accept­
ability of the wills of alcoholics and drug addicts. It has also been 
misapplied· to the case of the senile testator for which it was orig­
inally designed. This section will review the history of the Green­
wood-Baker rule as applied to retarded, handicapped, senile, and 
alcoholic testators. 
A. 	 The Retarded Testator 
The English Statute of Wills provided a simple formula for 
retarded testators: an idiot cannot make a will. The prevailing 19th 
century classification for the mentally retarded divided them into 
three groups: idiots, morons, and imbeciles. An idiot was supposed 
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to possess the mental acuity of a two to seven year old. 150 A moron 
had the mental ability of a child between seven and twelve. 151 Im­
beciles had the mental capacity of someone between twelve and 
whatever level was assigned as mental maturity. Modern medical 
terminology classfies mental retardation as slight, moderate, or se­
vere. Mental retardation is normally the product of brain dam­
age. 152 Brain damage can occur pre-natally, as a result of an illness 
to one's mother such as measles, or post-natally from illness or 
trauma. Brain damage takes many forms, and the resulting impair­
ment to mental functioning varies widely. 
Very few American appellate decisions have seriously dis­
cussed the will making ability of retarded persons. The few that 
have done so include the ancient case of Townsend v. Bogart,153 In 
re Delaveaga's Estate ,154 and In re Glesenkamp's Estate. 155 The fol­
lowing two cases show how courts deal with mentally retarded tes­
tators. 
In In re Teel's Estate/56 Marvin Teel, the testator, was a 
moderately retarded adult. According to testimony given in the will 
contest, he functioned at a competence level of ten to twelve 
years. 157 In 1945, Teel went to an attorney and had a will drawn 
which disinherited his brother, Frank, in favor of Marvin Teel's 
friend, Ruth Roberson,158 who functioned as a mother-substitute 
for Teel after his own mother's death. 159 Within ten months after 
he made his will, Marvin Teel was placed under guardianship. He 
remained under guardianship until his death. 160 Teel died in 1967 
at the age of seventy-seven, leaving his 1945 will. Frank Teel filed 
objections to probate of the 1945 will. The trial court admitted 
150. W. PAGE, THE LAW OF WILLS § 12.25 (1960). 
151. ld. 
152. The medical definition does not appear to have penetrated legal thinking 
at this time. See generally 3B L. GORDY & R. GRAY, ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF 
MEDICINE (1978). 
153. 5 Redf. 93 (N.Y. 1891). 
154. 165 Cal. 607, 133 P. 307 (1913). 
155. 378 Pa. 635, 107 A.2d 731 (1954). 
156. 14 Ariz. App. 371,483 P.2d 603 (1971). 
157. ld. at 372, 483 P.2d at 604. 
158. ld. 
159. ld. The testimony in the case showed that at one time Marvin Teel had 
operated a dairy farm, had been an active gardner, and had been a regular church­
goer. He was literate and able to transact business, insofar as he made purchases at 
the grocery store, maintained and repaired his automobile, and managed his farm. 
160. ld. at 373, 483 P.2d at 605. 
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Tee!' s will to probate, and Frank Teel appealed the decision. The 
Arizona Appellate Court sustained the trial court's judgment. It re­
lied on the traditional Greenwood-Baker rule, finding that Teel had 
fulfilled, by a preponderance of the evidence, the requisite three 
conditions of testamentary capacity.161 
In re Glesenkamp's Estate shows how another jurisdiction has 
dealt with the mentally retarded testator. Joseph A. Glesenkamp 
died at age fifty-nine, unmarried, survived by twenty-two first 
cousins as his next of kin. Glesenkamp made his will in October 
1951, a few months prior to his death from liver cancer.162 At that 
time, Glesenkamp was under guardianship as a "weak-minded per­
son. "163 Apparently the attorney who made the will for Glesen­
kamp had some misgivings because he brought in a psychiatrist to 
examine Glesenkamp. The physician related the results of his ex­
amination at trial: 
Anxious to determine, if I could, to what extent he was 
aware of his worldly goods, we went into that to some extent. 
He had no definite knowledge of his wealth at all. He knew that 
he had a guardian and that money came from the bank to him; 
and that he owned the house he lived in, and that he had 
enough he didn't have to work. I wouldn't feel that beyond that 
he had much knowledge of his means at all. 164 
The physician concluded that Glesenkamp could have capacity to 
make a will if all he was required to know was a general knowledge 
of his property.165 Glesenkamp had made his housekeeper, Mrs. 
Carson, the principal beneficiary of his will. She had been hired by 
his guardian to look after him. 166 His cousins objected to the pro­
bate of the will. The trial court set the will aside. 167 The Pennsyl­
vania Supreme Court affirmed, without extensive legal analysis, 
applying the Greenwood-Baker test. 16S It concluded that a finding 
of capacity would have been contrary to the overwhelming weight 
of the evidence. 169 
161. Id. 
162. 378 Pa. at 638, 107 A.2d at 733. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 639, 107 A.2d at 733. 
165. Id. According to the contestant's witnesses, however, Glesenkamp's 
functional ability was that of a five-year-old boy. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 640, 107 A.2d at 734. 
168. Id. at 640, 107 A.2d at 733-34. 
169. Id. 
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In both cases, the reviewing court tried to apply the 
Greenwood-Baker rule to the recall and motivation of a retarded 
testator. The evidence relating to the ordinary elements of capacity 
contained the usual mish-mash of lay opinions, medical reports, 
and hypothetical expertise. Joseph Glesenkamp appeared to have a 
pretty good grasp of what he owned and how he could use it. Mar­
vin Teel had engaged in business with some outside help. Both had 
detractors who thought them "feeble minded" or "unable to care for 
themselves." Teel made his will before undergoing formal guardi­
anship; Glesenkamp made his after being placed under guard­
ianship. Each will disinherited blood relations in favor of a friend. 
The court's strict application of the Greenwood-Baker rule caused 
them to miss some of the real issues involved. Neither case re­
viewed the physiology of brain damage, nor the psychology of brain 
damaged persons. Neither case inquired into recall impairment 
or motiviational deficiencies relating to property. In each case, the 
object of the will would ordinarily by socially acceptable: benefit­
ting a close friend. It is difficult to see the basis for the differing 
results. 
B. The Handicapped Testator 
The situation of the handicapped testator really has nothing to 
do with the Greenwood-Baker rule. However, some lawyers have 
accepted cases contesting wills made by handicapped people. 
"Handicapped" in this instance means physical disorders which im­
pair motor-sensory skills without significant change in psychological 
behavior. The will contest waged against the handicapped testator 
may unconsciously arise from the dread of most people for certain 
types of illness. In this classification, one finds the case of the blind 
testator,170 the deaf testator,l71 and the testator who has Parkin­
son's disease,172 epilepsy,173 locomotor ataxia,174 or tuberculosis. 175 
170. See, e.g., Coleman v. Walls, 241 Ark. 842,410 S.W.2d 749 (1967) (will of 
100-year-old blind testator, attacked for want of capacity, sustained); Frazie's Ex'r v. 
Frazie, 186 Ky. 613, 217 S.W. 668 (1919); Kingman v. Damon, 290 Mass. 472, 195 
N.E. 740 (1935) (testator memorized parent's will, then reproduced it verbatim). 
171. See, e.g., Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324 (1849); Tidholm v. Tidholm, 391 Ill. 
19,62 N.E.2d 473 (1945); In re Eklund's Estate, 186 Minn. 129,242 N.W. 467 (1932). 
172. Nowlin v. Spakes, 250 Ark. 26, 463 S.W.2d 650 (1971). 
173. Bodine v. Bodine, 241 Ky. 706,44 S.W.2d 840 (1932); Lynn v. Ada Lodge 
No. 146, 398 P.2d 491 (Okla. 1965). 
174. Succession of Moody, 227 La. 609, 80 So. 2d 93 (1955). 
175. Edwardson v. Gerwein, 41 N.D. 506,171 N.W. 101 (1919). 
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Even the will of a diabetic has been assailed. 176 
Lynn v. Ada Lodge 146177 is a representative case from this 
class. David Ray McNeil, the testator, was an epileptic. 178 He was 
employed as a night watchman. His physician described him as 
rational and of sufficient mental capacity to know the nature and 
extent of his property and his family members, and to make a ra­
tional plan to deal with his property at death,179 In 1947, his 
mother filed an insanity proceeding against him and had him com­
mitted after an episode in which David McNeil tore up the McNeil 
home. 18o Mrs. McNeil had a change of heart and obtained her 
son's discharge. However, her son attributed his discharge to the 
efforts of the local International Order of Odd Fellows Lodge. 18l 
McNeil believed until his death that his mother and sister wanted 
to put him away. There was apparently some basis for his belief. 182 
The trial court probated his will which left all of his property to the 
Odd Fellows Lodge. 183 The contestants argued that McNeil had an 
insane delusion which led him to make this disposition. The Su­
preme Court of Oklahoma sustained the trial court, finding that 
McN eil' s blind hatred of his mother and sister were related to his 
physical condition. 184 One would wish that the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court had restated the evidence relating to McNeil's ailment in 
clearer terms. 185 If McNeil's condition led to moments of total 
mental dysfunction without apparent physical symptoms, the so­
called "pyscho-motor" seizure, then his will may have been vitiated 
by his organic condition. 
176. In re Jacobsen's Will, 223 Wis. 508,270 N.W. 923 (1937). 
177. 398 P.2d 491 (Okla. 1965). 
178. Id. at 493. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 494. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 495. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 497. 
185. The description without diagnosis appears to parallel psychomotor 
epilepsy. Epilepsy is generally classified as idiopathic or acquired. Acquired 
epilepsy includes all those cases in which a seizure is produced by a structural le­
sion or condition of the brain, which causes an alteration in its electrical activity. 
When no pathology is detected, the condition is described as idiopathic, since no 
cause has been isolated. 3B L. GORDY & R. GRAY, supra note 152, § 92.05. Psycho­
motor epileptic seizures are a type of acquired epilepsy produced by a brain lesion. 
These seizures manifest automatism characteristic of this form of seizure and some 
neuropsychiatric behavior disorders. Id. § 92.40. According to Penfield, a person 
suffering from a psychomotor attack may waik and engage in activity, but will be 
unable to make judgments or decisions, will not be open to reason, and will be 
resistive of any attempt to control his behavior. Id. § 92.41. 
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In Nowlin v. Spakes l86 the testator had Parkinson's disease. 
His will gave a considerable estate to his sister, rather than to his 
mother. The testator was thirty-seven years old when he made his 
will. His sister assisted him in signing, due to his palsy.187 His 
mother's objections to probate survived demurrer where the sole 
basis of attack was his lack of capacity. 188 
The handicapped testator's will may get rough treatment from 
his surviving family. Wills made by handicapped persons get 
crammed into the ancient Greenwood-Baker formula regardless of 
whether the type of handicap has anything at all to do with the 
three elements of the classical definition of testamentary capacity. 
In both Lynn and Nowlin the testator's organic impairment was 
neither discussed nor considered as a possible basis for generating 
a legal rule appropriate to this class of cases. In both cases, some 
hints of serious organic impairment of motivation can be found, but 
no discussion helps one to understand the real basis for decision. 
The expansive legalisms applied obscure the problems of each tes­
tator. In Lynn, most informed professionals would think the ob­
ject of the will was not socially acceptable. In Nowlin, the unde­
sirability of the object of the will is less clear. 
C. The Senile Testator 
The last and largest category of testators in this section are the 
senile testators. The cases appear to make no distinction between 
senile dementia and arteriosclerotic psychosis.189 Consequently, 
two kinds of mental impairment have been classed under "senility:" 
impairment without definite cause due in general to aging; and im­
pairment caused by hardening of the brain arteries. Both types 
lead to shrinking or atrophy of the brain and loss of brain tissues 
caused by brain cells dying from lack of oxygen. Brain cells do not 
replace themselves; thus the loss of brain size as a result of cell 
death. This shrinking mayor may not produce behavioral changes 
in affected people. 
186. 25 Ark. 26, 463 S.W.2d 651 (1971). 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Senile psychosis and arteriosclerotic brain disease have different etiol­
ogies. Arteriosclerotic psychosis results from the decrease in the supply of blood to 
the brain as the arteries to the brain are narrowed by the aging process. Upon au­
topsy, an older person will show marked changes in the shape and size of the brain. 
This shrinking or atrophy of the brain occurs because brain ceIfs die from lack of 
oxygen and do not replace themselves. See Smith & Hager, supra note 93, at 413-14. 
This shrinking mayor may not produce behavioral changes in affected people. Id. 
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The accepted medical diagnosis for behavioral change pro­
duced by these organic changes is "chronic brain syndrome­
psychosis due to cerebral arteriosclerosis."19o These organic be­
havior changes probably form the greatest single source of will con­
tests. 191 The wills of very old people whose memory is failing, 
whose spacial orientation is defective, who may "see things" or 
"talk to the walls" or otherwise behave queerly or unacceptably, 
regularly get challenged, especially when such wills are disinherit ­
ing wills. Whether these behavioral changes result from hardening 
of the arteries or from some other source,192 they clearly affect the 
willmaker's ability to function with respect to recall and motivation. 
The courts generally hold that a testator may make a will, 
even if he or she is very old. 193 However, the changes associated 
190. 3 C. FRANKEL, LAWYERS MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 17.9 (1970). The symp­
toms which indicate this condition are (a) impairment of orientation, (b) impairment 
of memory, (c) impairment of other intellectual functions such as comprehension, 
calculation, knowledge, and learning, (d) impairment of judgment, and (e) instability 
of emotional reactions. These symptoms may be accompanied by vivid auditory or 
visual hallucinations, or both. A second diagnosis with corresponding indications is 
"chronic brain syndrome-psychosis due to senility." This, of course, is an organic 
condition produced by the loss of brain tissue. See note 197 supra. 
191. See Appendix, Table IV. 
192. Smith & Hager, supra note 93, at 415. The literature indicates that the two 
organic psychoses may be two sides or descriptions of the same condition. 
193. See, e.g., the following cases: 
Alabama: Cox v. Martin, 250 Ala. 401,403,34 So. 2d 463, 464 (1947); 
Arkansas: Yarbrough v. Moses, 223 Ark. 489, 497, 267 S.W.2d 289, 294 (1954); 
Toombs v. Blankenship, 215 Ark. 551, 557, 221 S.W.2d 417, 420 (1949); Pernot v. 
King, 194 Ark. 896, 910, 110 S.W.2d 539, 545 (1937); 

California: In re Lockwood's Estate, 254 Cal. App. 2d 309, 315, 62 Cal. Rptr. 

230, 233 (1967); In re Goetz's Estate, 253 Cal. App. 2d 107, 113, 61 Cal. Rptr. 

181, 185 (1967); In re Teed's Estate, 112 Cal. App. 2d 638, 645, 247 P.2d 54, 58 





Florida: In re Dunson's Estate, 141 So. 2d 601, 604 (Fla. 1962); 

Illinois: Logsdon v. Logsdon, 412 Ill. 19, 26, 104 N.E.2d 622, 625 (1952); Chal­

liner v. Smith, 396 Ill. 106, 124, 71 N.E.2d 324, 333 (1947); Pooler v. Cristman, 

145 Ill. 405, 411, 34 N.E. 57, 59 (1893); Auerbach v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank 

& Trust Co., 340 Ill. App. 64, 76, 91 N.E.2d 144, 150 (1950); Children's Home of 

Rockford v. Andress, 311 Ill. App. 446,456,36 N.E.2d 596, 601 (1941); 

Indiana: Zawacki v. Drake, 149 Ind. App. 270, 273, 271 N.E.2d 511, 512 (1971); 

Iowa: In re Ruedy's Estate, 245 Iowa 1307, 1314,66 N.W.2d 387, 391 (1954); In 

re Groen's Estate, 245 Iowa 634, 637, 62 N.W.2d 143, 145 (1954); In re Sinift's 

Estate, 233 Iowa 800, 810, 10 N.W.2d 550, 554 (1943); Hanrahan v. O'Toole, 139 

Iowa 229, 234,117 N.W. 675, 678 (1908); 

Kentucky: New v. Creamer, 275 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Ky. 1955); Tye v. Tye, 312 Ky. 

812, 816, 229 S.W.2d 973, 975 (1950); Burgess v. Belford, 306 Ky. 711, 714, 209 
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with aging, such as memory loss, regressive behavior, personal un­
S.w.2d 90, 91 (1948); Perkins' Guardian v. Bell, 294 Ky. 767, 777, 172 S.W.2d 
617,622-23 (1943); Frazie's Ex'r v. Frazie, 186 Ky. 613, 622, 217 S.W. 668, 672 
(1919); Robinson v. Davenport, 179 Ky. 598, 603, 201 S.W. 28, 30 (1918); 
Maine: Appeal of Martin, 133 Me. 422, 427-28,179 A. 655, 659 (1935); Appeal of 
Rogers, 126 Me. 267, 283, 138 A. 59, 66 (1927); In re Chandler's Will, 102 Me. 
72, 88, 66 A. 215, 221 (1906); 
Maryland: Gilbert v. Gaybrick, 195 Md. 297, 304, 73 A.2d 482, 484 (1950); Riggs 
v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 186 Md. 54, 61, 46 A.2d 97, 100 (1946); Drury v. 
King, 182 Md. 64, 73, 32 A.2d 371, 375 (1943); Cronin v. Kimble, 156 Md. 489, 
494, 144 A. 698, 700 (1928); 
Minnesota: Schmidt v. Schmidt, 47 Minn. 451, 457, 50 N.W. 598, 600 (1891); 

Missouri: Ahmann v. Elmore, 211 S.W.2d 480, 489 (Mo. 1948); Lee v. Ullery, 

346 Mo. 236, 244, 140 S.W.2d 5, 10 (1940); Proffer v. Proffer, 342 Mo. 184, 195, 





Nebraska: In re Urbanowski's Estate, 191 Neb. 308, 311, 215 N.W.2d 74, 76 

(1974); In re Scoville's Estate, 149 Neb. 415, 425, 31 N.W.2d 284, 290 (1948); In 

re Goist's Estate, 146 Neb. I, 13, 18 N.W.2d 513, 520 (1945); In re Bose's Estate, 

136 Neb. 156, 163,285 N.W. 319, 324-25 (1939); 

Nevada: In re Peterson's Estate, 77 Nev. 87, 109,360 P.2d 259, 270 (1961); 

New Jersey: In re Livingston's Estate, 5 N.J. 65, 77, 73 A.2d 916, 922-23 (1950); 

In re Herrman's Estate, 124 N.J. 542,543,3 A.2d 148, 148 (1938); In re Gotchel's 

Estate, 10 N.J. Super. 208, 212, 76 A.2d 901, 903 (1950); 

New York: In re Coddington's Will, 281 App. Div. 143, 146, 118 N.Y.S.2d 525, 

528 (1952); In re Hollenbeck's Will, 65 Misc. 2d 796, 799, 318 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608 

(Sur. Ct. 1969); In re Brown's Will, 171 Misc. 1008, lOll, 15 N.Y.S.2d 387, 

390-91 (Sur. Ct. 1939); In re Vonhaus's Will, 167 Misc. 660,661,4 N.Y.S.2d 599, 

600 (Sur. Ct. 1938); In re Pratt's Estate, 152 Misc. 560, 562, 274 N.Y.S. 417, 419 

(Sur. Ct. 1934); 

Oklahoma: Dunkin v. Rice, 197 Okla. 150, 151, 169 P.2d 210, 211 (1946) (deed); 

In re Sixkillers' Estate, 168 Okla. 302, 305, 32 P.2d 936, 938 (1934); 

Oregon: In re Bond's Estate, 172 Or. 509,520,143 P.2d 244, 249 (1943); McGreal 

v. Culhane, 172 Or. 337, 343, 141 P.2d 828, 831 (1943); 

Pennslyvania: Williams v. McCarroll, 374 Pa. 281, 293, 97 A.2d 14,20 (1953); In 

re Roberts' Estate, 373 Pa. 7, 16,94 A.2d 780, 784 (1953); 

South Dakota: In re Melcher's Estate, 232 N.W.2d 442, 445 (S.D. 1975); In re 

Anders' Estate, 88 S.D. 631, 636, 226 N.W.2d 170, 173 (1975); Peterson v. Imb­

sen, 46 S.D. 540, 546, 194 N.W. 842, 844 (1923); 

Tennessee: Rogers v. Hickam, 30 Tenn. App. 504, 515-16, 208 S.W.2d 34, 38-39 

(1947); Melody v. Hamblin, 21 Tenn. App. 687, 694, 115 S.W.2d 237,242 (1937); 

Texas: Jowers v. Smith, 237 S.W.2d 805, 810 (Tex. Ct. App. 1950); Green v. 

Dickson, 208 S.w.2d 119, 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 1948); 

Virginia: Ferguson v. Ferguson, 169 Va. 77,89, 192 S.E. 774,778 (1937); Jenkins 

v. Trice, 152 Va. 411, 421, 147 S.E. 251, 261 (1929); 





West Virginia: Prichard v. Prichard, 135 W. Va. 767,778,65 S.E.2d 65,71 (1951); 

Wisconsin: In re Washburn's Will, 248 Wis. 467, 474, 22 N.W.2d 512,515 (1946). 
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tidiness, or peculiar behavior, are often the alleged basis for a will 
contest. None of these changes, unless psychotic, is totally dys­
functional. However, the courts have thrown around psychological 
and medical jargon about "senile dementia" for the past century 
with little care for precision or accuracy. It is therefore very dif­
ficult for students of the case method to determine what the courts 
are really doing with the senile testator. 
1. The Foregetful Testator 
The Greenwood-Baker rule, parenthetically, was designed for 
the senile testator. If a person can recall his family, his property, 
and make a plan for after-death disposition of his property, the 
Greenwood-Baker rule has been satisfied and the person's will is 
acceptable. Unfortunately, the legal test has been confused with 
diagnostics. In many cases, the testator has been described by his 
attending physician or an alienistI94 as "having senile dementia" or 
suffering from "senility." Without differentiation, the case is 
treated as that of an old person's will without regard to the particu­
lar psychotic behavioral patterns. The will is usually admitted to 
probate. I95 This is clearly true in those cases involving moderate to 
severe impairment of recall, or, in laymen's terms, the "failure of 
memory" cases. In most instances, the will of a person who has 
moderate to severe recall impairment will be probated even though 
he has manifested extensive difficulty in recalling what he owns or 
whom his next of kin may be. I96 
194. An alienist in this sense refers to a professional expert witness hired to 
testify" at trial. 
195. See, e.g., Walters v. Heaton, 223 Iowa 405, 271 N.W. 310 (1937); Albright 
v. Moeckly, 202 Iowa 565, 210 N.W. 813 (1926); Byrne v. Fulkerson, 254 Mo. 97, 162 
S.W. 171 (1914); In re Scoville's Estate, 149 Neb. 415, 31 N.W.2d 284 (1948); In re 
Bose's Estate, 136 Neb. 156,285 N.W. 319 (1939). 
196. See, e.g., In re Dobrzensky's Estate, 105 Cal. App. 2d 134, 139, 232 P.2d 
886,889 (1951); In re Ridgeway's Estate, 92 Cal. App. 2d 325, 328, 206 P.2d 892, 894 
(1949); In re Selb's Estate, 84 Cal. App. 2d 46, 49, 190 P.2d 277, 280 (1948); Chil­
dren's Home of Rockford v. Andress, 311 Ill. App. 446, 456, 36 N.E.2d 596, 601 
(1941); In re Richardson's Estate, 199 Iowa 1320, 1322,202 N.W. 114, 116 (1925); In 
re Harris' Estate, 166 Kan. 368, 372, 201 P.2d 1062, 1065 (1949); Tye v. Tye, 312 Ky. 
812, 816, 229 S.W.2d 973, 975 (1950); Sloan v. Sloan, 303 Ky. 180, 185, 197 S.W.2d 
77, 79-80 (1946); Kentucky Trust Co. v. Gore, 302 Ky. 1, 8, 192 S.W.2d 749, 752 
(1946); Perkins' Guardian v. Bell, 294 Ky. 767, 777, 172 S.w.2d 617, 622-23 (1943); 
McCrocklin's Adm'r v. Lee, 247 Ky. 31, 39, 56 S.W.2d 564, 568-69 (1933); In re 
Paquin's Estate, 328 Mich. 293, 302, 43 N.W.2d 858, 862 (1950); In re Nickel's Es­
tate, 321 Mich. 519, 526, 32 N.W.2d 733, 736 (1948); In re Grow's Estate, 299 Mich. 
133, 138, 299 N.W. 836, 838 (1941); In re Borstad's Appeal, 232 Minn. 365, 371, 45 
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An illustration of the type should suffice. In McGreal v. 
Culhane,197 Daniel Barrett, a seventy-six year old bachelor, died in 
Portland, Oregon as a result of kidney complications. He left the 
residue of his estate, about $10,000, to the surviving family of his 
late uncle Daniel Culhane of Rice County, Minnesota. 198 Daniel 
Culhane died in 1902. The will was made May 10, 1940. When 
Barrett had immigrated from Ireland in the 1880's, he lived with 
his uncle Dan, who supported him for about a year. 199 Barett's two 
earlier wills had left his estate to his brother's family. 200 When 
Barrett made his last will in 1940, he could no longer recall the 
names of Daniel Culhane's children to whom he was to leave his 
estate. 201 Naturally, his brother's children filed a caveat charging 
that Barrett lacked capacity. The Oregon Supreme Court sustained 
probate of Barrett's will. 202 So it would appear that a testator who 
cannot even give the number or names of the persons to whom he 
wishes to leave his estate has "capacity" despite severe recall prob­
lems. 
2. The Childish Testator 
In addition to the subclass of forgetful testators, there are the 
childish testators. The typical childish testator is an individual who 
regresses to very childish behavior patterns before or at the time of 
making a will. His will is attacked as the product of an unsound 
mind. Usually, such attacks fail,203 In re Scoville's Estate204 is a 
representative example of this genre. W.A. Scoville, the testator, 
had five daughters and a son named Bud.205 His wife and three 
N.W.2d 828, 831-32 (1951); In re Livingston's Will, 5 N.J. 65, 77, 73 A.2d 916, 920, 

(1950); In re Gotchel's Estate, 10 N.J. Super. 208,212,76 A.2d 901, 903 (1950); In re 

Carpenter's Will, 145 N.Y.S. 365, 368-70 (Sur. Ct. 1913); In re Roberts' Estate, 373 

Pa. 7, 17,94 A.2d 780, 784 (1953); In re Olsh-efski's Estate, 337 Pa. 420, 423, 11 A.2d 

487, 488 (1940); American Trust & Banking Co. v. Williams, 32 Tenn. App. 592, 602, 

225 S.W.2d 79, 83-84 (1949); Rogers v. Hickam, 30 Tenn. App. 504, 512, 208 S.W.2d 





197. 172 Or. 337, 141 P.2d 828 (1943). 
198. Id. at 339, 141 P.2d at 829. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 340, 141 P.2d at 830. 
201. Id. at 341, 141 P.2d at 829-30. 
202. Id. at 344-45, 141 P.2d at 831-32. 
203. See, e.g., Walters v. Heaton, 223 Iowa 405, 271 N.W. 310 (1937); In re 
Harris' Estate, 166 Kan. 368, 201 P.2d 1062 (1949). 
204. 149 Neb. 415, 31 N.W.2d 284 (1948). 
205. Id. at 419, 31 N.W.2d at 287. 
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of his five daughters survived him.206 Scoville made three wills in 
close proximity. One dated September 1942, left his home farm to 
one daughter, and cash gifts to the other two. A second will made 
July 8, 1943, devised the home farm to Scoville's second daughter, 
Flossie Wensky. A third and last will executed in August 1943, 
when Scoville was eighty-three, shifted the home farm for a third 
time to his youngest daughter, Orpha Cross. 207 
The trial produced much testimony showing that W.A. 
Scoville became very eccentric and childish after the death of his 
son in 1942. He accused his grandchildren of stealing his tools. He 
wanted all the turtledoves shot around his house. He threatened to 
take his gun and shoot some relatives he disliked. He alternatively 
quarrelled with Flossie and her husband, and begged and pleaded 
with them to stay and operate the home farm for him. He "made 
peculiar remarks about radio shows." He tied up the family dog on 
th~ porch.. with a chain so short it could not get off the porch to 
eliminate, then kicked the dog for making a mess. 208 The contes­
tant produced an expert of unknown specialty who testified that in 
his opinion Scoville suffered from "senile dementia" and could not 
have understood except in a superficial way what he did when he 
changed his will.209 The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that 
the trial court had not erred in refusing to submit the issue of 
testamentary capacity to the jury.210 The supreme court quoted 
extensively from In re Bose's Estate211 in support of the conclusion 
that "senile dementia~does not mean the victim is totally disable 
from making a will. Nebraska law already classed "senile dementia" 
with "insanity."212 In short, the case holds that a person who is 
insane due to the degenerative changes of aging and whose be­
havior is markedly bizarre and childish, may make a will if in the 
balance he can be said to have a superficial knowledge of his prop­
206. Id. 
207. [d. at 420,31 N.W.2d at 288. Orpha Cross offered this will for probate after 
her father's death and Flossie objected to it. At that time, Scoville's wife was men­
tally incompetent. Flossie Wensky had moved back to her father's house in 1942 
when Bud Scoville had suddenly died, leaving the two old people alone. The family 
situation broke down in 1943, and W.A. Scoville and his wife lived with other rela­
tives for the two years prior to Scoville's death on July 29, 1945. [d. at 424, 31 
N.W.2d at 288-89. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 426, 31 N.W.2d at 291. 
210. [d. at 431,31 N.W.2d at 293. 
211. 136 Neb. 156,285 N.W. 319 (1939). 
212. 149 Neb. at 430,31 N.W.2d at 292. 
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erty and his next of kin, and if a plan of disposition can be inferred 
from the operative scheme of the will itself. 
3. The Hallucinating Testator 
The third class of senile testator cases is the hallucinating tes­
tator. This subclass includes the testator who "sees things" or 
"hears things." The Greenwood-Baker rule is applied to this class of 
cases to determine whether the will of the hallucinating testator 
should be probated. Cubbage v. Gray213 is a typical example of 
such cases. In this 1967 Kentucky case, the testator, at age eighty­
two, exhibited some rather exotic behavior. He conversed with 
sticks and other inanimate objects, he thought that a vein of gold 
ran in the mountains behind his house, and he spent most of his 
time up on the mountain digging for gold. 214 His daughter and her 
husband attempted to get the old gentleman to stop his eccentric 
behavior by pleading with him to behave himself. The result was 
that the testator took to heart the conclusion that his daughter and 
her husband were out to kill him. 215 He promptly made a will 
disinheriting her. The resulting will contest ended in a jury verdict 
for the daughter. This verdict was sustained by the Kentucky Court 
of Appeals on the ground that the questions of fact raised by the 
case were proper issues for a jury trial verdict and would not be 
disturbed on appeal. 216 This holding sheds little light on the true 
basis for the court's decision below. 
4. Empirical Analysis of Senile Testator Cases 
The will of a senile testator has about a seventy-nve percent 
chance of being probated after appellate review. 217 Eighty percent 
of the wills of persons legally under guardianship will be admitted 
to probate upon appellate review. 218 In order to clarify this analy­
sis, one should keep in mind that being placed under guardian­
ship is not an adjudication of insanity. Rather, it is a determina­
tion that the ward is incompetent by reason of mental or physical 
disability to manage his own affairs. However, nearly nfty percent 
213. 411 S.w.2d 2.8 (Ky. 1967). 
214. Id. at 28-29. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 29. 
217. See Appendix, Table V. The actual percentages are 68.9 for the proponent 
and 31.1 for the contestant out of 386 appellate decisions spanning 92 years. 
218. See Appendix, Table V. Out of 73 appellate decisions spanning 92 years, 
75.3% went for the proponent and 24.7% for the contestant. 
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of the wills of persons adjudicated insane will be admitted to pro­
bate after appellate review. 219 Consequently, the will of a senile 
testator will probably be probated, despite the fact that that same 
person may be incompetent to manage his own affairs or to make a 
simple contract. This result is outrageous. 
D. 	 The Drugged Testator 
There is yet another class of impaired testators whose wills 
provoke litigation. The wills of opium eaters, morphine addicts, 
people under heavy sedation for pain, and alcoholics are regularly 
challenged by unsatisfied survivors. 220 The lay assumption seems to 
219. Appendix, Table V. Of the nine appellate decisions reviewed, 47.4% went 
for the proponent and 53.6% went for the contestant. 
220. See, e.g., the following cases: 

Alabama: Whitset v. Belue, 172 Ala. 256, 54 So. 677 (19II); 

Arizona: Komadino v. Jack, 55 Ariz. 504, 103 P.2d 669 (1940); 

Arkansas: Brown v. Emerson, 205 Ark. 735, 170 S.W.2d 1019 (1943); 

California: Williams v. Stewart, 65 Cal. App. 2d 533, 151 P.2d 8 (1944); Smith v. 

Frederick, 38 Cal. App. 2d 449, 101 P.2d 551 (1940); Smethhurst v. Smethhurst, 

15 Cal. App. 2d 322,59 P.2d 830 (1936); 

Delaware: Ball v. Kane, 17 Del. (I Penne.) 90, 39 A. 778 (1897); 
Florida: In re Willmott's Estate, 66 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1953) (opiates); Fernstrom v. 

Taylor, 107 Fla. 490, 145 So. 208 (1933); 

Idaho: Yribar v. Fitzpatrick, 91 Idaho 105,416 P.2d 164 (1966); 

Illinois: Applehans v. Jurgenson, 336 Ill. 427, 168 N.E. 327 (1929); 

Iowa: Heller v. Ripperger, 233 Iowa 1356, II N.W.2d 586 (1943); 

Kansas: Pyle v. Millar, 167 Kan. 455, "207 P.2d 483 (1949); Akins v. Akins, 109 

Kan. 453, 199 P. 922 (1921); 

Kentucky: Nunn v. Williams, 254 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1953) (under drugs); Tye v. 

Tye, 312 Ky. 812, 229 S.W.2d 973 (1950) (on opiates); Bickel v. Louisville Trust 

Co., 303 Ky. 356, 197 S.W.2d 444 (1946); Madden v. Cornett, 290 Ky. 268, 160 

S.W.2d 607 (1942); Holliday v. Holliday, 161 Ky. 500, 171 S.W. 156 (1914); 

Maryland: Lynn v. Magness, 191 Md. 674, 62 A.2d 604 (1948) (life insurance 

policy change of beneficiary); 

Massachusetts: Simoneau v. O'Brien, 3II Mass. 68, 40 N.E.2d I (1942); Maynard 

v. Tyler, 168 Mass. 107,46 N.E. 413 (1897); 

Michigan: In re Leech's Estate, 227 Mich. 299, 269 N.W. 181 (1936); 

Mississippi: O'Bannon v. Henrich, 191 Miss. 815, 4 So. 2d 208 (1941); 

Missouri: Byars v. Buckley, 461 S.W.2d 817 (1970); Williams v. Lack, 328 Mo. 

32, 40 S.W.2d 670 (1931); Naylor v. McRuer, 248 Mo. 423, 154 S.W. 772 (1913); 

Montana: Akers v. Morton, 499 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1974) (Indian will); 

New Jersey: Bannister v. Jackson, 46 N.J. Eq. 593, 21 A. 753 (1890); 

New York: In re Heaton's Will, 224 N.Y. 22, 120 N.E. 83 (1918); 

North Carolina: In re Rose's Will, 28 N.C. App. 38, 220 S.E.2d 425 (1975); 

Oklahoma: Bigheart v. Pappan, 482 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir. 1973) (Indian will); Al­
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he that persons under the influence of some drug at the time they 
make a will lack the capacity to make an acceptable post-death dis­
position of their property. This common assumption is not shared 
by the courts. 
1. Alcoholic Testators 
Alcoholics who make wills generally find their wills sustained 
by appellate courts if the contestant is unable to show by the req­
uisite burden of proof that the alcoholic was actually, acutely intox­
icated or experiencing delirum tremens at the time the will was 
signed. A representative case should suffice to show the point. 
In Applehans v. Jurgenson,221 Christine Hagenow, the testa­
tor, owned a three story apartment house in Chicago. She made a 
will June 8, 1926, leaving her apartment house and a considerable 
amount of other property to her boarder, John C. Jurgenson. 222 
Her heirs were her sister Anna Applehans and two nephews. 
Christine Hagenow died twenty-two days later. 223 Her sister filed 
objections to probate of the will. 
A great deal of the evidence presented at trial related to Mrs. 
Hagenow's drinking. A dentist testified that she reported for a den­
tal appointment in 1925 while intoxicated, and then made a pass 
bright v. Miller, 467 P.2d 475 (Okla. 1970); Duckwall v. Lawson, 197 Okla. 472, 

172 P.2d 415 (1946); In re DeVine's Estate, 188 Okla. 423, 109 P.2d 1078 (1941); 

Oregon: Zenger v. Wyss, 177 Or. 382, 163 P.2d 285 (1945) (on morphine); 

Shanks v. Shanks, 168 Or. 650, 126 P.2d 504 (1942) (took opiates); 

Pennsylvania: Reichenbach v. Ruddach, 127 Pa. 564, 18 A. 432 (1889); In re 

Fay's Estate, 163 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 60 A.2d 356 (1948); 

South Carolina: Hellams v. Ross, 268 S.C. 284, 233 S.E.2d 98 (1977); Citizens 





South Dakota: Osterkamp v. Weeks, 250 N.W.2d 286 (S.D. 1977); Fleege v. 

Fleege, 230 N.W.2d 230 (S.D. 1975); 

Tennessee: Alexander v. Rhodes, 222 Tenn. 394, 436 S.W.2d 429 (1968); Ameri­

can Trust & Banking Co. v. Williams, 32 Tenn. App. 592, 225 S.W.2d 79 (1948); 

Texas: Hamil v. Brashear, 513 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974); 

Utah: Burgess v. Colby, 93 Utah 103, 71 P.2d 185 (1937) (heavy sedation); 

Vennont: In re Burt's Estate, 122 Vt. 260, 169 A.2d 32 (1961); 

Virginia: Lewis v. Roberts, 207 Va. 742, 152 S.E.2d 44 (1967); 





221. 336 III. 427, 168 N.E. 327 (1929). 
222. Id. at 429-30, 168 N.E. at 328-29. 
223. Id. at 430, 168 N.E. at 329. 
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at him. 224 Her physician testified that in 1916, when she was 
treated for a fall at a bowling alley, she was intoxicated. This physi­
cian, however, had not seen Mrs. Hagenow since 1922.225 The 
evidence was somewhat equivocal, but it was evident that Mrs. 
Hagenow was an alcoholic for some time before her death. The 
jury set aside her will, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the 
jury verdict as contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. 226 
It applied the Greenwood-Baker rule to determine whether Mrs. 
Hagenow had testamentary capacity. It concluded that, unless the 
contestant showed that Mrs. Hagenow was actually drunk when 
she executed her will, her alcoholism made no difference to the 
court. 227 
2. Addicts 
The wills of persons who are addicted to "hard drugs" such as 
morphine, opium, or heroin, are treated in about the same manner 
as those of alcoholics. If the contestant does not show the addict 
was actually "high" or mentally incompetent by reason of brain 
damage at the precise moment when the addict signed his will, the 
con~estant loses the case. 
In re Walz' Estate228 is a typical addict case. Mrs. Gem Walz, 
the testator, had been addicted to morphine the last twenty-five 
years of her life. 229 She had been under treatment at the Neal 
Institute in Detroit shortly before her death. She took excessive 
doses of paregoric. She appeared to be drowsy and her speech was 
affected by her addiction. 23o She made exaggerated claims regard­
ing her property and the kind of car she owned. 231 On January 25, 
1919, she made her will before three of her roomers in the room­
ing house she managed and owned. She left the house, her princi­
pal assets, to her brother Fred, disinheriting her two other 
brothers who contested the will. 232 
The trial court did not let the case go to the jury because the 
contestant's experts could not state under examination sufficient 
224. ld. at 431, 168 N.E. at 329. 
225. ld. at 432, 168 N.E. at 329. 
226. ld. at 437, 168 N.E. at 331. 
227. ld. at 436-37, 168 N.E. at 330-31. 
228. 215 Mich. 118, 183 N.W. 754 (1921). 
229. ld. at 122, 183 N.W. at 755. 
230. ld. 
231. ld. 
232. ld. at 121-22, 183 N.W. at 754-55. 
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evidence to show that taking morphine and paregoric would so af­
fect the testator's mentality as to make her incapable of making a 
will at law under the Greenwood-Baker rule. The Michigan Su­
preme Court sustained the trial court's decision to withhold the 
case from the jury. 233 
In these two cases, the trial and appellate courts were con­
fronted with a single issue: whether an habitual user of drugs (al­
cohol is a drug) could have sufficient recall and appropriate motiva­
tion to make a will when the addiction had produced significant 
behavioral changes. When such behavioral changes occurred, the 
victim made a will altering an earlier post-death plan. In neither 
case did the reviewing court seem to care whether the testator had 
so lost touch with reality as to be considered psychotic. Such judi­
cial reluctance to inquire into the actual psychological awareness of 
the individual testator persists under the cloak of the principle of 
testamentary freedom. 
Assuming that the testator wishes to extend himself after death 
through his property, his motivation must either coincide or not 
coincide with his reality principle. That is, the motivation to make 
the post-death plan must be tied or linked up to "what is going on 
out there." Persistent use of alcohol, morphine, opium, and other 
depressive drugs, or of hallucinogens, alters one's perception and 
recall and affects motivation. 234 These side effects, in the case of 
chronic alcoholics and drug addicts, persist even when the user is 
not actually under the influence of his drug. If willmaking requires 
a "rational choice," and that selection of alternatives is in theory to 
coincide with socially acceptable ends, then a person under the 
grim sentence of addiction probably will not be able to make a 
socially acceptable choice. However, four out of five wills made by 
alcoholics are sustained at the appellate level,235 and nine out of 
ten wills made by drug addicts or persons under heavy sedation are 
upheld by appellate courts. 236 
233. [d. at 125, 183 N.W. at 756. 
234. For a current analysis of the side effects of these products, see Appendix I 
of S. SNYDER, SECOND REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND 
DRUG ABUSE (1974). 
235. Appendix, Table V. Out of 68 decisions between 1885 and 1977, 80.9% 
went in favor of the proponent and 19.1% in favor of the contestant. 
236. Appendix, Table V. Out of 19 cases over 92 years, 89.5% went for the 
proponent and 10.5% for the contestant. 
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IV. TESTING THE GREENWOOD-BAKER RULE: 
FUNCTIONALLY IMPAIRED TESTATORS 
A. The Psychotic Testator 
Courts have had a difficult time with nonorganic mental illness 
in testators. Judges seem to be unable to grasp psychiatric baffie­
gab used to describe functional mental illness. The results in such 
cases have been bizarre. 237 Generally, a functionally impaired tes­
tator has about a four to one chance of having his will probated, un­
less, of course, he has been adjudicated insane, in which case his 
chances drop to fifty_fifty.238 Judges use a variety of legalistic no­
tions to cope with functional disorder. Some courts employ a "pre­
sumption of continuing insanity," other courts "presume a person 
to be competent," and the usual "burden of proof' rhetoric allows 
courts to make decisions in this area of capacity law without coming 
to grips with the real problems of neurotic and psychotic behavior. 
Two medical terms are generally employed to describe any 
malfunctioning of any person's psychological processes: psychosis 
and neurosis. Psychosis denotes a serious illness in which the 
patient has nearly lost complete touch with reality.239 Neurosis is a 
less severe degree of loss of contact with reality.240 The various 
types of neuroses and psychoses are further broken down into or­
ganic and functional mental illness. 241 
Organic mental illness is caused by damage done to the brain 
or to the central nervous system. Organic mental disease usually 
begins with delirium and progresses through hallucination and 
forms of bizarre behavior. An organically ill patient's mental proc­
esses are nearly always impaired, his level of awareness is inconsis­
tent, and his memory is usually impaired. Unlike the functionally 
ill patient, this person is generally aware that something is wrong 
with him. 242 
237. Appendix, Table V. In 87 cases since 1885, the wills of functionally im­
paired testators have been probated in will contests 74.8% of the time and denied 
probate 25.2% of the time. 
. 238. Id. 
239. 3 C. FRANKEL, supra note 190, § 17.4a. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. § 17.4a & Table II, at 10-11. See also D. KRECH, R. CRUTCHFIELD, & 
N, LIVSON, supra note 128, at 772-84; A. WATSON, supra note 119, at 293-310. 
242. See 3 C. FRANKEL, supra note 190, § 17.9. The following are the generally 
accepted classifications of organic illness. 
(1) Arteriosclerotic psychosis. This condition arises from loss of brain tissue due to a 
decrease in blood supplied to the brain because of the hardening of the arteries. This 
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Functional mental illness, on the other hand, has no indentifi­
able physical cause. Normally, functionally ill patients do not ex­
perience delirium and are unaware that anything is wrong with 
them. They are more capable of normal mental functioning, and 
are often less confused and disoriented, than organically ill pa­
tients. 243 The most critical difference from organic illness is in in­
tellectual functioning; a functional psychotic's intellect is usually 
not impaired. His level of awareness is consistent. His memory is 
generally intact. 244 Functional mental illness is usually classified 
into four distiJ1ct types: schizophrenia,245 paranoia,246 manic de-
is the type of condition which characterizes the "senile testator" cases. 
(2) Psychosis due to alcohol. This condition is similar to (1) above. It involves dam­
age or loss of tissue resulting from chronic overuse of alcoholic beverages. It pro­
duces marked behavioral changes. 
(3) Psychosis due to drugs. Brain damage or shrinking of brain tissue can result from 
the persistent use of morphine, opium, and other narcotic and hallucinogenic drugs. 
(4) Psychosis due to syphillis. One of the frightening side effects of syphillis is the 
damage done to the central nervous system and brain tissue in the tertiary stage. 
This brain damage, resulting in organic impairment of muscular control (locomotor 
ataxia) and behavioral changes of marked and severe character, leads to another 
psychotic condition. 
(5) Psychosis due to convulsive disorders. A side effect of some forms of seizure 
disorders, either "psycho-motor" or "Jacksonian epilepsy," is marked behavioral 
change. This condition may persist after seizures and is a reflection of brain damage 
done by lesions which produce convulsive disorders. 
(6) Psychosis due to systemic infection. The most common form of this condition is 
the "hectic" behavior patterns once characteristic of persons in advanced stages of 
some varieties of tuberculosis. Through a combination of fever and cell death by 
hostile organisims, systemic infectious diseases can produce marked bizarre be­
havioral changes. 
(7) Psychosis due to brain trauma. Blows to the head, tumors, and wounds which 
penetrate the skull and actually destroy brain tissue may lead to behavioral changes 
in which the patient loses touch with reality. 
Id. 
243. See id. § 17.4a & Table II, at 10-11. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. § 17.5. In the early 20th century, this disorder was called dementia 
praecox since it was thought to be a disease entity which arose in prepuberty. 
Schizophrenia is a severe illness characterized by delusions, hallucinations, or both, 
accompanied by infantile behavior patterns. These behavior patterns may include 
withdrawal, apathy, violent excitement, or sitting or lying in one position for hours 
while remaining mute. The most common type of schizophrenia is dementia simplex 
which is a gradual, progressive change of personality, with marked withdrawal and 
apathy. A second species, hebrephrenic schizophrenia, is characterized by childlike 
behavior, peculiar mannerisms, and very disturbed speech patterns. This is the sort 
of illness that appears at the onset of puberty. A thi'rd type, catatonic schizophrenia, 
can consist either of violent excitement, with rambling, incoherent speech, or of sit­
ting or lying in one position for hours at a time while remaining mute. The fourth 
type involves delusions of persecution and is called paranoid schizophrenia. 
246. Id. § 17.7. Paranoia is a distinct disease entity. The paranoiac has delu­
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pressive disorder,247 and involutional disorder. 248 
B. 	 Insanity in Will Contests: Dew v. Clark Rule 
Unfortunately, the creaking rationalizations of the law have not 
caught up with the state of medical art. The law on capacity began 
with the notion that "idiots and persons of non-sane memory" 
should not make wills. 249 This general statement, as elaborated in 
the Greenwood-Baker rule, may have at one evolutionary stage 
adequately handled organically impaired willmakers so long as mak­
ing a will was thought to be as meaningful as making a simple 
contract. However, it never really dealt adequately with functional 
mental disorders in which the testator's troubles did not impair his 
memory. A testator could be found otherwise capable of making a 
will, even if he would have been without criminal responsibility 
under the M'Naughton Rule. 250 Naturally, this did not set well 
with English jurists, since a testator who could not tell right from 
wrong could still have capacity to make a will. In order to cover 
the problems of the fellow who knew the natural objects of his 
bounty, knew the nature and extent of his property, and could 
sions of persecution or of grandeur, without hallucinations. Emotional response is 
consistent with the belief that the individual is pursued by enemies. Intelligence is 
conserved and, except for the delusional state, this sort of patient appears to function 
normally. 
247. ld. § 17.6. Manic depressive disorder is characterized by abnormal 
changes in mood. The illness has two phases: the manic, in which the individual 
becomes overactive and elated and engages in constant activities, and the depres­
sive, which is the reverse. In the depressive stage, the patient becomes decidedly 
underactive, speech slows, and his mood is that of severe depression. In this stage, 
individuals often attempt suicide as a result of overwhelming feelings of unworthi­
ness. 
248. ld. § 17.8. This mental illness is a severe, prolonged depression occuring 
in men between the ages of 50 and 60 and in women between the ages of 40 and 50. 
lt is a result of involutional (change of life) stress. lt occurs most frequently in per­
sons who are unusually clean, meticulous, and perfectionist. It is also characterized 
by delusions that one's stomach has rotted away, the bowels have come out of one's 
body, or one's arms or legs have broken and fallen off. There is not a decrease in 
thinking as in the depressive state of manic depressive disease. 
249. The notion that someone who is insane should not make a will goes back 
to the original Statute of Wills, 1534,34 & 35 Hen. 7, c. 5 (1534). The term "idiot" in 
the 16th century probably covered both mental retardation and psychosis. "Persons 
of non-sane memory" seems to be a typical redundancy. 
250. The M'Naughton rule has long been accepted as the test to be used for the 
defense of insanity. Under this rule, the accused is not criminally responsible for his 
actions if he did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or did not 
know that he was doing wrong at the time he committed the act. See W. LAFAVE & 
A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 273-74 (1972). 
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make a "rational" plan for disposition, but who nonetheless was as 
crazy as a March hare, these jurists invented the notion of the 
"insane delusion." 
The judicial notion of "insane delusion" began with the strange 
case of Dew v. Clark. 251 Ely Stott, the testator, was a physician by 
training. His first wife bore him two children, only one of whom 
survived infancy, a daughter named Charlotte Mary. Stott's wife 
died soon after the child's birth. Stott practiced electric medicine 
upon a large number of wealthy persons and accumulated a vast 
fortune. He married twice more, his third wife surviving him at his 
death in 1821. 252 
According to much testimony given in the case, Stott de­
veloped an intense dislike for Charlotte Mary. She was packed off 
to boarding school as an infant. She was apparently a normal, affec­
tionate, but somewhat lonely child. 253 She was fairly well educated 
for the day, and later became a governess. 254 Ely Stott, however, 
was a strict Calvinist. He had determined that Charlotte Mary, at a 
very young age, was sullen, evil, wicked, and vicious. 255 Stott ac­
cused the child of lying without base, of being extremely depraved, 
immoral, and an abandoned profligate. These accusations were 
made of an eight- or nine-year-old girl. Stott rarely, if ever, saw 
Charlotte Mary, although he engaged in a letterwriting campaign 
to every boarding school the child attended, informing each head­
mistress of her evil and abandoned ways.256 He also regaled any­
one who would listen with stories about his evil and depraved 
daughter. 257 
Stott made a series of wills. Each will, including the last dated 
May 26, 1818, left a token bequest of about £2,000 to Charlotte 
Mary. Dr. Stott's remaining estate, some £40,000 in personalty 
alone, was divided between his nephews and friends, except for a 
pension for his third wife. 258 In February 1821, Stott's third wife 
filed a lunacy process against him. He was adjudicated insane in 
January 1821 and remained insane until his death. 259 
251. 162 Eng. Rep. 410 (Prerog. 1826). 
252. [d. at 420. 
253. [d. 
254. [d. at 424. 
255. [d. at 428-29. 
256. [d. 
257. [d. at 429-30. 
258. [d. at 410-11. 
259. [d. at 410. 
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When Stott's nephews attempted probate of the 1818 will, 
Charlotte Mary filed a caveat stating that Stott was not of sound 
mind when he made the will. Sir John Nicholl presided in Preroga­
tive Court when this will contest was tried. 260 He narrowed the 
issue to whether Stott was insane when he made his 1818 will. He 
formulated the following legal rationalization of the case: 
The true criterion-the true test-of the absence or pres­
ence of insanity I take to be, the absence or presence of what, 
used in a certain sense of it, is comprisable in a single term, 
namely-delusion. Wherever the patient once conceives some­
thing extravagant to exist, which has still no existence whatever 
but in his own heated imagination; and wherever, at the same 
time, having once so conceived, he is incapable of being, or at 
least of being permanently, reasoned out of the conception, such 
a patient is said to be under a delusion, in a peculiar, half­
technical, sense of the term; and the absence or presence of de­
lusion so understood forms, in my judgment, the true and only 
test or criterion of absent or present insanity.261 
This, Sir John said, was compatible with the common notion of 
capacity to make a will: 
It may be assumed that these authorities sufficiently fortify 
the Court's position, with respect to the true test or criterion of 
insanity, to justify it in pronouncing that, if the evidence in this 
cause be satisfactory to the existence of delusion in the mind of 
the deceased at the time of his making this will, it is also satis­
factory to the existence in the mind of the deceased at that time 
of some degree of insanity; whether, indeed, of that degree of 
insanity; and whether of insanity of that kind, or rather on that 
subject, which should operate to defeat this will, is another 
question. 262 
Sir John also dealt with the claim that there could be no such 
thing as a partially insane testator. 263 He settled that debate by 
declaring that Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale had already recog­
nized the doctrine of partial insanity in criminal cases. 264 Sir John 
felt free to apply the doctrine of partial insanity to a testator who 
260. Id. 
261. Id. at 414. 
262. Id. at 415. The "authorities" cited by the court included J. LOCKE, 
TREATISE ON HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1698) and F. WILLS, TREATISE ON MENTAL 
DERANGEMENT (1822). 
263. 162 Eng. Rep. at 414-15. 
264. M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 29 (1690). 
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made a will. The court then held the will invalid, citing the tra­
ditional Greenwood v. Greenwood rule in support of the deci­
sion. 265 
Dew v. Clark became part of American jurisprudence by 
1890. 266 Appellate decisions between 1835 and 1890 support the 
conclusion that partial insanity may be grounds to set aside a will, 
so long as the insanity runs to some factor which relates directly to 
the testamentary act. 267 An early New York delusion case, Lathrop 
v. American Board of Foreign Missions, 268 involved a testator who 
was committed to an insane asylum in New York from 1838 to 
1840. Upon discharge in the latter year, he removed to Niles, 
Michigan. In 1866, he returned to New York and died there in 
1870. 269 His only living relatives were two brothers and two sis­
ters. He made a will in March 1867, which disinherited his 
brothers and sisters. He believed quite erroneously that his 
brothers and sisters were either Masons or under the influence of 
the Masons and were out to do him bodily harm. 27o This will was set 
aside. Judge E. Dawrin Smith said in affirming the denial of probate 
of the testator's will that, "It is quite apparent, I think, that his will 
was prepared, dictated and executed under the influence of these 
delusions, and that in this view it was an insane will, and that he was 
actually non compos mentis when it was made . . . . "271 
Judge Smith relied upon American Seaman's Friend Society v. 
Hopper272 to set aside the will. Hopper was a bizarre and interest­
ing New York case. Charles Hopper, the testator, died in New 
York City November 1, 1861. He was survived by his widow, a 
sister, six nephews, and a niece. Hopper's estate was valued at 
between $80,000 and $100,000. 273 Hopper made his will four days 
before his death while he was very ill. It gave the bulk of his estate 
265. 162 Eng. Rep. at 416-17. 
266. See, e.g., Hall's Heirs v. Hall's Ex'r, 38 Ala. 131 (1861); Florey's Ex'r v. 
Florey, 24 Ala. 241 (1854); Mill's Appeal, 44 Conn. 484 (1877); Lucas v. Parsons, 24 
Ga. 640 (1858); Barnes v. Barnes, 66 Me. 286 (1876); Stackhouse v. Horton, 15 N.J. 
Eq. 202 (1854); Jenckes v. Court of Probate, 2 R.1. 255 (1852). 
267. Evans v. Arnold, 52 Ga. 170, 183 (1874); Gardner v. Lamback, 47 Ga. 133, 
192 (1872); Benoist v. Murrin, 58 Mo. 307, 324 (1874); Denson v. Beazley, 34 Tex. 
191,203 (1870). 
268. 67 Barb. 590 (N.Y. 1876). 
269. [d. at 592. 
270. [d. at 593-94. 
271. [d. at 594. 
272. 33 N.Y. 619 (1865). 
273. [d. 
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to two benevolent societies instead of his family. Evidence given 
upon the subsequent will contest showed that Hopper had been an 
active businessman up to about 1856. In that year he underwent a 
dramatic personality change. He began to believe that his wife and 
relatives were out to take over his property. He confided to his 
lawyer that his wife and sister had conspired to kill him. He then 
drove his wife out of the family home by assaulting her and 
threatening to kill her. In 1859, Mrs. Hopper left her husband. 
Hopper persisted in his belief that his family was out to kill him. 
His will, of course, reflected his apprehension. 274 
The trial court found no basis for Hopper's belief that his fam­
ily intended to murder him. 275 Chief Justice Denio and the New 
York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding Hopper's 
will to be the product of an unsound mind. 276 Denio adopted the 
rationale of Dew v. Clark to explain his decision. 277 Denio's formu­
lation of the insane delusion rule was: 
If the deceased in the present case was unconsciously labor­
ing under a delusion, as thus defined, in respect to his wife and 
his family connections, who would naturally have been the ob­
jects of his testamentary bounty when he executed his will or 
when he dictated it (if he did dictate it), and the court can see 
that its dispository provisions were or might have been caused or 
affected by the delusion, the instrument is not his will, and can­
not be supported as such in a court of justice. 278 
C. 	 Acceptance of the Insane Delusion Rule 
The Dew v. Clark rule quickly wormed its way into American 
will contests. It became a standard alternative ground to the usual 
claim of lack of capacity and a typical form of alternative pleading. 
The actions of American courts over the past ninety or so years can 
be summarized rather effectively. 
1. 	 Definition of Insane Delusion 
Judges have concocted a number of verbalizations to describe 
an insane delusion. Some courts, notably in Arkansas, define an 
274. 	 Id. at 622-23. 
275. 	 Id. at 624. 
276. 	 Id. at 635-36. 
277. 	 Id. at 623-25. 
278. Id. at 625. In modem medical language, Hopper was probably psychotic. 
A skilled psychiatrist examining this case could find some basis for saying that Hop­
per had delusions and that he projected his own hostile feelings on others. 
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insane delusion as a "fixed belief in something which no rational 
person would believe in. "279 Other jurisdictions call it a "mental 
disease in which persons believe in what they imagine as though it 
were real. "280 Another popular formula says that an insane delusion 
is a "false and fixed belief not founded on reason and incapable of 
being removed by reason."281 All these formulations have the fol­
lowing common elements: If a testator is suffering from an "insane 
delusion," he will (1) possess an irrational acceptance of a phenom­
enon as actual, when it is not actual, and (2) in contemplation of 
the phenomenon, will subsequently alter his testamentary plans. 
These concepts have been very difficult for judges and lawyers to 
describe and apply. An interesting number of cases have been 
classed as archetypal insane delusion cases. These cases generally 
deal with functional mental disorder as its affects one's power to 
make a socially acceptable will. 282 
2. "They're Out To Get Me" Cases 
This class of insane delusion cases has to do with the testator 
who believes that one or more persons are out to harm him by 
taking his property, or by doing him physical injury. The testator 
in these cases shows symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia or 
paranoia. The testator behaves rationally, except for the delusion, 
and generally disinherits the persons he believes to be his 
enemies. American Seaman's Friend Society v. Hopper, analyzed in 
the preceding section, was this sort of case. According to empirical 
survey of appellate decisions since 1885, the will of such a testator 
has a seventy-five percent chance of admission to probate. 283 This 
279. See, e.g., Batson v. Batson, 217 Ala. 450, 453-54, 117 So. 10, 12-13 (1928); 
Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 255, 112 S.W. 405, 412-14 (1908); Jackman v. 
North, 398 III. 90, 101-02, 75 N.E.2d 324, 329 (1947). 
280. See, e.g., In re Cook's Estate, 63 Ariz. 78, 89, 159 P.2d 797, 802 (1945); 
Brumbelow v. Hopkins, 197 Ga. 247, 250, 29 S.E. 42, 44-45 (1942); Trustees of Ep­
worth Memorial M.E. Church v. Overman, 195 Ky. 773, 776, 215 S.W. 942, 944 
(1919); Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369, 370 (1870); Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 
120, 139 (1865); Middleditch v. Williams, 45 N.J. Eq. 726, 733, 17 A. 826, 828-29 
(1889); In re While, 121 N.Y. 406,413-14,24 N.E. 935, 936 (1890); Potter v. Jones, 20 
Or. 239, 247-48, 25 P. 764, 771-72 (1891); In re Hensen's Estate, 52 Utah 554, 568, 
177 P. 982, 987 (1918); In re McGovern's Will, 241 Wis. 99, N.W.2d 717, 720-21 
(1942). 
281. Hall v. Mercantile Trust Co., 332 Mo. 802, 815, 59 S.W.2d 664, 669-70 
(1933). 
282. See Appendix, Table IV. 
283. See Appendix, Table V(6). For representative cases, see Mosser v. Mosser, 
32 Ala. 551 (1858); In re Lingenfelter's Estate, 38 Cal. 2d 571, 241 P.2d 990 (1952); 
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result follows from the rationalistic, voluntaristic approach to decid­
ing will contests embodied in the Greenwood-Baker rule. The fol­
lowing is an examination of some representative cases of this type. 
Benjamin F. Tyler, the testator in Maynard v. Tyler,284 died 
February 10, 1895, at the age of seventy-two. He was survived by 
his widow, Annie Simonds Tyler, and three children by a previous 
marriage, Marie Tyler, Emeline B. Maynard, and John Tyler. 
Tyler had married Annie Simonds, thirty-five years his junior, 
after living with her for about a year. Tyler, a heavy drinker, had 
picked her up in a Boston hotel during one of his sprees. 285 His 
children disapproved of his exploits with Simonds. After his 1893 
marriage, Tyler avoided his children and eventually cut them all 
out of his will, leaving his property to Annie. The evidence at trial 
showed the children disapproved of their parent's hasty marriage. 
The only evidence of delusional conduct on Tyler's part had to do 
with his hard drinking and incoherent speech. Tyler's will was pro­
bated over the objections of the disinherited children. The Massa­
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court sustained the will and found it not 
to be the product of an insane delusion respecting the three Tyler 
children. 286 This illustrates the kind of disinheriting will structure 
in which family antipathy between a testator and the natural ob­
jects of his bounty appears 'to the court to have a "rational" basis. 
In Salter v. Ely,287 Joseph J. Ely's will, executed November 
10, 1893 with an August 15, 1895 codicil, was offered for probate 
on his death in 1896. Ely had four children, Stephen, Addison, 
Catherine, and Matilda. After his first wife's death in 1872, he had 
moved in with Stephen. Ely lived with Stephen until his death, 
even after his remarriage in 1886. In 1880, Ely had fallen and cut 
himself, eventually coming down with blood poisoning. 288 He was 
physically feeble thereafter, but was active mentally and certainly 
had the rudiments of testamentary capacity when he made his 
will. 289 Ely's will split his estate between his sons and disinherited 
In re Ruffino's Estate, 116 Cal. 304, 48 P. 127 (1897); Appeal of Kimberley, 68 Conn. 
428, 36 A. 847 (1896); Shorb v. Brubaker, 94 Ind. 165 (1883); Maynard v. Tyler, 168 
Mass. 107,46 N.E. 413 (1897); Salters v. Ely, 56 N.J. Eq. 357, 39 A. 365 (1898); In re 
White's Will, 121 N.Y. 406, 24 N.E. 935 (1890); Coit v. Patchen, 77 N.Y. 533 (1879); 
Martin v. Tahyer, 37 W. Va. 38, 16 S.E. 489 (1892). 
284. 168 Mass. 107, 46 N.E. 413 (1897). 
285. Id. at 108, 46 N.E. at 414. 
286. Id. at 115-16, 46 N.E. at 414-15. 
287. 56 N.J. Eq. 357, 39 A. 365 (1898). 
288. Id. at 359, 39 A. at 366. 
289. Id. 
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his daughters. The daughters filed objections to probate, which 
were denied. There was no evidence showing Ely had any convic­
tions about his daughters, but there was some evidence showing 
that the two women disliked their stepmother. 290 The New Jersey 
Chancellor sustained probate of Ely's will, despite "insane delu­
sion" objections from the outraged Ely girls. This, too, appears to 
be the kind of case in which "insane delusion" is dragged in as a 
makeweight argument, rather than a correct recapitulation of the 
testator's behavior. 
In re Lingenfelter's Estate291 presented a grimmer pattern. 
Vivian Lingenfelter, the testator, was married to Homer Lingenfel­
ter, an attorney who was in partnership with one Arthur Powell. 
Homer contracted terminal cancer. During his final illness, Vivian 
made a holographic will cutting out her brothers from her estate. 
She showed it to Powell. The holograph left her estate to Madge 
Tucker, Homer's sister. In explaining the devise, she told Powell, 
"They are only my in laws but they have always helped Homer and 
myself when we have needed them most and they have done more 
for me than my own family ever has. "292 Vivian also accused one 
brother of unfairly receiving Vivian's share of her mother's estate. 
This accusation had no rational foundation. Vivian had Powell 
transcribe her holograph, executed the will formally in the firm's 
offices, and then committed suicide. 293 A number of witnesses at 
trial described Vivian Lingenfelter as highly emotional and un­
stable. 294 She was jealous of Homer and unjustly accused him of 
infidelity. Her physician described her as "an advanced psycho­
neurotic and a borderline case between sanity and insanity in the 
medical sense. "295 
Objections to probate of the will were filed by Homer's legal 
secretary, Mrs. De Armond. She alleged Homer had made oral 
representations to her that she would be taken care of in his and 
290. rd. at 364, 39 A. at 368. 
291. 38 Cal. 2d 571, 241 P.2d 990 (1952). 
292. rd. at 575, 241 P.2d at 993. 
293. rd. at 575-76, 241 P.2d at 993-94. 
294. rd. at 575, 241 P.2d at 994. When emotionally disturbed, she would abuse 
any person who did not entertain her political opinions about Franco, Stalin, and the 
stability of the United States and world economy. 
295. rd. at 576, 241 P.2d at 997. There was also testimony that Homer Lingen­
felter was convinced that Madge Tucker and her husband were out to get their hands 
on the Lingenfelter money. Homer Lingenfelter violently disliked his sister and her 
husband. 
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Vivian's wills for long and faithful services. 296 Just how Mrs. De 
Armond had standing to attack Vivian's will does not appear from 
the case report. Mrs. De Armond contended that Vivian suffered 
from insanity or an insane delusion. The trial court ordered the will 
probated, and the California Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court decision. In doing so, the supreme court seemed to ignore 
Vivian's basic responses to reality: 
The fact that Vivian committed suicide is relevant upon the 
question of sanity, but standing alone it is insufficient to show an 
insanity so complete as to destroy testamentary capacity .... 
Likewise, there is no evidence that Vivian suffered from an 
insane delusion which influenced her will. Unquestionably she 
was extremely jealous of, and very much in love with, Homer 
... [blut this jealousy has not been connected with Vivian's 
testamentary disposition in any way. Moreover, her jealousy was 
not a delusion, for it was based upon conduct which had a ten­
dency to create her momentary beliefs. 297 
The supreme court did not pursue her antagonism to her brothers 
and its possible influence on her disposition. If it had, it might 
have considered the combination of circumstances surrounding the 
making of Vivian Lingenfelter's will to be sufficient to set it aside. 
Again, the real issues of defective motivation and impaired recall 
were neither discussed, nor resolved. 
Finally, the classic program reappears in a case like Dumas v. 
Dumas. 298 Wray Dumas died in October 1975, when he was sixty­
seven. He had divorced his wife of forty-six years in 1974. Dumas 
was apparently a solid citizen until 1957. In that year he had an 
affair with another woman and came to believe that people in his 
church knew about his affair and were watching him. He then took 
to drink. In 1969, Wray's daughter, Cecile, filed a process to have 
him committed to the state mental hospital. He was diagnosed at 
that time as an involutional paranoid, who was, in the opinion of 
the staff psychiatrist at the Arkansas State Hospital, unable to re­
late to reality and suffering from delusions of persecution. 299 Wray, 
after divorcing his wife, made out a deed of gift and a will in favor 
of his brother, disinheriting his daughter who later filed objections 
296. ld. at 578-79, 241 P.2d at 995. 
297. ld. at 581-82, 241 P.2d at 997 (citation omitted). 
298. 547 S.W.2d 417 (Ark. 1977). 
299. ld. at 418. 
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to probate of his will. 300 Evidence at trial showed that Dumas was 
obsessed by his delusion that the people in his church were "out to 
get him," and when his wife and daughter refused to stop going to 
church, he singled them out for retribution as part of the conspi­
racy against him.301 The trial court voided both the will and the 
deed of gift. The Arkansas Supreme Court sustained the trial court. 
These four cases show the range of the classical application of 
Dew v. Clark. In each instance, someone thought the deceased 
testator had mental problems. In each case, the principal attack 
was along the line of Dew v. Clark, trying to mold the facts of the 
case into the iron maiden of an "insane delusion." Two of the cases 
were pretty clearly decided in an acceptable way. Two were pretty 
clearly off the mark. The poor sot in Maynard v. Tyler appeared to 
have been exploited and bamboozled by his mistress. If he in fact 
was psychotic as a result of alcoholism, his will ought not to have 
been probated. Vivian Lingenfelter exhibited many of the signs of 
involutional psychosis. During a period of extreme stress arising 
from her husband's terminal illness she made a disinheriting will. If 
the will was the result of her condition, then it ought not to have 
been probated, whether or not it fitted the scheme of Dew v. 
Clark. 
3. The "Crank" Cases 
One of the more shameful exploitations of the "insane delu­
sion" principle, the case of the harmless crank's will, concerns per­
sons who entertain socially unacceptable philosophical, religious, or 
political views. For example, any number of persons believe they 
can, and do, communicate with dead people through the use of a 
medium. For many years, the wills of spiritualists have been the 
focus of attack on the ground that belief in spiritualism was an "in­
sane delusion. "302 Those people who believe in witchcraft can ex­
300. Id. at 417-18. 

30l. Id. at 419. 

302. See, e.g., In re Spencer's Estate, 96 Cal. 448, 31 P. 453 (1892); Crumbaugh 
v. Owen, 238 Ill. 497, 87 N.E. 312 (1909); Whipple v. Eddy, 161 III. 114,43 N.E. 789 
(1896); Steinkuehler v. Wempner, 169 Ind. 154, 81 N.E. 482 (1907); In re Ruedy's 
Estate, 245 Iowa 1307, 66 N.W.2d 387 (1954); In re Dunahugh's Will, 130 Iowa 692, 
107 N.W. 925 (1906); Compton v. Smith, 286 Ky. 179, 150 S.W.2d 657 (1941); 
McCrocklin's Adm'r v. Lee, 247 Ky. 31, 56 S.W.2d 564 (1933); Raison v. Raison, 148 
Ky. 116, 146 S.W. 400 (1912); In re Randall, 99 Me. 396, 59 A. 552 (1904); Robinson 
v. Adams, 62 Me. 369 (1870); Brown v. Ward, 53 Md. 376 (1879); Donovan v. Sulli­
van, 296 Mass. 55, 4 N.E.2d 1004 (1937); O'Dell v. Goff, 149 Mich. 152, 112 N.E. 736 
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pect their wills to be challenged,303 as can those who claim to 
have received direct divine revelation. 304 Faith healers and 
charismatics, too, can expect their survivors to war over their es­
tate on the ground that they had an "insane delusion. "305 None of 
these opinions or beliefs relates to the Greenwood-Baker rule of 
capacity. Therefore, the wills of cranks would normally be prob­
ated. These people are probably not psychotic and may not be 
mentally ill at all. However, their wills are often viciously attacked 
by disappointed relatives. The following cases are typical "crank" 
decisions. 
In Owen v. Crumbaugh,306 the testator died April 3, 1905, at 
age eighty-three. He was survived by his widow, Elizabeth. He 
had no living children or descendants. 307 Crumbaugh's will placed 
most of his real and personal property in trust for his wife for life, 
and at her death, the rents and profits and proceeds of sale, if 
necessary, were to be applied to building a spiritualist church and 
a public library in the town of Leroy, Illinois. 308 After making the 
devise in trust, the will contained the following statement: 
(12) Twelfth-Now, be it understood that I do hope it will never 
be questioned but that I have been in my right mind and natural 
mind in the making of this my last will and testament, and I 
have not been influenced by any person or spirits, but have only 
made same after many weeks of study, thought and considera­
tion. As before expressed, I have talked and conversed freely 
with my dear wife, and she heartily approves and with me de­
sires such a bequest as I have made . . . . Our property has all 
(1907); McClary v. Stull, 44 Neb. 175, 62 N.W. 501 (1895); Middleditch v. Williams, 
45 N.]. Eq. 726, 17 A. 826 (1889); In re Rohe's Will, 50 N.Y.S. 392 (Sur. Ct. 1898); 
General Convention v. Crocker, 7 Ohio C.C. 327 (1893); In re Murray's Estate, 173 
Or. 209, 144 P.2d 1016 (1944); Buchanan v. Pierie, 205 Pa. 123, 54 A. 583 (1903); 
Irwin v. Lattin, 29 S.D. 1, 135 N.W. 759 (1912); In re Hanson's Estate, 87 Wash. 113, 
151 P. 264 (1915); In re Sieb's Estate, 70 Wash. 374, 126 P. 912 (1912); In re Smith's 
Will, 52 Wis. 543, 8 N.W. 616 (1881); Chafin Will Case, 32 Wis. 557 (1873). 
303. Carnahan v. Hamilton, 265 Ill. 508, 107 N.E. 210 (1914); Addington v. 
Wilson, 5 Ind. 137 (1854); Schildnicht v. Rompf, 9 K.L.R. 120, 4 S.W. 235 (1887); 
Kelly v. Miller, 39 Miss. 17 (1860); Fullbright v. Perry Co., 145 Mo. 432, 46 S.W. 
955 (1898); Van Guysling v. Van Kuren, 35 N.Y. 70 (1866). 
304. In re Murray's Estate, 173 Or. 209,144 P.2d 1016 (1944). 
305. Spencer v. Spencer, 221 S.W. 58 (Mo. 1920); In re Tritch's Will, 165 Pa. 
586, 30 A. 1053 (1895). 
306. 228 Ill. 380, 81 N.E. 1044 (1907). 
307. Id. at 384, 81 N.E. at 1045. He owned 1033 acres of farm land in eastern 
McLean County, Illinois, and his estate was estimated to be worth about $250,000. 
308. Id. at 385-86, 81 N.E. at 1045-46. 
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been made by us in our efforts to save and apply, and the clos­
ing joy of my life is the ability of my wife and I to leave some­
thing of a permanent nature that will always be a monument in 
Leroy to the memory of my dear wife and I. ... 309 
Crumbaugh's disinherited nieces and nephews attacked his 
will on the ground of lack of capacity and insane delusion. 31o The 
evidence showed that Crumbaugh had become a convert to 
spiritualism five or six years prior to his death. Crumbaugh had 
traveled extensively in order to attend spiritualist meetings. Once 
he brought home from a seance a picture of his son, who had died 
thirty years earlier in childhood. The picture showed him as a 
grown man. 311 According to Crumbaugh, his son was called "Bright 
Eyes" in the spirit land, and "Bright Eyes" was Crumbaugh's spirit 
guide who would keep him from harm. Crumbaugh insisted that 
"Bright Eyes" sometimes came to his room and bade him good 
night. He attributed a close escape from injury while dynamiting 
tree stumps to "Bright Eyes'" intervention.312 Outside of his 
spiritualistic persuasion, Crumbaugh came across as a hard-driving 
midwestern farmer-banker. 313 The trial court set aside the will. 
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. 314 The court, relying on the 
somewhat earlier case of Whipple v. Eddy,315 held that a belief in 
spiritualism was not sufficient grounds to set aside a Will. 316 The 
court discussed the tenets of spiritualism and a long hypothetical 
question put to an expert alienist who concluded anyone who be­
lieved in spiritualism was insane. 317 The court said that the trial 
court should have directed a verdict for the proponent and not 
have allowed the case to go to the jury.318 
309. ld. at 391,81 N.E. at 1047. 
310. ld. at 391-92, 81 N.E. at 1048. The trustees of the will were members of 
the Spiritualist Movement in Bloomington, Illinois. During the course of the pro­
tracted trial, 24 lay witnesses and 8 physicians testified. 
311. ld. at 394,81 N.E. at 1049. 
312. ld. at 395, 81 N.E. at 1049. 
313. ld. at 397,81 N.E. at 1049-50. 
314. ld. at 414,81 N.E. at 1056. 
315. 161 III. 114,43 N.E. 789 (1896). 
316. 228 III. at 407-08, 81 N.E. at 1053. 
317. ld. at 408, 81 N.E. at 1053. 
318. ld. at 413-14, 81 N.E. at 1055-5~. On remand, the bill was dismissed by 
the trial court. The supreme court reversed and remanded for trial. Crumbaugh v. 
Owen, 232 III. 191, 83 N.E. 803 (1908). Later, the case was retried by the circuit 
court, resulting in a jury verdict for the contestant. The supreme court, this time, 
reversed without remand and ordered judgment for the proponent. Crumbaugh v. 
Owen, 238 III. 497, 87 N.E. 312 (1909). 
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In Middleditch v. Williams,319 William H. Livingston made a 
will on January 11, 1887, and died on February 4, 1888. He was 
survived by his daughter, Lillian, and his mother-in-law, Marie 
Williams. 32o Livingston's will left his estate to his mother-in-law, in 
trust for his daughter, to pay income to her until she reached age 
twenty-five or married. Then, after making provisions for a gift to 
his mother-in-law and her son, the trust principal would be paid to 
his daughter, Lillian. If Lillian did not survive him, Marie Williams 
or her son would take the estate. 321 Livingston's blood relatives 
filed objections to probate. The evidence at trial showed Livingston 
to be quite ordinary, except for his belief that he could communi­
cate with spirits. 322 Livingston resorted to mediums. When he was 
thinking about making a will, he asked a New York City medium to 
contact his wife. The medium told Livingston that his wife wanted 
him to put something in his will for her mother. 323 The New Jer­
sey Chancellor, citing Banks v. Goodfellow324 and Dew v. Clark, 
concluded that belief in spiritualism and in the power of mediums 
to communicate with the dead was not an insane delusion. 325 He 
offered no opinion on whether or not the medium or Livingston's 
dead wife engaged in unduly influencing Livingston's will. 
In the two cases which have been analyzed, the testator's be­
havior was pretty clearly in touch with reality. In each case disap­
pointed family members filed objections to probate, alleging that 
the decedent's will was the product of an "insane delusion." 
Neither testator can be labeled "psychotic" according to modern 
medical terminology. Neither testator showed the memory loss, de­
lirium, or hallucinations which characterize organic senile psy­
chosis. Neither testator showed such a divorce from reality to 
classifY them as functionally psychotic. Eventually, both wills were 
probated after long, expensive jury trials. Objections to probate in 
each instance should have been dismissed as a matter of law since 
the beliefs were clearly not "insane delusions" under the Dew v. 
Clark formulation. 
The insane delusion formula adds nothing to the Greenwood­
Baker test for capacity except a further verbal formula which may 
319. 45 N.J. Eq. 726, 17 A. 826 (1889). 
320. Id. at 728, 17 A. at 827. 
321. Id. at 729, 17 A. at 827. 
322. Id. at 730, 17 A. at 828. 
323. Id. at 731, 17 A. at 828. 
324. [1870] L.R. 5 Q.B. 549. 
325. 45 N.J. Eq. at 735-36, 17 A. at 830. 
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be used to instruct and thus confuse the jury on the real issues of 
the case. The usual way that this occurs is by giving a general 
instruction on the Greenwood-Baker rule of capacity, followed by 
an instruction which in substance says that if you assume that the 
testator had capacity, you may still find his will to be invalid if you 
find that it was the product of an insane delusion. Since delusional 
states characterize a wide variety of organic and functional mental 
illness, the "insane delusion" rule erroneously focuses on only a 
symptom for an underlying disease. The rule attempts to build a 
legal prohibition against only the symptom, without attempting to 
understand the illness itself. This formulation may actually be un­
necessary since the "insane delusion" rule's technical meaning is 
already included within the first and third elements of the 
Greenwood-Baker rule. 326 
The Greenwood-Baker rule and the insane delusion rule can­
not be understood completely, however, without an understanding 
of the problems of burden of proof and relevancy particularly oc­
curring in will contests. In the following section, a brief examina­
tion of burden of proof and relevancy will establish a further basis 
for evaluating the present state of the law of testamentary capacity. 
V. 	 THE MECHANICS OF DISPROVING TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 
So far, this article has examined the structural law of testamen­
tary capacity. It should be apparent that the substantive law of 
capacity is not the sole reason for the outcome of will contests. 
Three additional factors must be explored. First, one needs to 
know what kind of evidence will be admissible in a jury trial will 
contest relating to testamentary capacity. Second, one must know 
who has the burden of proof on the issue of testamentary capacity. 
Finally, there are several presumptions used in will contests which 
affect the outcome. The following is an examination of evidence 
admissible in will contests on the issue of capacity. 
A. 	 Evidence Showing Lack of Capacity 
Over the past nine decades, the courts have stubbornly in­
sisted that the crucial time to review testamentary capacity is the 
moment the testator executes his will. 327 This insistence ignores 
326. 	 See text following note 97 supra. 
327. 	 See, e.g., the following cases: 
Alabama: Burke v. Thomas, 282 Ala. 412, 417, 211 So. 2d 903, 908 (1968); 
California: In re Martin's Estate, 270 Cal. App. 2d 506, 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 911, 
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913 (1969); In re Lockwood's Estate, 254 Cal. App. 2d 309, 313, 64 Cal. Rptr. 

230,233 (1967), In re Nigro's Estate, 243 Cal. App. 2d 152, 157-58,52 Cal. Rptr. 

128, 131-32 (1966); 

Colorado: In re Gardner's Estate, 31 Colo. App. 361,366,505 P.2d 50, 52 (1972); 

Florida: In re Coles's Estate, 205 So. 2d 554, 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); 

Georgia: Crews v. Crews, 219 Ga. 459, 464-65, 134 S.E.2d 27, 31-32 (1963); Mar­

tin v. Martin, 185 Ga. 349, 352, 195 S.E. 159, 161 (1938); 

Illinois: Trojcak v. Hafliger, 7 Ill. App. 3d 495, 499, 288 N.E.2d 82, 85 (1972); 

Iowa: In re Corey's Estate, 169 N.W.2d 837, 842 (Iowa 1969); 

Kansas: In re Barnes' Estate, 218 Kan. 275, 281, 543 P.2d 1004, 1009 (1975); In 

re Perkins' Estate, 210 Kan. 619, 627,504 P.2d 564, 570 (1972); In re Bernatzki's 

Estate, 204 Kan. 131, 134, 460 P.2d 527, 529-30 (1969); 

Louisiana: Succession of Bush, 292 So. 2d 915, 917 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Succes­

sion of Brown, 251 So. 2d 465, 467 (La. Ct. App. 1971); 

Maine: In re Leonard, 321 A.2d 486, 489 (Me. 1974); 

Maryland: Webster v. Larmore, 268 Md. 153, 158,299 A.2d 814, 816 (1973); 

Michigan: In re Getchell's Estate, 295 Mich. 681,686,295 N.W. 360,362 (1940); 

In re Rawling's Estate, 291 Mich. 218,224,289 N.W. 136, 139 (1939); 

Nebraska: In re O'Donnell's Estate, 158 Neb. 583, 586, 64 N.W.2d 116, 119 

(1954); In re Fehrenkamp's Estate, 154 Neb. 488, 497, 48 N.W.2d 421, 427 

(1951); In re Inda's Estate, 146 Neb. 179, 184, 19 N.W.2d 37, 41 (1945); 

New Jersey: In re Livingston's Estate, 5 N.J. Eq. 65, 76, 73 A.2d 916, 922 (1950); 

In re Phillip's Estate, 139 N.J. Eq. 257, 258, 50 A.2d 862, 862 (1947), affd per 

curiam, 141 N.J. Eq. 362, 57 A.2d 387 (1948); 

New York: In re Alexieff's Will, 94 N.Y.S.2d 32, 34 (Sur. Ct. 1949), afI'd mem., 

277 App. Div. 790, appeal dismissed, 277 App. Div. 901, 98 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1950); 

In re Hill's Will, 73 N.Y.S.2d 258, 262 (Sur. Ct. 1947), appeal dismissed, 78 

N.Y.S.2d 365 (1948); 

North Dakota: In re Elmer's Estate, 210 N.W.2d 815, 819 (N.D. 1973); Stormon 

v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 483 (N.D. 1954); 

Oklahoma: In re Samochee's Estate, 542 P.2d 498, 502 (Okla. 1975) (Indian 

will); In re Bennight's Estate, 503 P.2d 203, 207 (Okla. 1972); In re Lacy's Es­

tate, 431 P.2d 366, 368 (Okla. 1967) (per curiam); In re Fletcher's Estate, 269 
P.2d 349, 353 (Okla. 1954); 
Oregon: In re Fredrick's Estate, 204 Or. 378, 385-86, 282 P.2d 352, 355 (1955); In re 
Johnson's Estate, 24 Or. App. 897, 904, 547 P.2d 658, 663 (1976); Covic v. Rosa, 
24 Or. App. 629, 633-34, 546 P.2d 773, 775 (1976); Whitteberry v. Whitteberry, 9 
Or. App. 154, 158, 496 P.2d 240, 242 (1972); In re Nease's Estate, 6 Or. App. 
589, 594, 488 P.2d 1396, 1398 (1971); Vsetecka v. Novak, 4 Or. App. 463, 468, 
478 P.2d 655, 657 (1971); 
Pennsylvania: In re Clark's Estate, 461 Pa. 52, 64, 334 A.2d 628, 634 (1975); In 
re Skrtic's Estate, 379 Pa. 95, 100, 108 A.2d 750, 752 (1954); Williams v. McCar­
roll, 374 Pa. 281, 293, 97 A.2d 14, 19-20 (1953); In re Higbee's Estate, 365 Pa. 
381, 384, 75 A.2d 599, 601 (1950); Farmers Trust Co. v. Wilson, 361 Pa. 43, 46, 
63 A.2d 14, 16-17 (1949) (ejectment); 
South Carolina: Matheson v. Matheson, 125 S.C. 165, 170-71, 118 S.E. 312, 313 
(1923); 
Texas: Stephen v. Coleman, 533 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976); Hamill v. 
Brashear, 513 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974); Lee v. Lee, 413 S.W.2d 931, 
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the process of schema recall and of motivational factors which pre­
date actual execution by a considerable period of time. 328 It also 
ignores the process of communicating the testator's post-death pro­
gram to an attorney, its reduction to "legal" terms, and the 
modification of the "legal" version by the testator. Clearly, the 
principle of focusing only on the actual moment of execution de­
veloped because that is the point of no return. Once the will is 
signed it cannot be called back without some form of legally ac­
ceptable revocation. Such an hypothesis, however, is overly ration­
alistic. It ignores the process of developing a will and concentrates 
only on a "doormouse view" of the physical act of making a will. 
With this in mind, an examination of the kinds of evidence admis­
sible in a will contest will make some sense. 
1. Acts and Conduct of the Testator 
What the testator did and did not do during his life, relevant 
to the making of his will in point of time, may be admitted to show 
competency or its absence. Wigmore says that "the first and fun­
damental rule then, will be that any and all conduct of the person 
is admissible in evidence. There is no restriction as to the kind of 
conduct. There can be none.... "329 The limitation on oral evi­
dence describing the testator's actions prior to the making of his 
will is that the acts must not be too remote from the date of execu­
tion of the will. This limitation is questionable considering that 
some testamentary schemes arise many years before a willmaker 
puts them into a will. Acts and conduct of the testator clearly in­
clude statements made by the deceased willmaker. Such state­
ments are admissible as an exception to the hearsay prohibition330 
if they are not too remote from the triumphal moment when the 
will is signed. 331 
934 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967); Venner v. Layton, 244 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1952); Bell v. Bell, 237 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex. Ct. App. 1951); 

West Virginia: Prichard v. Prichard, 135 W. Va. 767, 777, 65 S.E.2d 65, 71 (1951); 

Martin v. Thayer, 37 W. Va. 38, 52, 16 S.E. 489,494 (1892); 

Wisconsin: In re Ruden's Estate, 55 Wis. 2d 365, 372, 198 N.W.2d 583, 585 

(1972); In re Klagstad's Estate, 264 Wis. 269, 271, 58 N.W.2d, 636, 637 (1953); 

Wyoming: In re Carey's Estate, 504 P.2d 793,798 (Wyo. 1972). 

328. See text accompanying notes 114-41 supra. 
329. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 228 (3d ed. 1940).. 
330. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 329, § 1789. 
331. See, e.g., Waterman v. Whitney, 11 N.Y. 157 (1854). 
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Similarly, the "verbal acts" of the testator, though hearsay, 
may be admitted into evidence, with the usual qualification about 
remoteness. Such "verbal acts" include walking, imbecility, lack of 
coordination, suffering from Parkinson's disease,332 palsy, or the 
like. It is hard to see how these "statements" can even be consid­
ered hearsay in the first place, but a number of courts have con­
cluded that they are, yet are nonetheless admissible. 333 
2. Former Wills of the Testator 
The court and jury in a will contest are permitted to see and 
to compare older wills made by the testator with the will offered 
for probate. 334 The leading case authorizing admission of former 
wills is Embry v. Beaver,335 an Indiana case decided in 1922. In 
that case, an earlier will not offered for probate was admitted into 
evidence over a hearsay objection. The trial court was sustained on 
its decision to admit the old will. The Indiana Supreme Court 
stated, "The acts and declarations and previous wills and codicils of 
the testator are competent evidence to be considered on the ques­
tion of soundness of mind, and constitute an exception to the hear­
"336say ruIe.... 
3. Internal Evidence from the Document Attacked 
Without doubt, the purported will itself is a key item of evi­
dence in a will contest. First, it may show on its face that the 
testator lacked any rational plan for disposing of his property. Sec­
ond, if it is "unnatural" because it disinherits one or more blood 
relations, it tends to show the testator was behaving unreasonably 
when he made the will. 337 It may also be altered or marked to 
332. Nowlin v. Spakes, 250 Ark. 26, 463 S.W.2d 651 (1967). 
333. See, e.g., Minturn v. Conception Abbey, 227 Mo. App. 1179, 1195, 61 
S.W.2d 352, 360 (1933). 
334. See, e.g., In re Teed's Estate, 112 Cal. App. 2d 638, 643, 247 P.2d 54, 57 
(1952); In re Loomis' Will, 133 Me. 81, 84, 174 A. 38, 40 (1934); In re Forsythe's 
Estate, 221 Minn. 303, 313, 22 N.W.2d 19, 25 (1946); In re Frank's Will, 231 N.C. 
252,257,56 S.E.2d 668, 672-73 (1949), rehearing denied, 57 S.E.2d 315 (1950); Brown 
v. Mitchell, 87 Tex. 140, 141, 26 S.W. 1059, 1060 (1894); Redford v. Booker, 166 Va. 
561, 582, 185 S.E. 879, 888 (1936). 
335. 192 Ind. 471, 137 N.E. 55 (1922). 
336. Id. at 473, 137 N.E. at 56. 
337. See, e.g., In re Sturdevant's Appeal, 71 Conn. 392, 397, 42 A. 70, 72 (1899); 
Slaughter v. Heath, 127 Ga. 747, 755, 57 S.E. 69, 73 (1907); In re Lunder's Estate, 74 
Idaho 448, 451, 263 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1953); Ergang v. Anderson, 378 III. 312, 317, 38 
N.E.2d 26,28-29 (1941); Heseman v. Vogt, 181 III. 400, 407, 55 N.E. 151, 154 (1899); 
In re Alexander's Estate, 216 Miss. 26, 33-34, 61 So. 2d 683, 687 (1952). 
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indicate a lack of comprehension of the testamentary act. Clearly it 
is a useful and relevant item of evidence. 
4. Lay Witnesses' Opinions on Capacity 
There are two kinds of lay witnesses whose opmlOns are so­
licited in court on the issue of capacity: subscribing witnesses to 
the will, and all other kinds of witnesses. In some instances, special 
rules apply to subscribing witnesses which do not apply to ordinary 
lay witnesses. 
In Illinois, subscribing witnesses are required to testify on 
whether the testator was of sound mind when he made his will. 338 
A number of states attach great importance to the testimony of 
subscribing witnesses because they actually observed the testator 
execute his will, and the courts attach much magical significance to 
the behavior of the testator at the precise moment of signing. 339 
Since subscribing witnesses to a will seldom have any intimate ac­
quaintance with a testator before signing time, their judgment on 
338. In re Rutledge's Will, 5 Ill. App. 2d 355, 359-60, 125 N.E.2d 683, 685-86 
(1955). 
339. Those states which indicate that the testimony of subscribing witnesses 
will have greater weight than that of ordinary laypersons include the folloWing: 
Connecticut: Wheat v. Wheat, 156 Conn. 575, 584, 244 A.2d 359, 364 (1958); 
Illinois: Lewis v. Deamude, 376 Ill. 219, 221, 33 N.E.2d 440, 442 (1941); 
Maine: In re Leonard, 321 A.2d 486, 489 (Me. 1974); 









North Dakota: Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 501-03 (N.D. 1954); 

Oregon: In re Fredrick's Estate, 204 Or. 378, 387, 282 P.2d 352, 356 (1955); In re 

Walther's Estate, 177 Or. 382, 401, 163 P.2d 285, 293 (1945); In re Carr's Will, 

121 Or. 574, 580-81, 256 P. 390,392 (1927); Covic v. Rosso, 24 Or. App. 629, 634-35, 

546 P.2d 773, 775 (1976); Whiteberry v. Whiteberry, 9 Or. App. 154, 159, 496 









Texas: Lee v. Lee, 424 S.W.2d 609, 610-11 (Tex. 1968); 

Virginia: Tate v. Chumbley, 190 Va. 480, 501-02, 52 S.E.2d 151, 161 (1950); 





West Virginia: Prichard v. Prichard, 135 W. Va. 767, 772-73, 65 S.E.2d 65, 68-69 

(1951); Martin v. Thayer, 37 W. Va. 38, 53, 16 S.E. 489, 494 (1892); 
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that person's capacity is bound to be limited in scope and worth. 
Nonetheless, it receives great weight, particularly when the attest­
ing witness is the testator's lawyer. 340 
It is also clear that the opinion of any lay person based on 
personal observation of the testator may be admissible, if the 
period of observation is reasonably close to the time of willmak­
ing.341 There is some rhetorical conflict between the states on 
whether the lay witness must first give the facts upon which he 
based his opinion. The majority of states that have considered this 
issue hold that the witness ought first to restate the facts on which 
his observation rests. 342 
The usual will contest consists of a parade of lay witnesses, the 
attorney for the testator, and his secretary, all of whom testifY to 
the testator's apparent capacity. The probative value of such opin­
ion evidence is not clear. The observations and characterizations of 
the witnesses are probably much more valuable as grist for expert 
evidence than as the bare recitation of opinion. 
5. Expert Witnesses 
Following the parade of lay witnesses, it is customary in will 
contests for both sides to offer one or more hired medical or 
psychological witnesses to pontificate on the mental condition of 
340. See, e.g., In re Fordyee's Estate, 130 Ill. App. 2d 755, 757, 265 N.E.2d 886, 
887 (1971); In re Bennight's Estate, 503 P.2d 203, 205 (Okla. 1972); In re 5zperka's 
Will, 254 Wis. 153, 158, 35 N.W.2d 209, 211 (1948), vacated on other grounds, 35 
N.W.2d 911 (1949); In re Scherrer's Estate, 242 Wis. 211, 224, 7 N.W.2d 848, 853 
(1943). 
341. Dean Wigmore treated this as beyond argument. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 
329, §§ 1933-1939. In general, layperson's opinions are today everywhere con­
ceded to be admissible, but are subject to broad qualifications and quibbles. Id. 
342. See, e.g., Wear v. Wear, 200 Ala. 345, 349-50,76 So. Ill, 115-16 (1916); In 
re Rich's Estate, 79 Cal. App. 2d 22, 25-27, 179 P.2d 373, 375 (1947) (form of ques­
tion); Espy v. Preston, 199 Ga. 608, 609, 34 S.E.2d 705, 715 (1945); Trojcak v. Haf­
Iiger, 7 III. App. 3d 495, 500-01, 288 N.E.2d 82, 86 (1972); Swygart v. Willard, 166 
Ind. 25, 30, 76 N.E. 755, 758 (1906); In re Heller's Estate, 233 Iowa 1356, 1362, 11 
N.W.2d 586, 590 (1945); In re Prine's Estate, 208 So. 2d 187, 190 (Miss. 1968); Lee v. 
Ullery, 346 Mo. 236, 244-47, 140 S.W.2d 5, 9-11 (1940); Williford v. Masten, 521 
S.W.2d 878, 884-85 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). See also In re Powers' Estate, 375 Mich. 
150, 168-69, 134 N.W.2d 148, 157-58 (1965), in which testimony relating to an opin­
ion on capacity, which showed the witness did not comprehend the nature of tes­
tamentary capacity under the Greenwood-Baker rule, was stricken as irrelevant. This 
limitation seems to be much too strict in view of the universal requirement-save for 
Illinois' attesting witnesses-that lay opinion be premised on actual observations 
which are related by the lay wihless to the trier of fact prior to the witness's rendi­
tion of an opinion. 
1979] TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY 505 
the testator. The usual vehicle for eliciting this evidence is the 
hypothetical question, except in those instances where the de­
ceased testator's attending physician is permitted to testify. Such 
testimony is admissible, subject to the usual warning relating to 
assumptions of "facts not in evidence" by the expert. 343 
Unfortunately, expert testimony in will contests tends to be 
discounted. Many courts have adopted the view that such tes­
timony has little probative value unless it originates from the tes­
tator's attending physician. 344 An illustration of this discounting 
process, In re Powers' Estate,345 seems to make little sense to any­
one not involved in the litigation. Lunette Powers, the testator, 
was a physician. She never married. In 1919 she met Loretta 
Rogoski who became her companion and intimate friend. Loretta's 
husband was a lawyer. 346 In December 1955, Dr. Powers had At­
torney 'Rogoski draw up a will which disinherited her blood rela­
tives and left the bulk of her estate to Loretta Rogoski. 347 Upon 
Dr. Powers' death, the 1955 will, with two later codicils of De­
cember 22, 1955 and November 14, 1956, was offered for probate. 
Dr. Powers' blood relatives filed objections. The case was tried 
twice and appealed three times. 348 The evidence at both trials 
showed that Dr. Powers' sight began to fail in 1951. In 1955 she 
had a slight stroke, and gradually deteriorated mentally until she 
was confined to the Traverse City State Hospital as a senile psycho­
tic. 349 Her narcotics license was terminated in June 1956. Her pro­
fessional associates testified at length about her unprofessional and 
incompetent behavior in 1955 and 1956. 350 The contestants had re­
343. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 329, §§ 1917-1919. 
344. See, e.g., In re Callahan's Estate, 67 Cal. App. 2d 609, 613, 63 Cal. Rptr. 
277, 280, 432 P.2d 965, 967-68 (1967); In re Weihe's Estate, 268 So. 2d 446, 450-51 
(Fla. App. 1972) (alienist's testimony held not to be entitled to great weight); Trojcak 
v. Hafliger, 7 Ill. App. 3d 495, 498, 288 N.E.2d 82, 84-85 (1972); American Nat'l Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Penner, 444 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Ky. 1969); Simmons v. Inman, 471 
S.W.2d 203, 204-05 (Mo. 1971); In re Langbein's Will, 25 App. Div. 2d 681, 683, 269 
N.Y.S.2d 160, 162 (1966); In re Bennett's Estate, 503 P.2d 203, 207-08 (Okla. 1972); 
In re Cohen's Estate, 445 Pa. 549, 552, 284 A.2d 754, 755-56 (1971); In re Price's 
Estate, 401 S.W.2d 98, 102-03 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966); Jenkins v. Trice, 152 Va. 411, 
421-25, 147 S.E. 251, 254-55 (1929); In re Johnson's Estate, 20 Wash. 2d 628, 640-43, 
148 P.2d 962, 968-69 (1944) (medical testimony entitled to great weight). 
345. 375 Mich. 150, 134 N .W.2d 148 (1965). 
346. Id. at 156, 134 N.W.2d at 151. 
347. Id. 
348. Rogoski v. Streeter, 364 Mich. 115, 110 N.W.2d 617 (1961); In re Powers' 
Estate,362 Mich. 222, 106 N.W.2d 833 (1961). 
349. 375 Mich. at 165-66, 134 N.W.2d at 156. 
350. Id. 
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tained Dr. Andrew S. Watson, a psychiatrist, as an expert. The 
lawyer for the contestant attempted to broach the subject of undue 
influence by discussing the relation between attorney and client. 351 
The trial judge allowed Dr. Watson to spend a great deal of time 
discussing transference phenomena relating to the lawyer-client re­
lationship.352 The result was that Dr. Powers' will was broken. The 
Michigan Supreme Court reversed the trial court, precisely be­
cause it had permitted Watson to talk about the real issue. The 
commentary of the Michigan Supreme Court is worth remember­
ing for a long time: 
The function of the expert witness is to supply expert tes­
timony. This includes, where proper foundation is laid, opinion 
evidence. This opinion evidence may even embrace ultimate is­
sues of fact. 
What the opinion of an expert does not yet extend to is the 
creation of new legal definitions and standards, and legal conclu­
sions.... [Nor] does it extend to the creation of a new legal 
definition of a will, nor a new legal standard for testamentary 
capacity. There must be some point, objection or no, at which a 
court sua sponte is obligated to say judicial determination is still 
something more than choosing between conflicting theories of 
expertise. That point was reached in this case. 353 
In short, the training of the psychiatrist and behavioral scientist 
does not satisfy the limitations imposed on litigants in court. 
B. 	 Burden of Proof on Issue of Capacity 
As usual in this sort of problem, lawyers try to take refuge in 
the concepts of burden of proof and such presumptions as are 
available to litigants. Will contests are highly emotional dramas in­
volving the litigant's notions of death, property, and lawyers. The 
conflicts raised by attempting to break a family member's will may 
be very hard to deal with up front. Thus, lawyers are apt to use 
rationalizations to defend against the existential terror liberated by 
a will contest. There are two such rationalizations normally em­
ployed; the burden of proof and the presumption. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. at 170-71, 134 N.W.2d at 158-59. 
353. Id. at 172-73, 134 N.W.2d at 159-60. 
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1. Burden of Proof 
Essentially, the jurisdictions line up on two sides. The major­
ity of states have determined that once the proponent proves the 
will was duly executed, the burden of going forward with the evi­
dence, and the risk of non-persuasion, shifts to the contestant who 
is then required to establish all the elements of lack of capacity by 
at least a preponderance of the evidence. 354 However, a respect­
354. See, e.g., the following cases: 

Alabama: Flowler v. Flowler, 292 Ala. 340, 341-43, 294 So. 2d 156, 157-59 

(1974); King v. Aird, 251 Ala. 613, 617, 38 So. 2d 883, 887 (1949); Dersis v. 

Dersis, 210 Ala. 308, 312, 98 So. 27, 31 (1923); 

Arizona: In re Westfall's Estate, 74 Ariz. 181, 185,245 P.2d 951, 954 (1952); 
Arkansas: Sullivant v. Sullivant, 236 Ark. 95, 99, 364 S.W.2d 665, 668 (1963); 
Tatum v. Chandler, 229 Ark. 864, 869, 319 S.W.2d 513, 516 (1959); Shippen v. 
Shippen, 213 Ark. 517, 520, 211 S.W.2d 433, 435 (1948); Taylor v. McClintock, 

87 Ark. 243, 280, 112 S.W. 405, 414 (1908); McCulloch v. Campbell, 49 Ark. 367, 

373,5 S.W. 590, 592 (1887); 

California: In re Wright's Estate, 7 Cal. 2d 348, 356, 60 P.2d 434, 438 (1936); In 

re Perkins' Estate, 195 Cal. 699, 703, 235 P. 45, 46 (1925); In re Casarotti's Es­

tate, 184 Cal. 73, 75, 192 P. 1085, 1085 (1920); In re Wochos' Estate, 23 Cal. 

App. 3d 47, 55, 99 Cal. Rptr. 782, 787 (1972); In re Goetz' Estate, 253 Cal. App. 

2d 107, 113,61 Cal. Rptr. 181, 185 (1967); In re Llewellyn's Estate, 83 Cal. App. 

2d 534, 555, 189 P.2d 822, 833 (1948); In re Johanson's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 2d 

41, 54, 144 P.2d 72, 79 (1944); 

Colorado: In re Grimes' Estate, 500 P.2d 169, 170 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); 

Delaware: In re Reed's Estate, 300 A.2d I, 2 (Del. 1972) (per curiam); 

District of Columbia: In re Himmelfarb's Estate, 345 A.2d 477, 482 (D.C. 1975) 





Florida: Neal v. Harrington, 159 Fla. 381, 384, 31 So. 2d 391, 392 (1947); In re 

Carnegie's Estate, 153 Fla. 7, 9, 13 So. 2d 299, 300 (1943); In re Tobias' Estate, 

192 So. 2d 83, 85 (Fla. App. 1966); 

Idaho: In re Goan's Estate, 83 Idaho 568, 573, 366 P.2d 831, 834 (1961); 

Indiana: Kaiser v. Happel, 219 Ind. 28, 31, 36 N.E.2d 784, 785 (1941); Young v. 

Miller, 145 Ind. 652,656,44 N.E. 757, 759 (1896); 

Iowa: In re Gruis' Estate, 207 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Iowa 1973); In re Ruedy's Es­

tate, 245 Iowa 1307, 1314,66 N.W.2d 387,391 (1954); In re Ransom's Estate, 244 

Iowa 343, 377-78, 57 N.W.2d 89,108 (1953); 

Kansas: In re Estate of Carothers, 220 Kan. 437,443,552 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1976); 

In re Barnes' Estate, 218 Kan. 275, 281, 543 P.2d 1004, 1009 (1975); In re 

Peirano's Estate, 155 Kan. 48, 54, 122 P.2d 772, 776 (1942); 

Kentucky: Self v. Schooling, 462 S.W.2d 932, 933-34 (~y'. 1975); Trust Dep't, 

First Nat'l Bank v. Heflin, 426 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Ky. 1968); Bodine v. Bodine, 

241 Ky. 706, 714, 44 S.W.2d 840, 844 (1932); Langford's Ex'r v. Miles, 189 Ky. 

515,521, 225 S.W. 246,249 (1920); 

Louisiana: Succession of Schmidt, 219 La. 675, 679, 53 So. 2d 834, 836 (1951); 
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Succession of Pizzati, 218 La. 549, 554, 50 So. 2d 189, 190 (1951); Guidry v. 

Hardy, 254 So. 2d 675, 681 (La. Ct. App. 1971); 

Maryland: Phelps v. Goldberg, 270 Md. 694, 699, 313 A.2d 683, 686 (1974); 

Webster v. Larmore, 268 Md. 153, 158,299 A.2d814, 817 (1973); Acker v. Acker, 

172 Md. 477, 494,192 A. 327, 344 (1931); 

Michigan: In re Padjan's Estate, 340 Mich. 277,283, 65 N.W.2d 743, 745 (1954); 

In re Hallitt's Estate, 324 Mich. 654, 658, 37 N.W.2d 662, 663 (1949); In re Vol­

lbrecht's Estate, 26 Mich. App. 430, 434-35, 182, N.W.2d 609, 612 (1970); In re 

Karabatian's Estate, 17 Mich. App. 541, 544, 170 NW.2d 166, 168 (1969); 

Missouri: Brug v. Manufacturer's Bank & Trust Co., 461 S.W.2d 269, 276 (Mo. 

1970); Houghton v. Jones, 418 S.W.2d 32, 39 (Mo. 1967); Delaney v. Coy, 407 









Nebraska: In re Cain's Estate, 186 Neb. 159, 160, 181 N.W.2d 441,442 (1970); In 

re Benson's Estate, 153 Neb. 824, 828, 46 N.W.2d 176, 179 (1951); In re Kaiser's 

Estate, 150 Neb. 295, 302-03, 34 N.W.2d 366, 372 (1948); In re Hagan's Estate, 

143 Neb. 459, 466, 9 N.W.2d 794, 799-800 (1943); 

New Jersey: In re Weeks' Estate, 29 N.J. Super. 533, 543, 103 A.2d 43, 48 (1953); 

In re Loori's Will, 20 N.J. Misc. 376, 384, 28 A.2d 281, 286 (1941); 

North Carolina: In re Kemp's Will, 234 N.C. 495, 499, 67 S.E.2d 672, 675-76 

(1951); In re Frank's Will, 231 N.C. 252, 257, 56 S.E.2d 668, 672 (1949), rehear­

ing denied, 57 S.E.2d 315 (1950); 

North Dakota: Storman v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475,500,519 (N.D. 1954); 

Ohio: Kata v. Second Nat'l Bank of Warren, 26 Ohio St. 2d 210, 215, 271 

N.E.2d 292,295 (1971); 

Oklahoma: In re Wadsworth's Estate, 273 P.2d 997, 1001 (Okla. 1954) (burden on 

proponent to prove due execution, shifts to contestant thereafter); In re Holmes' 

Estate, 270 P.2d 320, 321 (Okla. 1954); In re HaIjo's Estate, 206 Okla. 88, 91, 241 





Pennsylvania: In re Heiney's Estate, 455 Pa. 574, 576-77, 318 A.2d 700, 701-02 

(1974); In re Protyniak's Estate, 427 Pa. 524, 529, 235 A.2d 372, 375 (1967); In re 

O'Malley's Estate, 370 Pa. 281, 285, 88 A.2d 69, 72 (1952); In re Cookson's Es­

tate, 325 Pa. 81, 86, 188 A. 904, 907 (1937); 

South Carolina: Hellams v. Ross, 268 S.C. 284, 288, 233 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1977); 

McCollum v. Banks, 213 S.C. 476,483,50 S.E.2d 199,202 (1948); 

South Dakota: In re Nelson's Estate, 250 N.W.2d 286,289 (S.D. 1977); 

Tennessee: In re Rhodes' Estate, 222 Tenn. 394, 406, 436 S.W.2d 429, 435 

(1968); Thomas v. Hamlin, 56 Tenn. App. 13,23,404 S.W.2d 569, 573-74 (1964); 

Texas: Gasaway v. Nesmith, 548 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); In re 

Rosborough's Estate, 542 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976); Halamicek v. 

Halamicek, 542 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976); Dominguez v. Duran, 540 

S.W.2d 567, 568 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (burden on proponent to prove original 

will; on contestant after original proceedings have terminated); Van Sickle v. 

Stroud, 467 SW.2d 509, 512 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971); Click v. Sutton, 438 S.W.2d 

610, 612 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969); 

Utah: In re Ekker's Estate, 19 Utah 2d 414,417,432 P.2d 45, 47 (1967); 

Washington: In re Riley's Estate, 78 Wash. 2d 623, 639,479 P.2d 1, 11 (1970); In 
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able number of states hold a minority view. In this class, the burden 
of proof on capacity remains with the proponent throughout trial. 
The contestant has to present evidence to rebut any presumption 
of capacity raised by due execution in order to throw the burden of 
proof back to the proponent. 355 Empirical analysis shows that con-
re Youngkins' Estate, 48 Wash. 2d 432, 434-35, 294 P.2d 426, 428 (1956); In re 

Moulton's Estate, 1 Wash. App. 993, 995, 465 P.2d 419, 420 (1970); 

Wisconsin: In re Bauer's Estate, 264 Wis. 556, 558-59, 59 N.W.2d 481, 482 

(1953); In re Bickner's Estate, 259 Wis. 425, 433, 49 N.W.2d 404, 408 (1951); 

In re Delmady's Will, 251 Wis. 98, 100,28 N.W.2d 301, 302 (1947); 

Wyoming: In re Carey's Estate, 504 P.2d 793, 797 (Wyo. 1972). 
Note: In Hawaii and Nevada, the question of who has the burden of proof on the 
issue of capacity has not been decided. In McCabe v. Pearson, 87 Nev. 177, 510 P.2d 
875 (1973), the Nevada Supreme Court reversed a trial court judgment setting aside a 
will on lack of capacity and undue influence, but expressly refused to decide what 
the burden of proof was. It indicated, however, that the moving party had failed to 
produce sufficient evidence to sustain a finding in its favor. 
355. The minority position is taken by the following states: 

Alaska: In re Kraft's Estate, 374 P.2d 413, 416 (Alaska 1963); 

Connecticut: Falk v. Schuster, 171 Conn. 5, 9, 368 A.2d 40, 42 (1976); 

Georgia: Waters v. Arrendale, 223 Ga. 617, 617, 157 S.E.2d 289, 290 (1967); 

Crews v. Crews, 219 Ga. 459, 465, 134 S.E.2d 27, 31 (1963); Whitfield v. Pitts, 

205 Ga. 259, 271, 53 S.E.2d 549, 557 (1949); Ellis v. Britt, 181 Ga. 442, 446, 182 

S.E. 596, 599 (1935); Dean v. Littleton, 161 Ga. 651, 653, 131 S.E. 507, 509 

(1926); Credille v. Credille, 123 Ga. 673, 675-76, 51 S.E. 628, 629 (1905); 

Illinois: Milne v. McFadden, 385 Ill. 11, 13, 52 N.E.2d 146, 147 (1944); Gilbert 

v. Oneale, 371 Ill. 427, 434, 21 N.E.2d 283, 286 (1939); Pendarvis v. Gibb, 328 

Ill. 282, 293, 159 N.E. 353, 357 (1927); Kellan v. Kellan, 258 Ill. 256, 272, 101 

N.E. 614, 620 (1913); Wilkinson v. Service, 249 Ill. 146, 150, 94 N.E. 50, 52 

(1911); Hess v. Killebrew, 209 Ill. 193,200,70 N.E. 675,678 (1904); In re Estate 

of Fordyce, 130 Ill. App. 2d 755, 757, 265 N.E.2d 886, 888 (1971); Auerbach v. 





Maine: In re Leonard, 321 A.2d 486, 488 (Me. 1974); 

Massachusetts: Dobije v. Hopey, 353 Mass. 600, 603, 233 N.E.2d 920, 922 

(1968); Crowninshield v. Crowninshield, 60 Mass. (2 Gray) 521, 522 (1854); 

Minnesota: In re Jenks' Estate, 291 Minn. 138, 143-44, 189 N.W.2d 695, 698 

(1971); In re Estate of Healey, 243 Minn. 383, 386, 68 N.W.2d 401, 403 (1955): 

Mississippi: In re Moses' Will, 227 So. 2d 829, 834-35 (Miss. 1969); Wallace v. 

Harrison, 218 Miss. 153, 161,65 So. 2d 456,458 (1953); 

New Hampshire: Albee v. Osgood, 79 N.H. 89, 90, 105 A. 1,2 (1918); 

New York: Delafield v. Parrish, 25 N.Y. 9, 34 (1862); In re Watson's Will, 37 

App. Div. 2d 897, 897-98, 325 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348 (1971); In re Morrisson's Will, 

270 App. Div. 552, 555, 60 N.Y.S.2d 546, 549 (1946); In re Morolla's Will: 104 

N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (Sur. Ct. 1951); In re Goldin's Will, 90 N.Y.S.2d 601, 602-03 

(Sur. Ct. 1949); In re Buckley's Estate, 52 N.Y.S.2d 292, 293 (Sur. Ct. 1940); 

Oregon: In re Knutson's Will, 149 Or. 467, 484, 41 P.2d 793, 799 (1935); Estate 

of Johnson, 24 Or. App. 897, 903-04, 547 P.2d 658, 663 (1976); 
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testants have a much better chance of success in those states which 
keep the burden of proof of testamentary capacity on the propo­
nent throughout trial. 356 
2. .Presumption of Capacity 
Interlocking with the burden of proof rhetoric is the notion of 
a presumption of testamentary capacity which arises from proof of 
due execution of a will. Twenty-nine states allow a testator a pre­
sumption of capacity to make a will. 357 This presumption, accord-








Virginia: Redford v. Booker, 166 Va. 561, 569, 185 S.E. 879,883 (1936); 

West Virginia: Payne v. Payne, 97 W. Va. 627, 640, 125 S.E. 818, 823 (1924). 

356. See Appendix, Table III for comparative analysis. 

357. The following states grant a presumption of capacity: 

Alabama: Jones v. Blackman, 284 Ala. 684, 685-86, 228 So. 2d 1, 2-3 (1969); Cox 

v. Martin, 250 Ala. 401, 403, 34 So. 2d 463, 464 (1947); Tucker v. Tucker, 248 

Ala. 602, 606, 28 So. 2d 637, 640 (1947); 

Arizona: In re Smith's Estate, 53 Ariz. 505, 508, 91 P.2d 254, 255, (1939); 

Arkansas: Gray v. Fulton, 205 Ark. 675, 680, 170 S.W.2d 384, 386 (1943); 
California: In re Sexton's Estate, 199 Cal. 759, 764,25 P. 778, 781 (1926); In re 
Dow's Estate, 181 Cal. 106, 112, 183 P. 794, 797 (1919); In re Dunne's Estate, 
130 Cal. App. 2d 216, 220,278 P.2d 733, 734 (1955); In re Llewellyn's Estate, 83 
Cal. App. 2d 534, 555, 189 P.2d 822, 833 (1948); In re Schwartz's Estate, 67 Cal. 
App. 2d 512, 519-20, 155 P.2d 76, 80 (1945); In re Agnew's Estate, 65 Cal. App. 
2d 553, 559, 151 P.2d 126, 130 (1944) (expressed as presumption of sanity); 
Colorado: Hankins v. McNeill Coal Corp., 114 Colo. 578, 585, 168 P.2d 256, 260 

(1943) (expressed as "sanity"); 

Delaware: In re Hallett's Estate, 295 A.2d 755, 756 (Del. Ch. 1972); 

Idaho: In re Heazle's Estate, 74 Idaho 72, 76, 257 P.2d 556, 558 (1953); 

Illinois: Roller v. Kurtz, 6 Ill. 2d 618, 626, 129 N.E.2d 693, 697 (1955); Downey 

v. Lawler, 377 Ill. 298, 300-01, 36 N.E.2d 344, 346 (1941); Quathamer v. Schoon, 

370 Ill. 606, 608, 19 N.E.2d 750, 751 (1939); Norton v. Clark, 253 Ill. 557, 566, 97 

N.E. 1079, 1083 (1921); McGovern v. McGovern, 328 Ill. App. 316, mem., 65 
N.E.2d 583, 583, (1946); 

Indiana: Kaiser v. Happel, 219 Ind. 28, 30, 36 N.E.2d 784, 785 (1941); Young v. 

Miller, 145 Ind. 652, 652, 44 N.E. 757, 758 (1896); 

Iowa: In re Houston's Estate, 238 Iowa 297,298-99,27 N.W.2d 26, 28 (1947); In 

re Behrend's Will, 233 Iowa 812, 816-17, 10 N.W.2d 651, 654 (1943); In re 

Cooper's Estate, 196 Iowa 116, 123, 194 N.W.2d 218, 221 (1923); 

Kentucky: Belcher v. Somerville, 413 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Ky. 1967); New v. 

Creamer, 275 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Ky. 1955); Madden v. Cornett, 290 Ky. 268, 275, 

160 S.W.2d 607, 611 (1942); Ramsey v. Howard, 289 Ky. 389, 394, 158 S.w.2d 

981,984 (1942); Leary v. Leary, 203 Ky. 344, 346, 262 S.w. 293, 294 (1924); 

Louisiana: Lebleu v. Manning, 225 La. 1087, 1089-90, 74 So. 2d 384, 384 (1954); 
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Cornier v. Myers, 223 La. 259, 271, 65 So. 2d 345, 349 (1953); Patterson v. 
Blakesley, 329 So. 2d 925, 926 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Succession of Kelly, 305 So. 
2d 704, 705 (La. Ct. App. 1974); 
Maryland: Phelps v. Goldberg, 270 Md. 694, 699, 313 A.2d 683, 686 (1974); West 
v. Lamore, 268 Md. 153, 158, 299 A.2d 814, 817 (1973); Sellers v. Qualls, 206 
Md. 58, 66, 110 A.2d 73, 78 (1954); Slicer v. Griffith, 27 Md. App. 502, 508, 341 
A.2d 838, 842 (1975); 
Massachusetts: Duchesneau v. Jaskoviak, 360 Mass. 730, 733, 277 N.E.2d 507, 
510 (1972); Santry v. France, 327 Mass. 174, 175-76,97 N.E.2d 533, 534 (1951); 
Goddard v. Dupre, 322 Mass. 247, 247, 76 N.E.2d 643, 644 (1948); 
Michigan: In re Padjan's Estate, 340 Mich. 277, 283, 65 N.W.2d 745, 745 (1954); 
In re Kuzawa's Estate, 337 Mich. 397, 401, 60 N.W.2d 138, 140 (1953); In re 
Shattuck's Estate, 324 Mich. 568, 573, 37 N.W.2d 555, 557 (1949); O'Connor v. 
Madison, 98 Mich. 183, 187,57 N.W. 105, 106 (1893); 
Mississippi: Gathings v. Howard, 122 Miss. 355, 375, 84 So. 240, 243 (1920); 
Missouri: Fields v. Luck, 335 Mo. 765,782,74 S.W.2d 35, 43-44 (1934); 
Montana: In re Cissell's Estate, 104 Mont. 306, 314-15, 66 P.2d 779, 782 (1937) 
(expressed as presumption of sanity); 
Nebraska: In re Wal's Estate, 151 Neb. 812, 815, 39 N.W.2d 783, 786 (1949); In 
re Hunter's Estate, 151 Neb. 704, 711, 39 N.W.2d 418, 423 (1949); In re Kaiser's 
Estate, 150 Neb. 295, 302-03, 34 N.W.2d 366, 372 (1948); In re White's Estate, 
145 Neb. 295, 300, 16 N.W.2d 203, 206 (1944); 
New Jersey: In re Blake's Will, 37 N.J. Super. 70, 73-74, 117 A.2d 33, 35 (1955); 
In re Week's Will, 29 N.J. Super. 533, 543, 103 A.2d 43, 48 (1953); In re 
Hoover's Estate, 21 N.J. Super. 323, 325, 91 A.2d 155, 156 (1952); 
New York: In re Beneway's Will, 272 App. Div. 463, 467, 71 N.Y.S.2d 361, 365 
(1947); In re Hollenback's Will, 318 N.Y.S.2d 604, 607 (Sur. Ct. 1969); 
North Carolina: In re Frank's Will, 231 N.C. 252, 259, 56 S.E.2d 668, 674 (1949), 
rehearing denied, 231 N.C. 427, 57 S.E.2d 315 (1950); In re York's Will, 231 N.C. 
70, 70, 55 S.E.2d 791, 792 (1949); 
North Dakota: In re Elmer's Estate, 210 N.W.2d 815, 819 (N.D. 1973); 
Oklahoma: In re Lay's Estate, 431 P.2d 367, 368 (Okla. 1967) (per curiam); 
Brown v. Brown, 287 P.2d 913, 914 (Okla. 1955) (syllabus); In re Holmes' Estate, 
270 P.2d 320, 322 (Okla. 1954); In re Mason's Estate, 185 Okla. 278, 280, 91 P.2d 
657, 660 (1939); In re Anderson's Estate, 142 Okla. 197, 199, 286 P. 17, 19 
(1929); 
Oregon: In re Fredrick's Estate, 204 Or. 378, 385-86, 282 P.2d 352, 355-56 
(1955); Detsh v. Detsh, 186 Or. 1, 9-10, 205 P.2d 180, 183 (1949); In re Chirstof­
ferson's Estate, 183 Or, 75, 84-85, 190 P.2d 928, 932 (1948); Vsetecka v. Novak, 4 
Or. App. 463, 468, 478 P.2d 655, 657 (1971); 
Pennsylvania: In re Heiney's Will, 455 Pa. 574, 576, 318 A.2d 700, 701-02 (1974); 
In re Cohen's Estate, 445 Pa. 549, 551, 284 A.2d 754, 755 (1971); In re DeMajo's 
Estate, 363 Pa. 559, 560, 70 A.2d 339, 340 (1950); In re Lauer's Estate, 351 Pa. 
438, 440, 41 A.2d 552, 553 (1945); 
Tennessee: Thomas v. Hamlin, 56 Tenn. App. 13,23,404 S.W.2d 569, 574 (1964); 
Virginia: Jenkins v. Trice, 152 Va. 411, 442, 147 S.E. 251, 261 (1929); 
Washington: In re Peter's Estate, 43 Wash. 2d 846, 861-62, 264 P.2d 1109, 1117 
(1953); In re Larsen's Estate, 191 Wash. 257, 259-60, 71 P.2d 47, 49 (1937); 
West Virginia: Powell v. Sayres, 134 W. Va. 653, 663, 60 S.E.2d 740, 747 (1950); 
Wisconsin: In re Goydynski's Estate, 46 Wis. 2d 393, 398, 175 N.W.2d 272, 275 
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ing to the cases, is Thayerian, which means it disappears when 
credible evidence to the contrary appears.358 The presumption is 
not evidence, and is only sufficient to stave off a directed ver­
dict. 359 Wigmore also states that the burden of proof on the sanity 
of the testator is on the proponent of the will, but the presumption 
of sanity arises upon proof of due execution. 36o This shifts the bur­
den of coming forward with evidence of lack of capacity to the con­
testant. 361 This is complicated, however, by the courts which treat 
the presumption of capacity as a Morgan-type presumption which 
remains alive after contrary evidence has been introduced. 362 
Three states reject the presumption of capacity altogether: 
Maine,363 Texas,364 and West Virginia. 365 Fifteen states have not 
decided whether such a thing as a presumption of capacity 
exists. 366 
(1970) (sanity); In re Bauer's Estate, 264 Wis. 556, 559, 59 N.W.2d 481, 482 
(1953); In re Szperka's Will, 254 Wis. 153, 158, 35 N.W.2d 209, 211 (1948), vac­
ated on other grounds, 35 N.W.2d 911 (1949). 
Note: The following states report no decisions on whether or not there is a presump­
tion of capacity: Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
South Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. 
Texas clearly holds that there is no presumption of sanity or testamentary capac­
ity running in favor of any testator. Kutchinski v. Zillion, 183 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1944). Maine may also take a similar position. See In re Haley's Estate, 147 
Me. 173, 179,84 A.2d 808, 812 (1951). 
358. Kaiser v. Happel, 219 Ind. 28, 30, 36 N.E.2d 784, 785 (1941); Leary v. 
Leary, 203 Ky. 344, 346, 262 S.W. 293, 294 (1924); Santry v. France, 327 Mass. 174, 
175-76, 97 N.E.2d 533, 534 (1951); In re Hunter's Estate, 151 Neb. 704, 711, 39 
N.W.2d 418, 423 (1949). 
359. See In re Dow's Estate, 181 Cal. 106, 113, 183 P. 794, 797 (1919). This 
presumption is not like the presumption of sanity in criminal law. According to 
Wigmore, the presumption of sanity in criminal law creates three positions on the 
sanity of criminal defendants: (a) The prosecution has the risk of non-persuasion on 
sanity as part of its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt; (b) the prosecution 
establishes sanity by preponderance, shifting the evidentiary burden of disproof 
to the defendant; or (c) the accused has the burden of proof on the issue of demon­
strating insanity by at least a preponderance of the evidence. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra 
note 329, § 2501, at 359-61. None of these formulae have any relevance to establish­
ing lack of testamentary capacity. 
360. Id. § 2500, at 356. 
361. Id. § 2500, at 357-58. 
362. See, e.g., Sturdevant's Appeal, 71 Conn. 392, 42 A. 70 (1899). 
363. In re Haley's Estate, 147 Me. 173, 179,84 A.2d 808, 812 (1951). 
364. Bell v. Bell, 248 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952); Jowers v. Smith, 237 
S.w.2d 805, 809 (Tex. Ct. App. 1950); Pullen v. Ross, 226 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Tex. Ct. 
App.1950). 
365. Powell v. Sayres, 134 W. Va. 653, 663, 60 S.E.2d 740, 747 (1950). 
366. They are Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. 
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The best way to gain an understanding of the distinctions 
made on burden of proof and presumptions of capacity is to review 
two essentially similar cases, one decided in a state in which the 
burden of proof is on the contestant to show lack of capacity, the 
other decided in a jurisdiction in which the burden of proof of 
capacity remains with the proponent. One of the more interesting 
issues to contrast is the juxtaposition of conflicting presumptions: 
that of capacity and that of continuing insanity. Normally, an ad­
judication of insanity raises a presumption that the person who is 
insane lacks testamentary capacity.367 In a state in which (a) a per­
son is presumed not to have capacity, and (b) a person adjudicated 
insane is presumed not to have capacity until adjudicated sane, and 
(c) the burden of proof is on the proponent to establish capacity, 
the proponent should lose. In a jurisdiction in which (a) a person is 
presumed to have capacity, (b) a person is presumed to lack capac­
ity if adjudicated insane, and (c) the burden of proof is on the con­
testant to show lack of capacity, the contestant should lose. 
In In re Duncan's Estate,368 the testator, James Mills Duncan, 
died May 21, 1939, at age seventy-one. He left a holographic will 
written August 19, 1938. Duncan was judicially declared a lunatic 
in 1908 and placed under guardianship. He was committed in 1909 
to the Harrisburg State Hospital for the Insane, and remained 
there until April 29, 1939, shortly before his death. A caveat was 
filed to the will by his nephews. The beneficiaries under the will 
were Frank A. Diehl and Nannie Diehl Lehman, the children of 
his tenant farmer in 1908.369 The proponent's principal witness was 
Dr. Petree, the staff psychiatrist at the hospital. Dr. Petree stated 
that Duncan, a schizophrenic with a paranoid personality disorder,370 
had an above normal IQ and knew the nature and extent of his 
property, the natural objects of his bounty, and what he was doing 
367. Houston v. Grigsby, 217 Ala. 506, 508, 116 So. 686, 688 (1928); In re Pow­
ers' Estate, 81 Cal. App. 2d 480, 483, 184 P.2d 319, 321 (1947); Estate of Southwick 
v. First Nat'l Bank, 33 Colo. App. 86, 89, 515 P.2d 484, 486 (1973); In re Ziy's Estate, 
223 So. 2d 42, 43 (Fla. 1969); In re Supplee's Estate, 247 So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. App. 
1971); Martin v. Martin, 185 Ga. 349, 352, 195 S.E. 159, 161 (1938); In re Weedman's 
Estate, 254 Ill. 504, 508, 98 N.E. 956, 957 (1912); Griffin v. Thrall, 109 Ind. App. 141, 
158-59, 29 N.E.2d 345, 352 (1940); In re Hall's Estate, 165 Kan. 465, 469, 195 P.2d 
612, 615 (1948); Cormier v. Myers, 223 La. 259, 270, 65 So. 2d 345, 348 (1953); 
Appeal of Eastman, 135 Me. 233, 235, 194 A. 586, 588 (1937); Simoneau v. O'Brien, 
311 Mass. 68, 74, 40 N.E.2d 1,4 (1942). 
368. 147 Pa. Super. 133, 23 A.2d 357 (1941). 
369. Id. at 135, 23 A.2d at 358. 
370. Id. at 137, 23 A.2d at 359. 
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when he wrote the will. A contestant's witness, a psychiatrist who 
had not examined the testator, reached the opposite conclusion on 
the testator's ability to make a will. 371 The orphans court probated 
the will. The superior court affirmed the orphans court, relying on 
the burden of proof, which, under Pennsylvania law, fell upon the 
contestant to show the testator lacked capacity.372 This case er­
roneously seems to suggest that the proponent has the burden of 
proof on capacity;373 but in light of Pennsylvania's standard, the 
court must be held to have said that the proponent had the burden 
of overcoming the presumption of continuing insanity by offering 
some evidence of probative value showing that the testator, al­
though insane, had capacity. This burden was carried by the scin­
tilla of expert testimony in the case. 
Contrast the ca~e of Western State Hospital of Staunton v. 
Winninger.374 There, the court dealt with essentially similar facts 
in a different way. Frederick S. Classett, a childless widower, died 
an inmate of Western State Hospital in Staunton, Virginia, on 
January 27, 1950. He was adjudicated insane November 7, 1931, 
and had been confined since that time. 375 He left two holographic 
wills, one executed before adjudication, dated March 21, 1931, and 
one executed February 3, 1942, leaving all of his property to the 
hospital. 376 The 1942 will was made when Classett was under strict 
custody after threatening to kill himself.377 His wife's brothers and 
sisters filed objections to probate of the 1942 will. 378 At trial, six 
hospital staff members testified that Classett knew his property, 
knew the natural objects of his bounty, and had a rational plan for 
disposition of his property in November 1942, when he made the 
second will. 379 Nonetheless, the trial judge refused to probate the 
1942 will. This decision was sustained by the court of appeals. The 
Virginia high court agreed that adjudication of insanity raised a re­
371. Id. at 138, 23 A.2d at 359. There was some evidence that Duncan was 
hostile toward his sister without any rational basis. 
372. In re O'Malley's Estate, 370 Pa. 281, 285, 88 A.2d 69, 72 (1952); In re 
Olshefski's Estate, 337 Pa. 420, 422, 11 A.2d 487, 488 (1940); In re Lawrence Estate, 
286 Pa. 58,64, 132 A. 786, 789 (1926). 
373. 147 Pa. Super. at 136, 23 A.2d at 358. 
374. 196 Va. 300, 83 S.E.2d 446 (1954). 
375. Id. at 301, 83 S.E.2d at 447. 
376. Id. at 301, 83 S.E.2d at 447-48. 
377. Id. at 303, 83 S.E.2d at 448. 
378. Id. at 302, 83 S.E.2d at 448. 
379. Id. at 308-10, 83 S.E.2d at 451-52. 
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buttable presumption of continuing insanity.380 It also agreed that 
the presumption could be overcome by clear and convincing evi­
dence of Glassett's capacity.381 The court felt that no person had 
given testimony about the actual execution of the will or the state 
of the testator's mind on that day. It therefore found that the prop­
onent of the 1942 will failed to carry its burden of proof.382 This is 
consistent with the general Virginia rule that the burden of proof 
on capacity always rests with the proponent. 
The preceding illustration demonstrates how the legal notions 
of burden of proof and presumption can be used to lead to a result 
the court finds acceptable. In Duncan, the insane testator left his 
property to friends. In Winninger, the testator, also legally insane, 
left his estate to a state institution in which he was confined. In 
both cases, the court did not want to resolve the hard issue of 
whether or not a psychotic could lawfully make an enforceable will. 
Instead, the court took refuge in the usual thicket of conflicting 
presumptions and in the burden of proof to justify its result. 
VI. CONCLUSION: A MODEST PROPOSAL 

To LIMIT TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM 

So far, this article has attempted to demonstrate the ineffec­
tiveness of the traditional Greenwood-Baker rules for testamentary 
capacity, and the way in which the Dew v. Clark rule about insane 
delusions no longer satisfactorily handles the problem of the 
psychotic testator. All the evidence to date indicates that in close 
cases which reach the level of appellate review, the proponents of 
contested wills win much more frequently than the law of averages 
would indicate should be the result. 383 In short, a vast number of 
380. [d. at 311, 83 S.E.2d at 452-53. 
381. [d. at 312, 83 S.E.2d at 453. 
382. [d. at 315, 83 S.E.2d at 454. 
383. If one assumes that in a very large group of decisions, such as the appel­
late will contests analyzed for the purposes of this study, a totally dichotomous 
choice was at issue (win/lose), then the probabilities of the result coming out either 
way are equivalent to the probabilities of both win and lose added together, or 
50-50. For a treatment of the "coin toss" theory of probability, see T. ANDERSON & S. 
SCLOVE, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 218-27 (1974). The inference drawn 
from empirical analysis is that the structure and attitude of our judicial decision­
making process somehow operates to make the results in appella'te will contest deci­
sions different than the law of probabilities would suggest. There are several possi­
ble explanations for this difference. First, appellate cases are often taken up for rea­
sons other than success on the merits; i.e., as a bargaining point for negotiating 
a favorable settlement. Second, there are the factors of precedent and social policy 
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wills which ought not to have been probated were in fact admitted 
to probate, due to the evolutionary advance of scientific and medi­
cal knowledge without a corresponding advance in the evolution of 
the test for testamentary capacity. 
The limitations of capacity, due execution, lack of undue influ­
ence, and fraud are the only limitations on testamentary freedom in 
the Anglo-American legal system. Unlike the continental countries, 
our system does not have a forced heirship provision beyond the 
pittances allowed surviving spouses and children who are depen­
dent. The sole limitations on freedom of testation are those of tes­
tamentary capacity, insane delusion, undue influence, or fraud. 384 
The kind of freedom which these principles include is the kind of 
freedom which the con tractarians used to construct their model for 
political society. If man is prior to any social group, then the social 
group, through a fictitious agreement of the group to establish 
common regulations, can reach only the harmful external aspects of 
the individual's activities. 385 This type of freedom also presupposes 
conscious selection of pleasurable results and conscious rejection of 
painful results, according to the utilitarian principles of psychology 
formulated by Jeremy Bentham. As a result, testamentary freedom 
as a legal principle of decision making disregards the existence of 
operating in individual cases which may lead to a favoring of one side or another. 
There is no known way to precisely determine all of the factors which contribute to 
the results reached in any given case. However, when dealing with a vast number of 
individual cases, it is fair to say that the general laws of probability ought to apply. 
Empirical analysis of appellate will contest cases demonstrates that the decision­
making process does not obey general probability theory for a simple dichotomous 
choice. This clearly indicates a systematic structuring of the decision-making process 
in this area which directly influences the results obtained. See generally Appendix, 
Tables I-VIII. 
384. See, e.g., Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 198, 108 N.W. 627, 628 
(1906), which is the principle exponent of this view. See also Haskell, The Power of 
Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 CEO. L.J. 499 (1964); Touster, Testamentary 
Freedom and Social Control, After-Born Children, 6 BUFFALO L. REV. 251 (1957). 
A vitriolic restatement of testamentary freedom appears in In re Heller's Estate, 
223 Iowa 1356, 11 N.W.2d 586 (1943). 
The right of an individual to dispose of his property as he sees fit, even 
though he makes what others might think was an unequal or unjust disposi­
tion or give nothing to some or all of those who are regarded as naturally 
entitled to his bounty, is nevertheless a sacred right with which the courts 
must not interfere when it appears that he knew what he was doing. There 
is no such thing as a legal right in any relative, other that the surviving 
spouse of the testator, to the latter's bounty. Standing alone, the deprivation 
of that bounty cannot destroy a will. 
Id. at 1365, 11 N.W.2d at 591. 
385. See text accompanying notes 34 and 35 supra. 
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unconscious motivation, although, as noted previously, Freud an­
alyzed and described the unconscious more than seventy-five years 
ago. 386 Testamentary freedom also relegates perception to secon­
dary status, placing it in subordination to the absolute, uncontin­
gent exercise of choice, although choice is as much conditioned by 
perception as any other human endeavor. Finally, testamentary 
freedom, because it posits an individual with appropriation rights 
who is prior to social control, rejects any social limitation on the 
vertical and horizontal extension of one's personality through prop­
erty. In short, testamentary freedom stands for an asocial im­
plementation of one's personality by appropriation and other means 
as opposed to a socially meaningful participation by use of prop­
erty. As an ultimate ratio decidendi, the principle of testamentary 
freedom is unacceptable. 
Testamentary freedom also goes beyond the limits of indi­
vidual psychological analysis. As a principle of law, it is both a 
sociological and a political statement about the relationship of an 
individual to his or her family and to his or her society. In its 
present form, the principle of testamentary freedom imposes no 
restriction on a person's post-death disposition unless that person is 
adjudicated to lack capacity or to be under the influence of either 
undue influence or an insane delusion. The common law has 
shaped a modest limitation on giving to charities and reserved 
some of a person's estate for his or her spouse. But overall, tes­
tamentary freedom is a doctrine of irresponsibility, protected by a 
cloud of technical legal rationalizations. In its present form, tes­
tamentary freedom invites judges to support the judgment of tes­
tators who ignore the claims of family and society with respect to 
their property. It also has a double-barreled social impact. On one 
hand, as an instrument of the very rich, the principle of testamen­
tary freedom permits dynastic concentration of wealth by allowing 
the very rich to agglomerate their holdings through dynastic post­
death transfers, whether or not the dynastic concentration of 
wealth is in fact socially justifiable. Second, in the hands of the 
middle class, testamentary freedom becomes a tool by which 
wealth may be diffused to such an extent that familial economic 
support and sustenance is threatened. In both cases, dead persons 
are permitted to control the actions of living persons through 
post-death transfers, on the wholly indefensible theory of unfet­
386. See text following note 92 supra. 
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tered freedom of post-death dispositions. Testamentary freedom 
also contradicts the political statements made by the canons of de­
scent by permitting and supporting variances from the system of 
post-death transfer which has been approved by the legislature. 
Finally, testamentary freedom is regularly used to defend socially 
unacceptable post-death transfers. It is the vehicle used to disin­
herit wives and children as punishment for fancied wrongs, or in an 
attempt to control persons' lives after death. 387 
The common expectation of most men and women is essen­
tially that of the medieval moral theologian: a person should dis­
tribute most of his or her property at death among his or her fam­
ily. This expectation is part of the continental legal system of 
legitimate heirship which prevents disinheritance of one's family. 
In this nation,. Louisiana has retained legitimate heirship and the 
principle of collation at death by which lifetime distribution to 
legitimate heirs is treated in a manner similar to common law "ad­
vancement" principles. 388 These two principles tend to limit tes­
tamentary freedom to prevent the type of disinheriting will which 
produces most reported will contest cases. Consequently, the first 
limitation on testamentary freedom which seems to be inherent in 
the way social life organized itself is the legitimate limitation: a 
testator should not be permitted to disinherit his wife, children, 
grandchildren, parents, and perhaps even his brothers and sisters. 
The principles of testamentary capacity do a very inefficient job of 
providing this outside limit to testamentary freedom. 
Second, the legal rationalizing of testamentary freedom and its 
corresponding limitations has been embedded in 18th century 
philosophical and psychological notions, such that medical and 
psychological advances have not been received with due respect 
since 1830 or so. If there is such a thing as testamentary freedom, 
at least as to the portion of one's property not predestined for one's 
legitimate heirs, then it should be limited by relevant, known limi­
tations on recall, motivation, and the perception of reality. In other 
words, the Greenwood-Baker test for testamentary capacity and the 
insane delusion rule should be restructured in terms of the present 
state of behavioral science. 
387. See Appendix, Tables II, III, and IV for empirical evaluation of a long­
term trend in appellate decisions. 
388. See, e.g., LA. ClV. CODE ANN. arts. 1493, 1618, 1620, 1621 (West 1967) 
(pertaining to legitimate heirship); id. at arts. 2402-2406 (relating to community 
property); id. at arts. 1227-1280 (relating to collation). 
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A plausible restructuring of the law of testamentary capacity 
might take the following form. 
(1) A person may make an instrument which effectuates a 
post-death distribution of his property if he or she is not organically 
or functionally psychotic. 
(2) Any person who claims that a post-death distribution made 
by a decedent is invalid under (1) above must show to a court that, 
during the process of planning and execution of all dispositive in­
struments, the decedent was psychotic. Psychosis may be estab­
lished by testimony of one or more psychiatrists, who need not be 
the attending physician of the decedent. In considering the mental 
condition of the decedent, the psychiatrist may examine and review 
the acts and conduct of the decedent during the relevant time 
period, any former dispositive instruments made by the decedent, 
medical and psychological reports relative to the decedent's condi­
tion, and the eyewitness testimony of those persons who had a rea­
sonable opportunity to observe the decedent's conduct during the 
relevant period. Psychosis may not be established without one or 
more psychiatric reviews of the decedent's mental condition during 
the relevant period. 
(3) If a decedent is not organically or functionally psychotic, 
his or her post-death plan may be set aside by a court if the court 
finds that the decedent did not comprehend the· principle disposi­
tive portions of his post-death plan. This lack of comprehension 
may result from the testator's inability to read the final reduction of 
his or her plan to writing, or have it read or explained to him or 
her, due to some impairment of sight or hearing, or brain damage 
resulting in a "scrambling" of cognitive symbols, or inability to 
understand the language in which the final disposition is written 
when no corresponding interpreter's version of the final dispositive 
program was made available to the decedent during the relevant 
time. 
(4) The principl~ stated in (1) above is further limited by the 
following consideration: 
(a) No decedent may make a post-death disposition of more 
than one-third of the value of his assets at death, ifhe is survived by: 
(i) a spouse; 
(ii) one or more children; 
(iii) one or more parents; 
(iv) one or more grandchildren; or 
(v) one or more brothers or sisters. 
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(b) For purposes of this principle, assets at death will include 
any distribution of assets to any of the persons listed in (a) (i) 
through (v) above made by the decedent by living gift. Such in­
ter vivos distributions will be set off from the share provided by law 
for the classes of persons listed in (i) through (v). 
(c) The persons listed in (a) (i) through (v) will take the two­
thirds of the decedent's assets at death in accordance with the 
principles of law relating to interstate succession. 
Naturally enough, this schema is likely to be argued over and 
attacked piecemeal. Such attack, like most rhetorical devices, 
clearly misses the mark. The author concedes that his schematic 
may be in part less desirable than some other person's schema, and 
may lead to unresolved problems which can be posed hypotheti­
cally. The broad basis for the schema, however, rests upon recogni­
tion of the inadequacy of the Greenwood-Baker rule and the Dew 
v. Clark rule. It also rests upon the empirical survey of appellate 
decisions which shows the proponents of wills winning a far greater 
percentage of the time than would be called for by the law of 
chance events. Finally, it rests upon a fundamental quarrel with 
the abstract principle of testamentary freedom as a justification for 
disinheriting wills. In order to respond to this schema, one must 
respond to these principles and defend them. 
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ApPENDIX 
A. Description of Basic Method~logy 
This appendix contains a statistical analysis of American will contest 
cases. It was designed to explore the type of testators that make wills 
which are contested, the kinds of dispositions made by these testators, 
and the comparative results in appellate decisions for each type of will 
and testator. This introduction will explain how the survey was compiled 
and will suggest its shortfalls and its utility. 
The author attempted to find every reported appellate decision relat­
ing to testamentary capacity since 1885, the inception of the National Re­
porter System. Also added to this base were Northwest Reporter cases 
decided since 1881, and New York will contest decisions since 1780. The 
base was ranked according to state and according to outcome on appeal. 
Eventually, the New York cases were discarded from the base in order to 
maintain uniformity. The author examined and recorded all will contest 
cases decided by appellate courts since 1886, whether or not these deci­
sions were confined to testamentary capacity alone. The data base became 
1209 appellate decisions spanning ninety-two years. 
1. 	 State Ranking According to Number of Contests 
The fifty states and the District of Columbia were ranked according 
to the number of reported appellate will contest decisions occurring in 
that jurisdiction over the time span of the survey. They were also ranked 
in accordance with the number of decisions for the proponent and for the 
contestant. Data from the United States census of population for 1970 was 
examined to determine if any correlation might exist between will con­
tests, population, and geographic characteristics. In addition, the fifty 
states were ranked according to the frequency of reported will contest 
decisions to determine how often appellate courts in each jurisdiction 
passed on will contests. 
2. 	 Contests Ranked by Type of Testator 
The reported decisions were ranked according to a classification of 
the type of testator making the will. The classification used was gener­
ated by the author. The cases were broken down into testators adjudi­
cated insane, testators under guardianship, testators under the influence 
of drugs, testators with other organic impairment, testators with functional 
impairment, and unknown. The large number of cases reported in the 
"unknown" classification is accounted for by the great number of per 
curiam opinions that recited no facts of the case, and the many appellate 
decisions that recited a laundry list of legal principles and stated only that 
the court had examined the record and found the trial court judgment to 
be supported by the evidence, without reciting any of the evidence itself. 
This ranking was done to determine what kind of testators had the most 
difficulty having their wills probated. 
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3. 	 Contests Ranked by Type of Will 
The reported decisions were also ranked by the kind of will left by 
the testator. This classification was based on the dispositive scheme em­
ployed in the will. Wills were broken down into those which disinherited 
a spouse in favor of collateral relatives, those which disinherited a spouse 
in favor of children, those which disinherited a child in favor of other 
children, those which disinherited children in favor of a spouse, those 
which disinherited children in favor of collaterals, those which disinher­
ited a spouse, lineal descendants, or collateral heirs in favor of a stranger 
to the family or a charity, and unknown types. Again, the vast number of 
unknown cases arises from the type of reporting described in (2) above. 
The kind of will was not reported in the majority of appellate decisions. 
4. 	 Contests Analyzed by Combination of 
Testator Type and Will Type 
Finally, the 1209 reported appellate decisions were compared accord­
ing to the combination of eight testator types and nine will types to dis­
cover if any patterns were detectible. The results appear to indicate defi­
nite patterns may exist between the type of testator and type of will most 
often invalidated in appellate will contest decisions. 
B. Tables 
The data in Table I are divided into three parts; total number of deci­
sions by state, decisions decided for the proponent by state, and decisions 
decided for the contestant by state. Each of these parts is further divided 
into raw number of cases by state, percentage of total cases by state, and 
rank of the total number of cases for each state in comparison to the total 
number of states. 
The top five states in terms of sheer number of will contest decisions 
are Illinois, California, Texas, New York, and Georgia. The states with the 
fewest cases decided are the District of Columbia, Wyoming, Nevada, 
Alaska, and Hawaii. The number of will contests decided appears to be a 
function of population; the more populous the state, the more likely it is 
to have a large number of appealed will contests. The less populated the 
state, the more likely it is to have fewer such contests. There are, how­
ever, some notable exceptions to this general rule. Georgia is ranked fifth 
in number of decisions but is not a state with a large population. Ohio, a 
highly populated state, is forty-first in number of cases. 
Of the five states with the largest total number of will contest deci­
sions, three, California, Texas, and Georgia, can be considered to be 
"sunbelt" jurisdictiqns which, as retirement havens, attract an inordinate 
number of persons over the age of Sixty-five. Only one of the five, Illinois, 
lays the burden of proof of testamentary capacity on the proponent. 
Eight hundred and seventy-nine cases were decided in favor of the 
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proponent of the will; 330 were decided in favor of the contestant. The 
top five states in terms of decisions for the proponent are again Illinois, 
California, New York, Texas, and Georgia. The states with the fewest de­
cisions for the proponent are the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, 
New Mexico, and Nevada. These states are also among those having the 
fewest number of total decisions. 
From the above two comparisons, it can be seen that there is a direct 
correlation between the total number of decisions and the number de­
cided for the proponent. States with the largest total number of decisions 
also have the most cases decided for the proponent; states with the fewest 
number of total decisions have the fewest number decided for the propo­
nent. 
The correlation between total number of decisions and the number 
decided for the contestants is more tenuous. States with the largest 
number of total decisions, Texas, Illinois, California, and New York, do 
have the most cases decided for the contestant, with Kentucky replacing 
Georgia in the fifth spot. But when one looks at the other end of the 
scale, it is surprising to see that Ohio and Utah are among those states 
with the fewest decisions for the contestant. Also, more than half of the 
states (thirty-one) have five or fewer cases decided for the contestant, in­
dicating that the contestant has a smaller chance of success on the whole 
than does the proponent. This conclusion is further substantiated by the 
statistics of Table II. 
Most states were ranked in approximately the same position by total 
number of decisions and by number of decisions for the proponent. How­
ever, Alabama and Indiana were ranked much lower on proponent deci­
sions than on total decisions, while Alaska was ranked much higher. 
There is a wider divergence in rankings between total number of 
decisions and decisions for the contestant in each state. Four states, 
Maine, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Oregon, rank much lower on number 
of contestant decisions than on total number of decisions. Seven states, 
Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina, 
and Virginia, rank much higher. These figures indicate that the number of 
decisions in favor of the contestants is not proportionate to the total 
number of decisions. 
Table II plots forty-six of the reporting jurisdictions included in the 
survey. Only five states have more cases decided for the contestant than 
for the proponent, and these have relatively few total cases. Forty states 
have a majority of cases decided for the proponent, and these states con­
tain the overwhelming majority of the total number of cases. Again, the 
conclusion can be drawn that the proponent is far more likely to win in an 
appellate will contest than is the contestant. 
Most of the states which assign burden of proof on capacity to the 
proponent have a proponent win record below the national median and 
mean. Illinois is a significant exception to these comments, since its winl 
CItNATIONAL SURVEY 1885-1977 to 
"'" TABLE I 

Ranking Of States By Total Number Of Appellate Will Contest Decisions-Number And Percentage Of Total Decisions For 

Proponent And Contestant-Correlation To Percentage Of Total Population Over Age Sixty-Five. 

State Rank By Total Number Of Decisions Percent Of Decisions State Population Over 65 
Number Of Decisions % Of % Of
TA pn CC T" P" CF NutnberG StateR National' 
1. Illinois llO 83 27 9.1 9.4 8.2 1,153,000 10.3 5.1 ~ 
en2. California 82 62 20 6.8 7.1 6.1 2,056,000 11.3 9.2 '"l 
3. Texas 70 40 30 5.8 4.6 9.1 1,158,000 9.5 5.1 t>l :;x, 
4. New York 63 46 17 5.2 5.2 5.2 2,030,000 11.2 9.1 ~ 
5. Georgia 49 36 13 4.1 4.1 3.9 430,000 8.7 1.9 ~ 
6. Kentucky 48 32 16 4.0 3.6 4.8 368,000 10.8 1.6 t>l ~ 7. Pennsylvania 44 34 10 3.6 3.9 3.0 1,377,000 11.6 6.1 t>l
8. Missouri 43 34 9 3.6 3.9 2.7 601,000 11.5 2.7 <: 
9. Arkansas 40 34 6 3.3 3.9 1.8 271,000 12.8 1.2 "s:10. Louisiana 40 32 8 3.3 3.6 2.4 346,000 9.1 1.5 
11. Oklahoma 39 34 5 3.2 3.9 1.5 334,000 12.3 1.5 tl 
~ 
12. Iowa :37 28 9 3.1 3.2 2.7 364,000 12.7 1.6 s:13. New Jersey 35 33 2 2.9 3.8 0.6 767,000 10.5 3.4 
~ 14. Michigan 35 27 8 2.9 3.1 2.4 815,000 8.9 2.1 :;x,
15. Florida 34 24 10 2.8 2.7 3.0 1,347,000 16.1 6.0 t>l 
16. Nebraska 3:3 25 8 2.7 2.8 2.4 194,000 12.6 0.8 <:-t>l17. Oregon 29 25 4 2.4 2.8 1.2 257,000 11.3 1.2 ~ 
18. Massachusetts 27 17 10 2.2 1.9 3.0 672,000 11.5 3.0 
19. Alabama 26 17 9 2.2 1.9 2.7 378,000 10.4 1.7 
20. 'Vashington 23 16 7 1.9 1.8 2.1 365,000 10.3 1.6 
21. 'Visconsin 2:3 18 5 loB 2.0 1.5 512,000 ILl 2.3 
22. Maryland 22 19 3 1.8 2.2 0.9 340,000 8.3 1.5 
23. Kansas 19 15 4 1.6 1.7 1.2 285,000 12.6 1.3 <' 
24. Mississippi H) 14 5 1.6 1.6 1.5 253,000 10.8 1.1 ~ ....2.5. North Carolina 18 8 10 1.5 0.9 3.0 492,000 9.0 2.2 ;,:.. 





27. Minnesota 13 10 3 1.1 1.1 0.9 140,000 11.2 2.0 
28. Indiana 13 4 9 1.1 0.5 2.7 531,000 10.0 2.4 
29. Arizona 12 8 4 1.0 0.9 1.2 223,000 10.0 1.0 
30. Montana 11 6 5 0.9 0.7 1.5 75,000 10.0 0.3 
31. Delawarc 11 7 4 0.9 0.8 1.2 50,000 8.7 0.2 

~)2. Maine 10 8 2 0.8 OJ) 0.6 125,000 10.8 0.6 

33. South Carolina 10 7 3 0.8 0.8 0.9 229,000 8.1 1.0 
34. Tennessee 10 7 3 0.8 0.8 0.9 441,000 10.5 2.0 
:3.5. South Dakota I) 6 3 0.7 0.7 0.9 85,000 12.5 0.4 '"'l 
:36. Virginia I) 4 5 0.7 0.5 1.5 424,000 8.5 1.9 t'l en 
37. Idaho 9 4 5 0.7 0.5 1.5 79,000 9.6 0.4 ~ 
38. Rhode Island 8 4 4 0.7 0.5 1.2 113,000 12.2 0.5 ~ 
:39. Utah 8 7 1 0.7 0.8 0.3 91,000 7.5 0.4 t'l <-!
40. Connecticut 8 5 3 0.7 0.6 0.9 321,000 10.4 1.4 ~ 41. Ohio 7 6 1 0.6 0.7 0.3 1,066,000 9.9 4.8 ::>::I 
4" New Hampshire 5 5 0 0.4 0.6 0.0 87,000 10.7 0.4 "< ~. 
C"l43. New Mexico 5 1 4 0.4 0.1 1.2 90,000 7.9 0.4 :.­
44. Vcrmont 5 3 2 0.4 0.3 0.6 52,000 11.0 0.2 ~ 
45. West Virginia 5 4 1 0.4 0.5 0.3 211,000 11.7 0.9 C"l 
46. North Dakota 5 3 2 0.4 0.3 0.6 73,000 11.5 0.3 ­~ 
47. Dist. of Columbia 4 2 2 0.3 0.2 0.6 71,000 10.0 0.3 
48. Wyoming 3 3 0 0.2 0.3 0.0 33,000 9.0 0.1 
49. Nevada 2 2 0 0.2 0.2 0.0 44,000 7.5 0.2 
50. Alaska 2 1 1 0.2 0.1 0.3 9,000 2.4 0.0 
51. Hawaii 1 1 0 0.1 0.1 0.0 57,000 6.6 0.3 
TOTAL 1209 879 330 100.1 100.0 99.9 22,400,000 10.5% 101.8% 
A Total decisions in state. .' Percentage of total decisions for contestant. 
B Total for proponent. G Total state population over 65 in 1975. 
C Total for contestant. H Percentage of total state population over 65 in 1975. 
D State percentage of total decisions. I State's percentage of total national population over 65 in 1975. 
.. Percentage of total decisions for proponent. til 
t'l 
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TABLE II 

Ranking Of States By Outcome Of Appellate Will Contest Decisions-Number 

And Percentage Of State Decisions For Proponent And Contestant 

State Rank By Percentage 
For The Proponent Decisions For Proponent Decisions For Contestant 
(most to least) Number PercentO Number Percent° 
1. New Hampshire 5 100.0 0 0.0 
2. New Jersey 33 94.2 2 5.7 
3. Maine 9 90.0 1 10.0 
4. Utah 7 87.5 1 12.5 
5. Oklahoma 34 87.2 5 12.8 
6. Maryland 19 86.4 3 13.6 
7. Oregon 25 86.2 4 13.8 
8. Ohio 6 85.7 1 14.3 
9. Arkansas 34 85.0 6 15.0 
10. Louisiana 32 80.0 8 20.0 
11. West Virginia 4 80.0 1 20.0 
12. Missouri 34 79.1 9 20.9 
13. Kansas 15 78.9 4 21.1 
14. Wisconsin 18 78.3 5 21.7 
15. Pennsylvania 34 77.3 10 22.7 
It!. Michigan 27 77.1 8 22.9 
17. Minnesota 10 76.9 3 23.1 
18. Nebraska 25 75.8 8 24.2 
19. Iowa 28 75.7 9 24.3 
20. California 62 75.6 20 24.4 
21. Illinois 83 75.5 27 24.5 
22. Mississippi 14 73.7 5 26.3 
23. Georgia 36 73.5 13 26.5 
24. New York 46 73.0 17 27.0 
25. Florida 24 70.6 10 29.4 
26. South Carolina 7 ·70.0 3 30.0 
27. Tennessee 7 70.0 3 30.0 
28. Washington 16 69.6 7 30.4 
29. Arizona 8 66.7 4 33.3 
30. Kentucky 32 66.7 16 33.3 
31. South Dakota 6 66.7 3 33.3 
32. Alabama 17 65.4 9 34.6 
33. Delaware 7 63.6 4 36.4 
34. Massachusetts 17 63.0 10 37.0 
35. Connecticut 5 62.5 3 37.5 
36. Vermont 3 60.0 2 40.0 
37. North Dakota 3 60.0 2 40.0 
38. Texas 40 57.1 30 42.9 
39. Colorado 9 56.3 7 43.7 
40. Montana 6 54.5 5 45.5 
41. Rhode Island 4 50.0 4 50.0 
42. North Carolina 8 44.4 10 55.5 
43. Idaho 4 44.4 5 55.5 
44. Virginia 4 44.4 5 55.5 
45. Indiana 4 30.8 9 69.2 
46. New Mexico 1 20.0 4 80.0 
National Median 9 72.1 5 27.9 
National Mean 17 72.5 7 27.4 
States with fewer than five cases (Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Nevada, and Wyoming) 
have been excluded because percentages based on so few cases are probably not predictive of 
future outcome in those states. 
o Percentage of total state will contests. 
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lose record is slightly higher than average. New York, a second such 
state, has about an average record and is the median case. On the other 
hand, except for the statistically uneven results in states having very few 
cases, the states which assign the burden of proof to the contestant consis­
tently exceed the national mean and median proponent win/lose records. 
Where the contestant has the burden of proof, he or she is even less 
likely to win than where the proponent has the burden of proof. New 
Jersey, for example, has a 94.2% win record for the proponents. Wiscon­
sin has a 78.3% proponent win record, while Louisiana has an 80.0% 
proponent win record. Two notable exceptions to this statement, Texas, 
with a 57.1% proponent win record, and Alabama, with a 65.4% propo­
nent win record, indicate that burden of proof rules may not be as sig­
nificant in determining the outcome as the general run of figures would 
indicate at first glance. There appears to be no correlation between geo­
graphical location and win/lose records. 
Table III clearly shows that burden of proof allocation and assignment 
make a difference in the number and percent of will contests decided for 
the proponent and for the contestant. In those states in which the burden 
of proof of capacity remains with the proponent throughout trial, contes­
tants tend to win approximately one out of every three will contests on an 
average, or about two out of five contests based on median win/lose re­
cords. "Average" here refers to the arithmetic mean. Contestants in those 
states which allocate to them the burden of proof, tend to win about one 
of four will contests on median win/lose records, and about three out of 
ten contests on the average. 
TABLE III 
Median And Average Percentage Of State Decisions For The Proponent And 
Contestant According To State Allocation Of Burden Of Proof On Capacity 
Allocation Of Burden Decisions For Proponent Decisions For Contestant 
Of Proof On Capacity Median % Average % Median % Average % 
Burden on Proponent 66.6 64.S 39.3 3S.S 
Burden on Contestant 7S.0 71.3 24.2 30.3 
Difference in Outcome 
on Appeal +8.4 +6.8 -IS.1 -S.2 
Table IV analyzes appellate decisions in will contests according to 
seven varieties of testator types, plus unknowns. Of the seven varieties, 
the largest number of decisions for the proponent (266) come from cases 
involving senile testators. The next largest number of cases for the propo­
nent involve persons with other organic problems, such as syphillis de­
mentia, Parkinson's disease, cancer, diabetes, and the like. Ten and 
eight-tenths per cent of all decisions for the proponent involve a testator 
who had a functional mental disorder. Fifty-five cases for the proponent 
involved alcoholics, fifty-five are assigned to persons who are under guard­
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ianship at the time of willmaking, each representing 6.3% of the total 
number of decisions for the proponent. 
The largest number of decisions for the contestant, 36.4% of the total 
number of decisions for the contestants, were the 120 cases involving the 
senile testator. The next largest category for the contestant was other or­
ganic problems, representing 14.6% of the total, followed by functional 
mental disorder, representing 9.7% of the total. Other decisions for the 
contestant by type of testator included 5.5% under guardianship, 3.9% 
alcoholic, 3.0% adjudicated insane, and 0.6% on drugs. 
TABLE IV 

Decisions For Proponent And Contestant By Type of Testator-Number 

And Percentage Of Total Decisions By Outcome 

Decisions For Decisions For 
Type Of Testator Proponent Contestant 
Number Percent° Number Percentt 
l. 	 Adjudicated insane 9 1.0 10 3.0 
2. 	 Under guardianship when 

will made 55 6.3 18 5.5 

3. 	 Taking drugs, or drug addict 17 1.9 2 0.6 
4. 	 Alcoholic 55 6.3 13 3.9 
5. 	 Senile 266 30.3 120 36.4 
6. 	 Other organic problems, 
including psychoses 135 15.4 48 14.6 
7. 	 Functional mental disorders 95 10.8 32 9.7 
8. Others, or unknown 247 28.1 87 26.4 
TOTAL 879 100.1 330 100.1 
o Percentage of total will contests decided in favor of proponent. 
t Percentage of total will contests decided in favor of contestant. 
Table V shows that testators adjudicated insane at the time they 
made their wills are the only kinds of testators who lose more than they 
win at the appellate level. Only senile testators have a win/lose ratio 
under 70-30 (68.9% for proponent, 31.1% for contestant), the remainder 
ranging up to a high of 89.5% of testators on drugs whose wills are sus­
tained as against 10.5% whose wills are rejected. The total rate for all 
proponents is 72.7% win and 27.3% lose. 
Table VI demonstrates that the leading kind of disinheriting will in­
volved in appellate will contests is the will in which all family members 
are disinherited in favor of some stranger or charity. The second leading 
kind is the will in which one or more children or their descendants are 
disinherited in favor of one or more children or their descendants. This is 
the same c1assifkation as the will contest between Esau and Jacob. The 
third leading kind of disinheriting will is the one which picks and chooses 
between the testator's brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, and cousins. 
Additionally, there are a large number of appellate decisions which do not 
report the type of will involved. 
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TABLE V 

Decisions For Proponent And Contestant By Type Of Testator-Number And 

Percentage Of Total Decisions For Each Testator Type 

Decisions For Decisions For Total 
Testator Type Proponent Contestant Number 
Number Percent 0 Number PercentO 
1. Adjudicated insane 9 47.4 10 52.6 19 
2. Under guardianship 55 75.3 18 24.7 73 
3. Taking drugs 17 89.5 2 10.5 19 
4. Alcoholic 	 55 80.9 13 19.1 68 
5. Senile 	 266 68.9 120 31.1 386 
6. Organic problems 135 73.8 48 26.3 183 
7. Functional disorder 95 74.8 32 25.2 127 
8. Unknown 247 74.0 87 26.0 334 
TOTAL 879 72.7 330 27.3 1209 
o Percentage of total will contests for that testator type. 
TABLE VI 

Decisions For Proponent And Contestant By Type Of Will-Number And 

Percentage Of Total Decisions By Outcome 

Type of Will 	 Decisions For Decisions For 
By Outcome 	 Proponent Contestant 
Number Percent O Number Percent~ 
A. 	 Spouse disinherited in favor of 
children of same or earlier mar­
riage, or their descendants 17 1.9 2 0.6 
B. 	 Spouse disinherited in favor of 
ascendants or collaterals 6 0.6 2 0.6 
C. 	 One or more children disinher­
ited in favor of one or more chil­
dren or their descendants 179 10.4 48 14.5 
D. 	 One or more children disinher­
ited in favor of spouse 48 5.5 14 4.2 
E. 	 One or more children disinher­
ited in favor of ascendants or 
collaterals 31 3.5 24 7.3 
F. 	 One or more ascendants or col-
laterals disinherited in favor of 
one or more ascendants or col-
laterals 146 16.6 57 17.2 
G. 	 Spouse, children, descendants, 
ascendants, or collaterals disin­
herited in favor of a stranger to 
the estate 289 32.9 91 27.5 
BE. 	Spouse and one or more children 
disinherited in favor of ascen­
dants or collaterals 3 0.3 0 0.0 
H. 	 Other or unknown 160 18.1 92 28.2 
TOTAL 	 879 99.9 330 100.0 
o Percentage of total will contests decided in favor of proponent. 
t Percentage of total will contests decided in favor of contestant. 
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Of all the kinds of wills made by testators, there are no kinds which 
are defeated by appellate courts more often than they are sustained. The 
type of will with the lowest rate of success for the proponent is one in­
volving the disinheritance of a child or children in favor of collaterals. 
This will is sustained 56.4% of the time~ and rejected 43.6% of the time. 
The next lowest rate occurs in the unknown category (63.5% sustained, 
36.5% rejected). The highest rate of proponent success is for wills in 
which the spouse is disinherited in favor of one or more of the testator's 
children (89.5% sustained, 10.5% rejected). The next highest rate is for 
the will in which one or more children are disinherited in favor of one or 
more children or descendants (78.9% sustained, 21.1% rejected). 
TABLE VII 

Decisions For Proponent And Contestant By Type Of Will-Number 

And Percentage Of Total Decisions For Each Type Of Will 

Decisions For Decisions For Total 
Will TypeA Proponent Contestant Number 
Number PercentD Number Percent 
A. 17 89.5 2 10.5 19 
B. 6 75.0 2 25.0 8 
C. 179 78.9 48 21.1 227 
D. 48 77.4 14 22.6 62 
E. 31 56.4 24 43.6 55 
F. 146 71.9 57 28.1 203 
c. 289 76.1 91 23.9 380 
BE. 3 100.0 0 0.0 3 
H. 159 63.1 93 36.1 252 
TOTAL 879 72.7 330 27.3 1209 
.. The letters in this column refer to the type of will by outcome listed in column one of Table VI. 
B Percentage of total will contests involving that type of will. 
Table VIII attempts to determine if certain combinations of testator 
types and will types are more often than not rejected by appellate courts. 
Many cases occur too infrequently to be meaningful, and anyone's guess 
about the outcome in such cases is as good as the author's. Of all wills 
made by testators under guardianship, the most likely to be sustained 
is a will disinheriting a spouse, children, descendants, ascendants, or 
collaterals in favor of a stranger. The least likely to be sustained, insofar 
as meaningful results are concerned, is a will disinheriting a child in favor 
of a spouse. Insofar as testators who are taking drugs, wills which give the 
testator's estate to a stranger appear to be sustained significantly more 
than any other type. This is probably an anomaly, although the same re­
sult appears in the category of alcoholic testators. 
The wills of senile testators are most often sustained in the case of a 
will disinheriting a spouse in favor of a child. Testators who have organic 
problems other than senility will find wills which choose between collat­
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erals more often sustained than any other variety. Functionally disturbed 
testators' wills are most often sustained between children, the so-called 
type C will. A similar result is also found among the wills of testators 
whose classification is unknown. The will generally -least likely to be sus­
tained in all classes is the will of a testator who disinherits his children in 
favor of collaterals, the so-called type E will. 
TABLE VIII 
Decisions For Proponent And Contestant By Type Of Testator And Type Of Will-Number And 
Percentage Of Total Decisions For Each Combination Of Will And Testator Type 
<1l w 
t<l 



























100.0 1 100.0 










TOTAL 0 00.0 0 
(2 ) Testators Under Guardianship 

























For Proponent 0 0 4 
For Contestant 0 00.0 0 00.0 1 
TOTAL 0 00.0 0 00.0 5 
(3) Testators Taking Drugs Or Addicted To Drugs 
Will Type" A B 
# %8 # % # 
For Proponent 1 100.0 0 1 
For Contestant 0 00.0 







































































































































































(5) Testator Senile ...... <0 
-.\ 
Will Type' A B C D E F G H ~ 
# %B # % # % # % # Of 10 # % # % # % 
For Proponent 5 83.3 1 100.0 65 78.3 17 77.3 9 45.0 51 65.4 84 70.6 34 59.6 
For Contestant 1 16.7 0 18 21.7 5 22.7 11 55.0 27 34.6 35 29.4 23 40.4 
TOTAL (j 100.0 1 100.0 83 100.0 22 100.0 20 100.0 78 100.0 119 100.0 57 100.0 
(6) Testator With Organic Disorder Other Than Senility 






















































TOTAL 3 100.0 0 00.0 40 100.0 9 100.0 9 100.0 32 100.1 61 100.0 28 100.0 E:: 
t'l 
<: 























































TOTAL 3 100.0 3 100.0 23 100.0 6 100.0 9 100.0 17 100.0 46 100.0 19 100.0 
""'l 
-< 
(8) Testator Unknown Type 
Will TypeA A B C D E F G H 
# %" # % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
For Proponent 4 100.0 2 100.0 51 85.0 15 88.2 2 33.3 34 77.3 62 75.6 76 64.4 
For Contestant 0 0 9 15.0 2 11.8 4 66.7 10 22.7 20 24.4 42 35.6 
TOTAL 4 100.0 2 100.0 60 100.0 17 100.0 (j 100.0 44 100.0 82 100.0 118 100.0 
A These leiters refer to the type of will by outcome listed in column one of Table VI. 
B Percentage of total will contests involving that combination of will and testator type. CIl 
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